Origins of Political Order ペーパーバック – 2012/3/27
"Ambitious and highly readable." --The New Yorker"Political theorist Francis Fukuyama's new book is a major accomplishment, likely to find its place among the works of seminal thinkers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, and modern moral philosophers and economists such as John Rawls and Amartya Sen . . .It is a perspective and a voice that can supply a thinker's tonic for our current political maladies." --Earl Pike, The Cleveland Plain Dealer "An intellectual triumph--bold in scope, sound in judgment, and rich in provocations; in short, a classic." --Ian Morris, Slate "A sweeping survey that tries to explain why human beings act as they do in the political sphere. Magisterial in its learning and admirably immodest in its ambition." --David Gress, The Wall Street Journal "In many respects, Fukuyama is an ideal guide for this enormous undertaking. He combines a deep expertise in political institutions with an impressive familiarity of world history, philosophy and social theory. An engaging writer, his prose crackles with sharp observations and illuminating comparisons, and the book marshals a breathtaking array of stimulating facts and provocative generalizations. Who knew, for instance, that the tsetse fly retarded the spread of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa? Simply as a compendium of fascinating minutiae and social science theory, the book offers a treasure trove to the casual student of political history. More important, Fukuyama's book can help us appreciate why so many countries fail to combine the strong institutions, rule of law and accountability that are the hallmark of peaceful and prosperous nations." --Eric Oliver, San Francisco Chronicle "Fukuyama's intellectual instincts hard-wire him into the most geopolitically strategic--not to mention dangerous--corners of the world....[He] is arguably the world's bestselling contemporary political scientist... His new book, The Origins of Political Order, which hits bookstores this week, seeks to understand how human beings transcended tribal affiliations and organized themselves into political societies... His books have taken on not only politics and philosophy, but also biotechnology and that tinderbox of an idea: human nature. 'He's incredibly intellectually honest, ' says Walter Russell Mead, a historian of American foreign policy. 'He goes where his head takes him. His first duty is to the truth as he sees it.'" --Andrew Bast, Newsweek "The history profession is today dominated by small minds studying small topics. Specialists trade in abstractions, taking refuge in tiny foxholes of arcane knowledge. It was not always this way. In the 19th century, men like Leopold von Ranke, George Macaulay Trevelyan and Frederick Jackson Turner used the past to try to understand the present. Their ideas were big, and sometimes too were their mistakes. Francis Fukuyama is at heart a Victorian. As he admits, he wants to revive a 'lost tradition' when historians were big thinkers. In The Origins of Political Order, his topic is the world, his starting point the chimpanzee. He charts how states evolved, in the process explaining why, despite humans' common origin in Africa perhaps 50,000 years ago, great political diversity exists today...[It is] impressive to see such a huge and complicated topic covered in such an accessible and engaging fashion....The Origins of Political Order tries to make sense of the complexity that has cluttered the last two decades. It is a bold book, probably too bold for the specialists who take refuge in tiny topics and fear big ideas. But Fukuyama deserves congratulation for thinking big and not worrying about making mistakes. This is a book that will be remembered, like those of Ranke, Trevelyan and Turner. Bring on volume II." --Gerard DeGrott, The Washington Post "The Origins of Political Order begins in prehumen times and concludes on the eve of the American and French Revolutions. Along the way, Fukuyama mines the fields of anthropology, archaeology, biology, evolutionary psychology, economics, and, of course, political science and international relations to establish a framework for understanding the evolution of political institutions. And that's just Volume One....At the center of the project is a fundamental question: Why do some states succeed while others collapse?" --Evan Goldstein, The Chronicle of Higher Education "The evolving tension between private and public animates this magisterial history of the state....Fukuyama writes a crystalline prose that balances engaging erudition with incisive analysis. As germane to the turmoil in Afghanistan as it is to today's congressional battles, this is that rare work of history with up-to-the-minute relevance." --Publishers Weekly (starred, and a Top 10 Politics Pick for the Spring Preview) "Ambitious, erudite and eloquent, this book is undeniably a major achievement by one of the leading public intellectuals of our time." --Michael Lind, The New York Times Book Review "Stimulating. . . With impressive erudition, the author travels across China, India, the Islamic world and different regions of Europe looking for the main components of good political order and at how and why these emerged (or failed to) in each place. . . Mr. Fukuyama is still the big-picture man who gave us The End of History, but he has an unerring eye for illuminating detail. Books on political theory are not often page-turners; this one is." --The Economist "This exceptional book should be in every library." --David Keymer, Library Journal "Human social behavior has an evolutionary basis. This was the thesis in Edward O. Wilson's book Sociobiology that has caused such a stir . . . In The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama of Stanford University presents a sweeping new overview of human social structures throughout history, taking over from where Dr. Wilson's ambitious synthesis left off. . . Previous attempts to write grand analyses of human development have tended to focus on a single causal explanation, like economics or warfare, or, as with Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel, on geography. Dr. Fukuyama's is unusual in that he considers several factors, including warfare, religion, and in particular human social behaviors like favoring kin. . . 'You have to be bowled over by the extraordinary breath of approach, ' said Arthur Melzer, a political scientist at Michigan State University who invited Dr. Fukuyama to give lectures on the book. 'It's definitely a magnum opus.'" --Nicholas Wade, The New York Times "Sweeping, provocative big picture-study of humankind's political impulses. . . Endlessly interesting -- reminiscent in turns of Oswald Spengler, Stanislaw Andreski and Samuel Huntington, though less pessimistic and much better written." --Kirkus Reviews "Political theorist Fukuyama presents nothing less than a unified theory of state formation, a comparative study of how tribally organized societies in various parts of the world and various moments of history have transformed into societies with political systems and institutions and, in some cases, political accountability. . . This wide-ranging and frequently provocative work also carries the mantel of the great nineteenth-century socioloists." --Brendan Driscoll, Booklist
Francis Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. He has previously taught at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University and at the George Mason University School of Public Policy. He was a researcher at the RAND Corporation and served as the deputy director in the State Department's policy planning staff. He is the author of The End of History and the Last Man, Trust, and America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy. He lives with his wife in California.
