The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution (英語) ペーパーバック – 2012/3/27
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Francis Fukuyama, author of the bestselling The End of History and the Last Manand one of our most important political thinkers, provides a sweeping account of how todays basic political institutions developed. The first of a major two-volume work,The Origins of Political Order begins with politics among our primate ancestors and follows the story through the emergence of tribal societies, the growth of the first modern state in China, the beginning of the rule of law in India and the Middle East, and the development of political accountability in Europe up until the eve of the French Revolution.
Drawing on a vast body of knowledgehistory, evolutionary biology, archaeology, and economicsFukuyama has produced a brilliant, provocative work that offers fresh insights on the origins of democratic societies and raises essential questions about the nature of politics and its discontents.
"Ambitious and highly readable." --The New Yorker
"Political theorist Francis Fukuyama's new book is a major accomplishment, likely to find its place among the works of seminal thinkers like Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Locke, and modern moral philosophers and economists such as John Rawls and Amartya Sen . . .It is a perspective and a voice that can supply a thinker's tonic for our current political maladies." --Earl Pike, The Cleveland Plain Dealer
"An intellectual triumph--bold in scope, sound in judgment, and rich in provocations; in short, a classic." --Ian Morris, Slate
"A sweeping survey that tries to explain why human beings act as they do in the political sphere. Magisterial in its learning and admirably immodest in its ambition." --David Gress, The Wall Street Journal
"In many respects, Fukuyama is an ideal guide for this enormous undertaking. He combines a deep expertise in political institutions with an impressive familiarity of world history, philosophy and social theory. An engaging writer, his prose crackles with sharp observations and illuminating comparisons, and the book marshals a breathtaking array of stimulating facts and provocative generalizations. Who knew, for instance, that the tsetse fly retarded the spread of Islam into sub-Saharan Africa? Simply as a compendium of fascinating minutiae and social science theory, the book offers a treasure trove to the casual student of political history. More important, Fukuyama's book can help us appreciate why so many countries fail to combine the strong institutions, rule of law and accountability that are the hallmark of peaceful and prosperous nations." --Eric Oliver, San Francisco Chronicle
"Fukuyama's intellectual instincts hard-wire him into the most geopolitically strategic--not to mention dangerous--corners of the world....[He] is arguably the world's bestselling contemporary political scientist... His new book, The Origins of Political Order, which hits bookstores this week, seeks to understand how human beings transcended tribal affiliations and organized themselves into political societies... His books have taken on not only politics and philosophy, but also biotechnology and that tinderbox of an idea: human nature. 'He's incredibly intellectually honest, ' says Walter Russell Mead, a historian of American foreign policy. 'He goes where his head takes him. His first duty is to the truth as he sees it.'" --Andrew Bast, Newsweek
"The history profession is today dominated by small minds studying small topics. Specialists trade in abstractions, taking refuge in tiny foxholes of arcane knowledge. It was not always this way. In the 19th century, men like Leopold von Ranke, George Macaulay Trevelyan and Frederick Jackson Turner used the past to try to understand the present. Their ideas were big, and sometimes too were their mistakes. Francis Fukuyama is at heart a Victorian. As he admits, he wants to revive a 'lost tradition' when historians were big thinkers. In The Origins of Political Order, his topic is the world, his starting point the chimpanzee. He charts how states evolved, in the process explaining why, despite humans' common origin in Africa perhaps 50,000 years ago, great political diversity exists today...[It is] impressive to see such a huge and complicated topic covered in such an accessible and engaging fashion....The Origins of Political Order tries to make sense of the complexity that has cluttered the last two decades. It is a bold book, probably too bold for the specialists who take refuge in tiny topics and fear big ideas. But Fukuyama deserves congratulation for thinking big and not worrying about making mistakes. This is a book that will be remembered, like those of Ranke, Trevelyan and Turner. Bring on volume II." --Gerard DeGrott, The Washington Post
"The Origins of Political Order "begins in prehumen times and concludes on the eve of the American and French Revolutions. Along the way, Fukuyama mines the fields of anthropology, archaeology, biology, evolutionary psychology, economics, and, of course, political science and international relations to establish a framework for understanding the evolution of political institutions. And that's just Volume One....At the center of the project is a fundamental question: Why do some states succeed while others collapse?" --Evan Goldstein, The Chronicle of Higher Education
