フッサールの現象学 単行本 – 2003/11
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It is commonly believed that Edmund Husserl (1859-1938), well known as the founder of phenomenology and as the teacher of Heidegger, was unable to free himself from the framework of a classical metaphysics of subjectivity. Supposedly, he never abandoned the view that the world and the Other are constituted by a pure transcendental subject, and his thinking in consequence remains Cartesian, idealistic, and solipsistic.
The continuing publication of Husserl's manuscripts has made it necessary to revise such an interpretation. Drawing upon both Husserl's published works and posthumous material, Husserl's Phenomenology incorporates the results of the most recent Husserl research. It is divided into three parts, roughly following the chronological development of Husserl's thought, from his early analyses of logic and intentionality, through his mature transcendental-philosophical analyses of reduction and constitution, to his late analyses of intersubjectivity and lifeworld. It can consequently serve as a concise and updated introduction to his thinking.--このテキストは、ハードカバー版に関連付けられています。
Second, Zahavi is one of the most well respected Husserl scholars around. There are a few places where Zahavi offers somewhat contentious interpretations, particularly in his interpretation of time consciousness, but, for the most part, you do not need to wonder, when reading this book, whether you are getting an accurate presentation of Husserl's ideas or not. Zahavi is a serious and well respected scholar. I just finished getting a Masters in philosophy and, in my experience, a lot of intro philosophy texts, like this one, offer really questionable interpretations of the philosophers they are interpreting. That can be a real problem for people who are just starting out in philosophy because the first books you read tend to influence how you read everything after that. So you want to get an accurate book to start with so that you have a solid foundation. This book definitely provides a solid foundation in Husserlian phenomenology.
Third, Zahavi covers most of the major periods of Husserl's philosophical career, from the Logical Investigations up through the The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Zahavi also analyzes most of the major topics in Husserlian phenomenology. He has an excellent chapter on perception, and the role of the body in perception, a good chapter on intersubjectivity, and a good chapter on the life-world and the crisis of the sciences. Zahavi defends Husserl from many of his later critics and gives lots of examples where Husserl anticipated many of the ideas of the later phenomenologists. I love Merleau-Ponty, for example, and it was great to see the ways in which Husserl had already anticipated many of Merleau-Ponty's most important insights. Apparently, Husserl was already talking about the reversibility of the flesh.
There are two other books I would recommend for the newcomer to Husserl. I think that the Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology is probably the best place to start if you are new to Husserl, and if you do decide to start there, I highly recommend Routledge Philosophy GuideBook to Husserl and the Cartesian Meditations by Smith. It is an excellent commentary. Finally, I have to recommend a book by an old professor of mine, Burt Hopkins, The Philosophy of Husserl. I have actually only read sections of it so far, but it is very good, and Hopkins was a great professor, and a great Husserl scholar, so I definitely recommend his book if you are looking for another intro to Husserl.
The themes that have given students the greatest difficulty are treated concisely and with an elegance of expression that belies a deep understanding on Zahavi's part. These include intentionality, the nature of evidence and "apodicticity," the transcendental reduction and epoche, the balance of idealism and realism in Husserl's thought, the transcendental ego and constitution, time consciousness, the body, intersubjectivity, and the life world. The discussion of idealism/realism is very good, to a great extent owing to Zahavi's encyclopedic knowledge of all of Husserl's work -- both the major works published during or shortly after his lifetime, and the Husserliana, Husserl's notes and lectures that have only been available fairly recently. The discussion of the body, particularly in its role as both subject and object, and the foundation for intersubjectivity, is also extremely useful. The discussion of intersubjectivity is nothing short of superb. And the discussion of the life world, and the complexities and subtleties that this idea interjects into Husserl's developing understanding of the phenomenological project, is quite valuable.
It is a measure of how good this book is that I like it in spite of fundamentally disagreeing with several of the author's central arguments about how Husserl should be interpreted. Zahavi is one of a growing number of revisionists that challenge the traditional interpretation of Husserl. The traditional interpretation is held by explicators and anthologists such as Dermot Moran (Introduction to Phenomenology, Routledge, 2000), and other philosophers such as Paul Ricouer (Husserl: an Analysis of his Phenomenology, Northwestern, 1967), Leszek Kolakowski (Husserl and the Search for Certitude, St. Augustine's Press, 1975), and Richard Rorty (Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton, 1979). This tradition sees Husserl as the culmination of a philosophical line that begins with Descartes, touches upon the skepticism of Hume, and comes to its fullest statement in Kant. It emphasizes Husserl's debt to Descartes, his focus on subjectivity as the basis and origin of knowledge, a radical understanding of Husserl's doctrine of the ego's activity in constituting the given world, the foundationalist nature of Husserl's approach, and the consequent disjuncture between Husserl and the continental philosophers -- hermeneuticists, existentialists, and postmodernists -- that come after him. Not surprisingly, the revisionists tend to take opposing positions on each of these points. Examples of revisionist commentary in addition to Zahavi's are The Cambridge Companion to Husserl (Cambridge, 1995), and The New Husserl (Donn Welton, ed., Indiana, 2003).
Some correction of the received wisdom on Husserl is probably in order. It is possible to take an overly restrictive view of his treatment of subjectivity, for instance. But a couple of Zahavi's arguments just seem wrong to me. For instance, Zahavi argues that Husserl is not a foundationalist thinker. This is a difficult position to maintain in the face of Husserl's oft repeated claim that through phenomenology philosophy can finally fulfill its promise of a life lived according to reason alone. He also argues, against a number of other interpreters, that Husserl is able to escape the solipsism that is implied by the radical focus on subjectivity set forth at the beginning of the Crisis and the Cartesian Meditations, among other places. Here he points to the extensive attention that Husserl gives to "intersubjectivity," the objectivity leant to the external world by the overlapping of the consciousnesses of multiple subjects. My constitution of a particular object must take into account the consitution of the same object by others. But the problem for Husserl, as for Descartes before him, is not one of focus but of method. The question is how either, given the radical subjectivity of their initial methodology, can build a bridge to an objectively existing world. Descartes relies on God. Husserl offers a tortured doctrine of "the Other." Many, including some of Husserl's disciples, believe that neither approach is altogether satisfactory.
One of the well-taken points made by many of the revisionists, however, is that the relative neglect of Husserl in favor of later thinkers such as Heidegger, Sartre, Levinas, and Gadamer is not justified. Husserl changed the face of continental philosophy, and gave much to analytical philosophy as well. Happily, because of his work among thers, Zahavi can say that "Husserl is no longer simply regarded as a surpassed chapter in the history of phenomenology."