War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (英語) ペーパーバック – 2017/9/18
Kindle 端末は必要ありません。無料 Kindle アプリのいずれかをダウンロードすると、スマートフォン、タブレットPCで Kindle 本をお読みいただけます。
A Foreign Affairs Best Book of 2016
Today, nations increasingly carry out geopolitical combat through economic means. Policies governing everything from trade and investment to energy and exchange rates are wielded as tools to win diplomatic allies, punish adversaries, and coerce those in between. Not so in the United States, however. America still too often reaches for the gun over the purse to advance its interests abroad. The result is a playing field sharply tilting against the United States.
“Geoeconomics, the use of economic instruments to advance foreign policy goals, has long been a staple of great-power politics. In this impressive policy manifesto, Blackwill and Harris argue that in recent decades, the United States has tended to neglect this form of statecraft, while China, Russia, and other illiberal states have increasingly employed it to Washington’s disadvantage.”
―G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs
“A readable and lucid primer…The book defines the extensive topic and opens readers’ eyes to its prevalence throughout history…[Presidential] candidates who care more about protecting American interests would be wise to heed the advice of War by Other Means and take our geoeconomic toolkit more seriously.
―Jordan Schneider, Weekly Standard
“A readable and lucid primer…The book defines the extensive topic and opens readers’ eyes to its prevalence throughout history…[Presidential] candidates who care more about protecting American interests would be wise to heed the advice of War by Other Means and take our geoeconomic toolkit more seriously.”―Jordan Schneider, Weekly Standard
“War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft is [Blackwill and Harris’s] blueprint for how the United States national security apparatus can better wield the economic tools at its disposal. It is, in military parlance, about putting the big ‘E’ in the DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic) equation back into balance with the other ways in which a great power projects power.”―Nikolas K. Gvosdev, National Interest
“Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris do policymakers a service by reminding them of the importance of geoeconomic tools. In a world increasingly affected by economic power, their analysis deserves careful consideration.”―Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, former U.S. Secretary of State
“A brilliant, comprehensive study of how economic measures have been―and should be―used to pursue geopolitical objectives. War by Other Means should be required reading for all presidential candidates and their foreign policy advisors.”―General (Ret.) David H. Petraeus, Chairman, KKR Global Institute and former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency
“The economic aspect of foreign policy will be crucial to the next president’s success. She or he will need to reckon with Blackwill and Harris’s powerful arguments.”―Lawrence H. Summers, President Emeritus and Charles W. Eliot University Professor of Harvard University and former Secretary of the Treasury
“An urgent message that other countries are using economic measures to achieve their geopolitical objectives. Absent an effective U.S. response, we will increasingly be required to rely on military force to protect our vital interests.”―John Deutch, Emeritus Institute Professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and former Deputy Secretary of Defense
“In War by Other Means, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris build a very persuasive case for why the U.S. should make much more vigorous use of its economic and financial muscle to advance its geopolitical interests. This book should be required reading for anyone involved in making foreign policy.”―Liaquat Ahamed, Pulitzer Prize–winning author of Lords of Finance
“Although this thoroughly researched book is designed more for students of international relations and policymakers than casual readers, it is worth buying. Confident about the American mission in the world, the book is a lesson about how creative thinking can promote our interests without risk to blood and treasure.”―Tom Rogan, Washington Free Beacon
“Geoeconomics, the use of economic instruments to advance foreign policy goals, has long been a staple of great-power politics. In this impressive policy manifesto, Blackwill and Harris argue that in recent decades, the United States has tended to neglect this form of statecraft, while China, Russia, and other illiberal states have increasingly employed it to Washington’s disadvantage.”―G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs
“War by Other Means is an important and interesting contribution to U.S. statecraft in the unipolar world.”―Christopher J. Fettweis, H-Net Reviews
The authors define geoeconomics (GE) as “the use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country’s geopolitical goals” (@20). GE is “both a method of analysis and a form of statecraft” (id.), but it is neither geopolitics per se, nor is it foreign economic policy.
To illustrate (examples are mine, not the book's): (1) If geopolitics is “a method of foreign policy analysis that seeks to explain, understand and predict international political behavior primarily in terms of geographical variables” (@24), then relatively speaking it emphasizes the “geo” while GE emphasizes the economics. For example, consider how you might impose more liberal human rights in another country. If you were Napoleon (to the extent his legal system tended to follow his conquests), or perhaps the US in 2003 (to take the then-prevailing narrative about the tyrant Saddam at face value), you’d use military force; whereas if you were taking a GE approach, you might use economic sanctions. (2) To see the difference between GE and foreign economic policy, contrast the case above with one where punitive economic methods, such as a “border tax,” are used not to force human rights improvements, but for coercing the renegotiation of a trade treaty like NAFTA, in order to fix trade imbalances. Use of economic instruments for economic ends isn’t GE.