"The evolving tension between private and public animates this magisterial history of the state....Fukuyama writes a crystalline prose that balances engaging erudition with incisive analysis. As germane to the turmoil in Afghanistan as it is to today's congressional battles, this is that rare work of history with up-to-the-minute relevance." --Publishers Weekly (starred, and a Top 10 Politics Pick for the Spring Preview)
"Ambitious, erudite and eloquent, this book is undeniably a major achievement by one of the leading public intellectuals of our time." --Michael Lind, The New York Times Book Review
"Stimulating. . . With impressive erudition, the author travels across China, India, the Islamic world and different regions of Europe looking for the main components of good political order and at how and why these emerged (or failed to) in each place. . . Mr. Fukuyama is still the big-picture man who gave us The End of History, but he has an unerring eye for illuminating detail. Books on political theory are not often page-turners; this one is." --The Economist
"This exceptional book should be in every library." --David Keymer, Library Journal
"Human social behavior has an evolutionary basis. This was the thesis in Edward O. Wilson's book Sociobiology that has caused such a stir . . . In The Origins of Political Order, Francis Fukuyama of Stanford University presents a sweeping new overview of human social structures throughout history, taking over from where Dr. Wilson's ambitious synthesis left off. . . Previous attempts to write grand analyses of human development have tended to focus on a single causal explanation, like economics or warfare, or, as with Jared Diamond's Guns, Germs, and Steel, on geography. Dr. Fukuyama's is unusual in that he considers several factors, including warfare, religion, and in particular human social behaviors like favoring kin. . . 'You have to be bowled over by the extraordinary breath of approach, ' said Arthur Melzer, a political scientist at Michigan State University who invited Dr. Fukuyama to give lectures on the book. 'It's definitely a magnum opus.'" --Nicholas Wade, The New York Times
"Sweeping, provocative big picture-study of humankind's political impulses. . . Endlessly interesting -- reminiscent in turns of Oswald Spengler, Stanislaw Andreski and Samuel Huntington, though less pessimistic and much better written." --Kirkus Reviews
"Political theorist Fukuyama presents nothing less than a unified theory of state formation, a comparative study of how tribally organized societies in various parts of the world and various moments of history have transformed into societies with political systems and institutions and, in some cases, political accountability. . . This wide-ranging and frequently provocative work also carries the mantel of the great nineteenth-century socioloists." --Brendan Driscoll, Booklist商品の説明をすべて表示する
第四部は責任ある政府。欧州に見る社会集団の権力バランスによって異なる国家の発展過程。弱い専制国家（フランス、スペイン）、強い専制国家（ロシア）、 失敗した寡頭国家（ハンガリー、ポーランド）、責任ある政府（英国、デンマーク）。社会資本の欠如、 不公平な税制はエリートを起業活動よりもレント・シーキングに奔らせる。農奴の自由への道を開いた西欧の自由な自治区（町）。名誉革命の後、外敵からの国難を乗り越える為に増税を可能にした市民参加型の英国。
I am convinced by Dr. Fukuyama's arguments that good modern governments need the rule of law, accountability to its citizens and a strong state to be successful.
If a citizen is serious about their country, they should know why it is the way it is, why it it is legitimate (or illegitimate,) and the possible modes of decay. Dr. Fukuyama has presented several models based on history and philosophy. His arguments are convincing.
The future is not necessarily hopeful. As he adequately expresses, "The United States seems increasingly caught in a dysfunctional political equilibrium, wherein everyone agrees on the necessity of addressing long-term fiscal issues, but powerful interest groups can block the spending cuts or tax increases necessary to close the gap."
As a Conservative, I see that this is a correct analysis of the situation we find ourselves in today. Dr. Fukuyama shows that extreme conservatism (extreme by my standards of conservatism) results in institutions that can no longer adequately function. He credits this more than any other factor as the reason why states fail. And I think he is right: people receiving the benefits of an institution prevent it from being changed.
Furthermore, these institutions grow and require more and more resources (read TAXES,) eventually these institutions grow so big and are so dysfunctional, they kill the state that created them. Furthermore, the interests of the particular institutions grow so dependent on the institutions that they will protect these institutions even if it it means neglecting the protection of the overall state. This has happened in both Hungary and France.
This is not the Conservatism espoused Buckley and Hayek, but is a form of conservatism that is known by other names. Dr. Fukuyama has been referred to as a neoconservative by others in his outlook but, he, himself disputes this. The reader of this book needs to understand this. When conservatism is a maintenance of institutions that have lost their ability to efficiently serve the purposes that they were created for, then it is necessarily wrong and does not in general represent modern Conservatism. I regret that Dr. Fukuyama used this term as it will confuse those who can not distinguish the difference. Unfortunately, many will read this book and improperly infer the wrong conclusion.
