The New Chinese Empire: And What It Means For The United States [ペーパーバック]

Some complaints:
- Terrill is vague in parts. Take this sentence for example: "Historically, the centralization-devolution swings were sometimes a prelude to dynastic decline and fragmentation, but not always"(pg. 180). There are many wishy-washy sentences like that in "New Chinese Empire." Also, I am in the dark as to what 'synergy' really means in the context of international relations. A more detailed explanation would have been welcomed.
- China scholars would disagree with Terrill that because China does not hold national, free elections, Chinese citizens have no say in their government (see Shi Tianjian's "Political Participation in Beijing"). Elections are not the only, and not even the most effective, mode of participation. Chinese participate in a variety of ways...refusal to attend meetings, local elections, protests against local cadres, letter writing (which Terrill dismisses offhand as 'petitioning the court'), etc.
- Some of what Terrill writes contradicts what I have learned (not to say I am right; conflicting sources automatically make me wary). For example: Terrill claims the protests following the accidental American bombing of the Chinese embassy in Serbia were coordinated by the government. I was under the impression that the government tried its best to get Chinese to stop protesting for the sake of Sino-American harmony.
- Terrill can be overly harsh on China. In his disussion of Sino-Japanese relations, he criticizes China for not letting World War II issues go. To be fair, Japan never has apologized for atrocoties committed in that war, and its nations textbooks do not address the question honestly. The fact that China also censors its textbooks / history does not lessen Japan's blame . Also, there were a few times I felt Terrill was a micrometer away from calling China "Chicom," and he did call it a 'semi-terrorist outfit.' This seems a bit much.
- Terrill's argument seems to rely too much on emotion. He taps into American frustrations at China's grandstanding, and finds a historical basis for it.
- Some of the accusations Terrill waves at China could be said just as equally about America, or any country for that matter. He states China doesn't have allies, and therefore they are inconsistent and dishonest in foreign policy. No country has allies, they have interests, and these interests change over time. Terrill's accusation singles China out, but can be applied to every country in every time.

All those complaints aside, overall I liked this book. I particularaly liked his explanation of China's claims on territory that is simply not theirs (Tibet, Xinjiang, Manchuria, etc.). His view on Taiwan was especially appreciated. He notes that talk about the "Taiwan problem" masks that there is no problem. Taiwan is a healthy, prosperous democracy. The problem is that China claims to own it. Having lived in Taiwan, I can attest to the fact that the Mainland's propoganda claiming that the Taiwan issue is exacerbated by American policy is absolutely false. I have yet to meet a Taiwanese person who thinks "re"unification is anywhere close to a good idea. But I digress...

Okay, so in summary, this book was a good read, but read with a critical eye.

That leaders like Mao and Deng (and even Jiang) were emperors in all but name is something of a cliché, but Terrill gives a fresh perspective to this commonly-held notion. He is well-read in China's history, and shows it here to good effect without weighing himself down with excessive scholarship. His style is light and well-suited to his approach: prove a point to the general reader's satisfaction and then move on.

By far the most interesting sections of Terrill's book are those having to do with China's world view. China has traditionally looked upon not just the rest of East Asia, but even the rest of the world as an extension of China itself. This was not so much a ruling concept as it was a pervasive ruling assumption, and it formed the basis for imperial China. When China was strong, this assumption allowed it to swallow up other areas from Tibet to Vietnam without elaborate conceptual justifications; when China was weak, the assumption was still in force through tributary relations or complex diplomatic relations that allowed Beijing to appear to have the upper hand even when it did not. Circumstances may change, but the assumption is never questioned.

Terrill draws numerous parallels between imperial China and today's new China. Beijing still seeks to punch above its weight by formalizing relationships with other countries in ways China prefers even when it cannot immediately achieve its aims (this explains why China puts such stress on its "One-China" policy with the United States). What is remarkable, he argues, is not so much that China would use this strategy as how successful it is in doing so. Other nations - whether out of excessive respect for China's culture or fear of losing access to China's market - bow down and accede to many of China's demands.

In the area of international relations, this book should be viewed as the counterpoint to "The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security." Whereas the authors of that book, Andrew Nathan and Robert Ross, view China as fundamentally conservative in its international outlook, Terrill sees it as potentially destabilizing.

While Ferguson's final message on the British Empire is that America is in fact an empire and should be a larger one still in the future, Terrill argues similarly that China today is also an empire - but one that should cease to exist if possible.