The authors do acknowledge, though, that the distinctions sometimes get fuzzy, particularly between economic interests and security interests. Again, to illustrate with my own examples: Suppose the US were to repudiate NAFTA, or to impose an economic blockade on Mexico, each on the grounds of getting a “better deal” for the US; and suppose this caused the Mexican economy to collapse. Then an impoverished and angry population on our border could create national security problems, not just economic ones. Conversely, trade that helps maintain economic stability in Mexico can be helpful for improving security. And that seems to be the case: even during the 2016 US political campaign, with its incendiary accusations of criminals coming across the border from Mexico, no one was claiming that *terrorists* from Mexico were contributing to “this American carnage.”
After establishing what GE is and isn’t, the authors next discuss the main instruments of GE: trade policy, investment policy, economic and financial sanctions, cyber attacks, development aid, financial and monetary policy, and energy and commodities. The rest of the book then focuses mainly on the policies of China, Russia and the US. The gist is that China and Russia are very good at using pretty most of the instruments in the GE armory; whereas the US, while it once was proficient at GE, in recent decades has abandoned it in favor of using economic means for economic ends, and military means for geopolitical ends.
This isn’t a fast read at all — every paragraph is a dense thicket of facts. And if facts are fast becoming objects of nostalgia as I write this, that isn’t the only wistful aspect to the book: one of the authors had served as an ambassador under Secretary of State Clinton, who had appeared to be open to restoring a GE perspective to US policy. Perhaps the authors were hoping that this book would help to shape statecraft of the 21st Century Clinton White House. In any case, judging by the early weeks of the Trump Administration, the book’s lessons don’t seem yet to have fallen onto receptive ears: the past segregation of economic means for economic ends and armed means for geopolitical ones looks like it will continue for a while.
But there’s a more important respect in which this book carries resonances of the 2016 election. Usually GE measures are meant to change the behavior of the leaders of the target nation. But what about the impact on ordinary people? The authors never consider at length the effect of economic measures on the general population of the target countries. Their perspective is very aerial and lacking a human touch — exactly the sort of mandarin attitude that made it hard for people to warm up to the Clinton candidacy. While I’m agnostic about whether the Trump Administration will improve on this (especially given that some advisers, while ditching academic theory, seem to have replaced it with not just aerial but celestial visions of apocalyptic holy war), it’s easy — and a bit chilling — to see why the Clinton team had such a tough time.
A couple of minor issues: The authors call John Maynard Keynes an “early neoclassical economist” (@178), when he was neither a neoclassical, nor, if he had been, would he have been an early one. The book has extensive endnotes, but no list of references. And the title is puzzling. If it’s intended to be from Clausewitz, it’s mangled: Clausewitz wrote that war is *politics* by other means. Michel Foucault ironically inverted the formula, to the effect that politics is “war by other means.” Could this be what the authors meant? But actually, this book doesn’t adopt such a paranoid vision at all.
The authors’ personal politics notwithstanding, the book itself is even-handed and of value to a wide audience, provided readers have the patience to swim in its streams of policy prose. It certainly will have you thinking more deeply about the nightly news, and about whether there might be a better way for the US, or whatever country you live in, to conduct its foreign affairs.
Another chilling chapter details Chinese and Russian successes in cyberwarfare, and explains why the US has the most to lose in this arena.
The final section of the book outlines a program of geoeconomic policies the US could adopt to respond to our adversaries’ actions and to promote our own interests, such as passage of the TPP and steps to counteract Russian adventurism. Sadly, the prospect of these ever being implemented seems vanishingly remote after today’s events
I particularly liked the historical perspective of Geoeconomics. An excerpt:
"In return for favorable borrowing terms, the British crown under William III provided legal sanction for London credit markets and judicial enforcement of contract obligations, even obligations against the crown. By binding the crown as subject to credit obligations, British rulers succeeded in opening up new, vastly more affordable financing streams and flexibility that “in turn greatly strengthened its options in war and other forms of international competition,” Suri explains. 163 The chief lessons learned by William III and his successors are at least as relevant today."!
The practice of geoeconomic manipulation is brought to light by concrete cases. However, geoeconomics is changing the ways that states project and seek power around the globe.
That may work for less powerful countries but it will be impossible to attempt it with China.