However, Dr. Fukuyama's analysis of history and the formation of of the political states rings with truth. His thesis is largely that an effective modern government needs a balance between the rule of law, accountability, external family/tribal social mobilization and a strong state.
He dismisses Marx and Hobbes for assuming facts not in in evidence. Dr. Fukuyama fundamentally believes that man is a social animal and has never lived without a social structure of man's own making. First that social structure was family and then it developed into a tribe as being more efficient to meet man's needs. As the need for defense from other tribes grew, it required state-like organizations to survive. As man became increasingly agrarian, the efficiency of food supply offered by farming required property rights that needed protection. The development of religion influenced what people thought about laws, morals and legitimacy. Ultimately, it affected how states formed.
This was not a linear process as Marx professed but a process where cultures differed and where reversion to earlier conditions often occurred. In many cases the conditions for a modern state did not exist until late. In some cases, it is still developing. The natural state of man favored family so often early development of states reverted back to patrimonialism. And where modern states did develop, the paths were variable depending on the geography including religion and history of the region.
But states that succeeded overcame this through various supporting mechanisms including religious supports, legal supports and the involvement of nonruling classes in government have come to some successful institutions that have endured. There were very different ways of achieving a modern government. He only touches briefly on recent developments. This he is reserving for the second book. But he has built a great foundation for further discussion.
In general I agree with Dr. Fukuyama and look forward to reading the second book.
The first volume ends with the American and French revolutions. The second volume, which I have not yet read, promises to describe political development subsequent to the Industrial Revolution. “The Origins of Political Order” is suitable for a general reader who has a solid grasp of Western history, but I do stress that one must already know their history. For me, it was a pleasure to read and I found it very insightful. I enjoyed the multidisciplinary approach and the quality of the writing. The book is very helpful in thinking critically about how and why the political institutions of the West developed as they did.
Fukuyama ascribes the development of political order to the rise of governmental accountability, the rule of law, and a centralized, impersonal state/bureaucracy. To defend this premise, he tackles some of the simplifications offered by Enlightenment thinkers, Marxists and free-marketers/libertarians. For one, he shows how Enlightenment thinkers got the 'state of nature' wrong: humans evolved to hunt and gather in groups--there never was a time when individuals acted as free-agents who, in their rational self-interest, came to establish a 'social contract' wherein they would give up some liberty in order to provide for the common security (government). Instead, there was an ongoing interplay between an emergent market morality (provided by tit-for-tat exchanges), the need to wage war, and ideas (religion, ideology & normative beliefs regarding the law) that together have tended to promote the development of political order in societies. And political development, rather than being a constant progression toward some liberal-democratic or Marxist-utopian goal, is fragile and just as likely to decay as it is to progress. Furthermore, Fukuyama explains why it is futile to try to radically impose a new social order on a state (evidenced by the excesses of the French Revolution and failures of collectivist farming reform in communist societies); and also, why one cannot count on limited governments and free markets to produce political development.
Fukuyama does not offer any simple causes or solutions to the problems of political development in this volume--and that's a good thing. Polemical condemnations of American imperialism, authoritarianism, and centralized government are, thankfully, nowhere to be found. Instead, some of the major contributors of political decay/disorder are described as patrimonialism (nepotism), a lack of social unity (collective exploitation by any one group), "collective action problems" (whereby individuals interests benefit from a suboptimal order) and a lack of faith in the law. The author does not expound democratic models over authoritarian models of development; nor does he consider economic development to be contingent on the rise of democratic institutions. He discusses the deficiencies of weak (inability to act decisively & tackle entrenched interests) and strong governments (potential for abuse of power). Furthermore, he provides evidence against the cynic's view that governments and political actors alway seek to maximize their 'rational self-interests'--desire for recognition, institutional conservatism, and ideas being curbing factors. In all, I would say his treatment of the subject is even-handed, thorough and copiously defended with examples from across time and regions.
Fukuyama has called this book the primer that he wished he'd had as an undergrad student in political science. His style of writing is direct and well-organized. Fukuyama provides enough background information to make his discussions of most concepts and various instances of political development across regions and time comprehensible, but I still found myself getting a bit lost at times. Thankfully, he summarizes his points often and at the end of chapters. If I had to critique this book as a primer for undergrads, I'd say that perhaps it might be a bit too heavy-duty in the length and the number of examples provided by Fukuyama to make his points. However, this book is immense in scope and scale, well-reasoned and dispels a number of misconceptions starting political science students might have or might develop over time--making it invaluable to serious students. And, then again, what are professors for if not to challenge their students with "impossible" readings and then help make the difficult points understandable?