- ペーパーバック: 48ページ
- 出版社: Osprey Publishing (2002/3/25)
- 言語: 英語
- ISBN-10: 1841763624
- ISBN-13: 978-1841763620
- 発売日： 2002/3/25
- 商品パッケージの寸法: 18.4 x 0.3 x 24.6 cm
- おすすめ度： 1 件のカスタマーレビュー
- Amazon 売れ筋ランキング: 洋書 - 601,524位 (洋書の売れ筋ランキングを見る)
U-boats of the Kaiser's Navy (New Vanguard) (英語) ペーパーバック – 2002/3/25
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As was the case in World War II, one of the greatest threats to Britain during World War I was the German U-boat menace. This book traces the development of the U-boat threat from the Brandtaucher, designed by Wilhelm Bauer, the father of the German submarine arm, in 1850, through to the commissioning of Germany's first U-boat to go into service, the U-1, in 1906. It then covers the main types of World War I U-boat, detailing the operational history of the U-boat service in depth, with a particular focus on the campaigns in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, as well as the slow build up of anti-submarine measures by the allies.
Gordon Williamson was born in 1951 and currently works for the Scottish Land Register. He spent seven years with the military Police TA and has published a number of books and articles on the decorations of the Third Reich and their winners. He is author of a number of World War II titles for Osprey.
Gordon Williamson氏は「Torpedo Los! The Fascinating World of U-Boat Collectibles」という凄い名作を出せる実力があるのに、他の本は何故に面白くないのでしょう...？
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A major deficiency of this volume is the lack of much statistical compilation effort by the author. While the author does mention the total number of U-Boats built, he fails to mention that a total of 178 were lost in the First World or that 5,000 crewmen were lost with those boats. The cause of U-Boat losses in the First World should also have been included, but it is not. The author does not ever bother to tally up total U-Boat achievements in either terms of tonnage or vessels sunk, nor are several top U-Boat commanders even mentioned. None of these statistics would have taken much space, just effort. Finally, the author's narrative ends at the armistice in 1918, without even bothering to mention the ultimate fate of the Kaiser's U-boats. The fact that Germany lost its entire U-Boat arm as a result of the war is not even mentioned.
The author provides very little assessment of the U-Boat campaign, but what he does provide is faulty; he notes, "the U-Bootwaffe [service] had represented Germany's only real chance to achieve a successful conclusion to the war." This assessment is ridiculous because it ignores the fact that Germany's idiotic decision to pursue unrestricted submarine warfare was the primary cause of American intervention in the war. Had the Kaiser forbidden unrestricted submarine warfare, the United States would have remained neutral and after 1917 Germany would have been fighting only a one-front war against the exhausted French and British armies. Without unrestricted U-boat warfare, Germany had a very real chance to achieve a military stalemate and a favorable negotiated peace in 1918. Furthermore, the great German U-boat campaign that the author promotes completely failed to stop the shipment of 2 million American doughboys to the Western Front; only 56 American servicemen were lost to U-Boat attacks. The author's final conclusion that the Kaiser's U-boats were not militarily defeated rings hollow; 50% of the boats commissioned were lost and while they inflicted serious damage, German U-boats failed to achieve their strategic objectives.
While providing some detail about the U-Boats, I found the volume too short to provide more than just fairly basic information about the submarines and a very few of their commanders. For example, while the book discusses the various types of U-Boats and the regions they were deployed in, the author never really discusses how they were employed, their strengths and weaknesses in their roles, difficulties they faced, nor provides more than incomplete summaries of their overall success and failures.
I additionally found some nits to pick about his writing and analysis. For example, when discussing the heavy armament carried on many of the U-Boats, he mentions that mounting the heavy armament may seem out of place but points out that the World War I U-Boats didn't have to face the anti-submarine measures of World War II submarines. All well and good up to that point. But in the discussion that follows, he talks about how the deck guns were dangerous to use and became considered superfluous weight and were removed, and how anti-aircraft armament was added in its place. But it's not clear until a bit later that he's actually talking about WW II deck guns, and that deck guns were a very valuable weapon for WW I U-Boats.
Additionally, as another reviewer has also noted, the author claims that the "Uboatwaffe" represented Germany's only real chance to achieve a successful conclusion to the war, when actually, America entered the war as a direct result of Germany initiating unrestricted submarine warfare in 1917. This act alone probably doomed Germany. If the United States had not entered the war, Germany's 1918 offensives stood a much better chance of succeeding, perhaps allowing Germany to at least negotiate a favorable peace, if not win the war outright. So, due to the way they were employed, the U-Boats probably cost Germany the war.
This is not a bad book by any means, but it needs to be longer, and have more analysis and assessments.