- 出版社 : FSG Adult; Reprint版 (2012/3/27)
- 発売日 : 2012/3/27
- 言語 : 英語
- ペーパーバック : 606ページ
- ISBN-10 : 0374533229
- ISBN-13 : 978-0374533229
- 寸法 : 13.89 x 4.29 x 21.06 cm
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: - 85,854位洋書 (の売れ筋ランキングを見る洋書)
第四部は責任ある政府。欧州に見る社会集団の権力バランスによって異なる国家の発展過程。弱い専制国家（フランス、スペイン）、強い専制国家（ロシア）、 失敗した寡頭国家（ハンガリー、ポーランド）、責任ある政府（英国、デンマーク）。社会資本の欠如、 不公平な税制はエリートを起業活動よりもレント・シーキングに奔らせる。農奴の自由への道を開いた西欧の自由な自治区（町）。名誉革命の後、外敵からの国難を乗り越える為に増税を可能にした市民参加型の英国。
I hope you find my review helpful.
It is this question that Fukuyama seeks to answer in 'The Origins of Political Order'. He, I think rightly, determines that a modern liberal democracy requires three components: the rule of law, democratic accountability and a strong state. The last one might surprise some as many think of liberalism as being in opposition to the state, and of authoritarianism as being the result of an over mighty state. However, Fukuyama posits that the strong and impartial state is required to provide justice prevent governance from descending into corruption and what Fukuyama calls 'patrimonialism' i.e. a personal, rather than institutional, basis of political power. All social science has to be grounded in a biological foundation, and (laudably) Fukuyama supports his idea of patrimonialism with the biological concepts of kin selection and reciprocal altruism in human relationships i.e. the fact that we prefer people who are related to us and nice to us, family and friends. This may work perfectly well for hunter-gathers, but can cause problem when we are expected to treat everyone equally when acting as part of a wider institutional framework. Fukuyama identifies China, with it's system of mandarin bureaucracy as the first impersonal state in this respect.
Secondly, Fukuyama examines where the first rule of law originated, emphasising that while some states saw impartial justice as an obstacle, others saw it as a service they could provide to legitimate themselves, the English monarchy for example. He also stresses the role of religion, easy to overlook in our increasingly secular age, as being either subservient to the state (caesaropapist) or independent of it. An independent and powerful religious order can act as a provider and adjudicator of law separate from the state, creating a rule of law. What was so interesting about this is the historical contingencies that led to the Catholic Church to become an independent corporate body, while the Orthodox Church did not. How different history might be if the opposite had happened?
Lastly, the origins of democratic accountability and examined. Fukuyama stresses that are the different forms of unaccountable government: some where the state is dominated by elites who prevent the diffusion of political power that accountability brings, such is in Hungary, and to an extent absolutist France and Spain. Unaccountable government can also take the perhaps more familiar form of a state dominating the entirety of society, such as in Tsarist Russia and Ancient China, which purged their elites throughout their respective histories.
Finally, in nations such as England and Denmark a balance between various social actors and between civil society the state enabled accountable government to develop alongside the state and the rule of law.
The result is hugely ambitions work of comparative history that covers huge sweeps of time and space. The book, I think, does mostly deliver on this ambition. Fukuyama has access to a more scientific understanding of human nature than earlier writers and addresses a wider range of historical contexts and cultures. The most interesting of idea of the entire book is that liberal democracy is an attempt to replicate and protect the freedoms lost in the transition from a relatively free and egalitarian pre-historic sociality (the state of nature, if you like) to a state level and ultimately modern society. The best compliment I can pay to the book is that I look forward to reading volume two.
