戦争と政治とリーダーシップ 単行本 – 2003/3/28
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The orthodoxy regarding the relationship between politicians and military leaders in wartime democracies contends that politicians should declare a military operation's objectives and then step aside and leave the business of war to the military. In this timely and controversial examination of civilian-military relations in wartime democracies, Eliot A. Cohen chips away at this time-honored belief with case studies of statesmen who dared to prod, provoke, and even defy their military officers to great effect.
Using the leadership of Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion to build his argument, Cohen offers compelling proof that, as Clemenceau put it, “War is too important to leave to the generals.” By examining the shared leadership traits of four politicians who triumphed in extraordinarily varied military campaigns, Cohen argues that active statesmen make the best wartime leaders, pushing their military subordinates to succeed where they might have failed if left to their own devices. Thought provoking and soundly argued, Cohen's Supreme Command is essential reading not only for military and political players but also for informed citizens and anyone interested in leadership. --このテキストは、ペーパーバック版に関連付けられています。
I was more struck by his point via these two leaders,as I was less impressed with the sections on Churchill and Ben Gurion, which sadly seemed to approach hero-worship at times rather than objective analysis. Although starting the book in a positive light, Cohen makes use of his following arguments, discussing the Vietnam War then, later, the War in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Although the Vietnam War discussion is very applicable to this topic, to do so in a single chapter as Cohen has done not only rushes the judgment but necessitates huge generalizations that ruin the effectiveness of his argument. Furthermore, I could barely get through the chapter on Rumsfeld and Iraq. Written in 2003, this book was not an accurate depiction of Rumsfeld's style, nor should any book, on any war, that hopes to be objective and make light of all facts be written less than (at least) a decade or two after the conflict. Using Rumsfeld as an example is this case was a poor academic decision and representative of Cohen's desire to espouse his personal philosophy.