All societies were originally organized as tribes or bands. The state came into existence as a consequence of various factors the most prominent of which may have been the need to wage war or defend one self from neighbouring tribes or bands. The state is understood to be an organization that enjoys a legitimate monopoly in the deployment of violence/coercion over a defined territory.
To illustrate the nature of political order and development and its relationship to the process of state building, the rule of law and accountability, Fukuyama makes a series of historical comparisons between different regions. These relate to China, India, the Middle East under the Ottomans, and Medieval and Early Modern Europe.
Fukuyama argues that China was the first society to develop a state structure in the modern sense ie an organization that is impersonal in terms of recruitment and authority over its citizens; whose administrative machinery is subject to a rational division of labour; and is based on technical specialisation and expertise. However although China historically had a strong state the idea that no individual even the ruler was above the law was absent. Similarly the notion of accountability did not exist throughout the period of China's historical development. Fukuyama argues that this was not the case historically in India, the Ottoman Empire and Western Europe. A nascent idea of the rule of law was present in these regions but it was derived from religious sources in all three cases. However the only country to develop notions of accountability was England in the Early Modern period.
Fukuyama argues that stable, free, democratic polities only arise when these three institutional structures are present. Thus a strong, rationally organised and capable state must be balanced by the presence of a strong sense of the rule of law and government accountability.That is, a strong state must be capable of being checked and if necessary, challenged, by a robust civil society. He epitomises this outcome as "getting to Denmark". However political order in this sense is not necessarily the same as same as economic development. Modern China and parts of South East Asia have experienced relatively high levels of growth recently yet in these regions accountability and the rule of law are comparatively weak vis-a-vis strong state apparatuses.
Overall, Fukuyama takes a Weberian perspective to the problem of political order. He stresses the importance of what Marxist would describe as superstructural elements in the process of historical and political development as opposed to the view that it is economic activity or the economic base that is the sole driver of societal evolution. Thus ideological factors such as religion, culture and politics play a significant role in social change and hence state formation, the development of the rule of law and political accountability. He is implicitly critical of Marx's notion of modes of production. Such a model of historical change is specific ( for example the idea of feudalism ) to the historical evolution of Europe and may not necessarily apply to other parts of the world. Thus there is no certainty that developing countries will follow the same path of development Europe underwent over the past five hundred years in order to "get to Denmark" or achieve high levels of growth and freedom. Furthermore, Fukuyama argues that no country is bound by its history and that all social and political development is contingent upon circumstances and do not follow necessary laws of historical development.
The problem of political decay is integral to that of development. Fukuyama argues that this occurs when the impersonality and rationality of the state are compromised by the process of patrimonialisation ie when social elites and other powerful groups gain control of the state and promote their own kin and clients irrespective of their suitabiliy, to high positions within it. Historically this has been a persistent problem that has beset all countries. States have responded in various ways to this problem. For example the Han Chinese instituted impartial competitive examinations open to all suitable candidates, for entry into public service in order to combat the problem of nepotism. The Ottomans recruited slaves as officials and soldiers within their empire as a solution for precisely the same problem.
Fukuyama bases his notion of patrimonialisation from his perspective on human nature which he derives in part from the findings of evolutionary psychology. He argues that biological and evolutionary factors play a role (as well as cultural ones) in the development of human institutions. That human beings have an in-built tendency based on genetic inheritance for norm-building and rule-making and that the same tendency will function in favouring altruistic behaviour and kin selection as a default outcome in the absence of any counterveiling normative restraints. He likens this tendency to the ability of humans to learn languages because the means to do so are hardwired genetically. While there may be some truth in this view, it is, nevertheless, highly contentious territory that needs to be clarified further
On the whole this book is very lucid, interesting and coherent in its presentation. As other commentators have noted it does provide a framework for understanding the problems faced by contemporary developing countries ie why some evolve into authoritarian dictatorships while others degenerate into pariah or failed states. In my opinion it dispels the the charge held in some quarters that the author is just another neo-con mouthpiece. Fukuyama disagrees with the Hobbsian and Lockian view that all human beings in the state of nature were isolated, competing individuals. They were and are in the Aristotelian sense, social and political beings. Individualism is something that evolved through the course of history and is not a natural human condition. Fukuyama is dismissive of the kind of right wing economic anarchism based on this fallacious view of human individuality that would prefer to abolish as much of the state and its functions as possible in favour of the freemarket. Thus Fukuyama displays a communitarian outlook that appears to encompass both elements of the political spectrum.