This book is somewhat confusing, a jumble of anecdotes, historical analysis, and political theorizing. It is so full of complaints about the present Chinese government that I doubt this is unintentional: Ross Terrill is making a statement, being deliberately provocative (no doubt improving sales here in America), and leaving behind a personal manifesto for posterity, so to speak. This book is unlikely to make the bestsellers lists in China, to put it mildly.

If I'm not mistaken, Terrill believes China will democratize - and break up into a federation of semi-independent states. He offers a number of scenarios, but the point is the same: China cannot, must not, and will not remain what it is today. He means politically. Of economics he has little to say.

While I agree with him that China will change, Terrill is a bit vague on his specific timeframe.

My personal observation is as follows. China has undergone more changes politically and economically in the last two hundred years than it had ever had since 400-200 B.C., when China was in political, military, cultural, economic and social turmoil before finally achieving the prosperity and stability of the two Han Dynasties. Today China is still in transition, and one cannot expect China not to change. Terrill's point is valid, if somewhat overstated. Every country follows its own course, which is marked out by its history and shaped by international events. Certainly China will eventually liberalize and be part of the international community in every sense. Why be so impatient? China today is authoritarian and totalitarian. What Terrill doesn't ask is: Is China more authoritarian and totalitarian today than a quarter century ago, or is it less so? The answer is of course LESS SO. Moreover, all signs point to the same thing: China is still moving in the democratic direction, and however slow this process may be, it seems irreversible. Terrill chooses not to point this out. (If China were NOT moving in the right direction, I doubt very much the 2008 Olympics would have been awarded to Beijing. The reason why comparing the Beijing Games to the "Hitler Olympics" in 1936 doesn't make sense is that Germany in the 1930's was moving in the wrong direction, while China today is clearly changing in the right direction, politically as well economically.)

I have a slight problem with authors who make their points with highly selective facts. It makes me suspicious of their integrity (or worse, their competence). I have no doubt Terrill is a China-lover. After all his biography of Mao is one of my favorite books. But this book is a little different. One detail illustrates my point. On p. 281: "In fact, after two decades of MFN status for China, US trade with the PRC was very far from being 'ten times' its trade with Taiwan. In 1999, US exports to the PRC were LESS than its exports to Taiwan."

First of all, considering this book just came out of the printers, I find it odd that he has chosen 1999 to make his point. US exports to China in Feb 2003 was $4 billion, compared to $2.5 billion to Taiwan - not LESS, but 1.6 times. US total trade with China for the month of Feb, 2003 was $11.69 billion, compared with the puny $3.38 billion with Taiwan. For the whole year of 2002, US total trade in both exports and imports with China amounted to $147.3 billion, compared with the much smaller $50.6 billion with Taiwan. (All figures from the US Dept of Commerce.) Now, of course none of these figures invalidate Terrill's point that US trade with China is still less than ten times that with Taiwan, but what he suggests is misleading (and in his suggestion that US exports to China is less than to Taiwan, wrong). The truth is, China is doing much more trade, both ways, with America than Taiwan is. It may not be ten times as much - YET - but considering the fact that America has been seriously trading with China for only a decade, while it has been doing so with Taiwan since 1949, the ten times conjecture is very possible in the future. China is already America's 4th largest trade partner - coming fast on the heels of Japan - while Taiwan is only 9th. Terrill neglects to mention that the trade growth between China and the US is extremely fast, while America's trade with Taiwan is stalled. He also fails to note that two-way trade betwen China and Taiwan is also growing healthily (despite SARS). Terrill is suggesting that when Deng Xiaoping made this forecast to Carter, he was lying. But he wasn't, because he never said when this target would be achieved. In time, it will be.

Terrill makes this observation to illustrate the difference between what the Chinese govenment says and the reality. This book has countless such examples. No doubt the point itself is well-made and correct. (Show me a government - any government - that tells the truth, the whole truth and nothing but! Where are the WMD and al-Qaeda links in Iraq?) But since the reality he himself presents is often so misleading and sometimes wrong, he makes a fool of himself. He must first find out the truth himself before accusing others of not telling the truth.

While I'm on this subject of trade, Terrill doesn't ask himself why trade with the West will not be the key to political changes in China. It WILL be. Indeed he has little to say about economics in general, even though foreign trade leads to economic prosperity, which in turn will drive social and political liberalization, not to mention further economic reform. Trade is China's political and economic engine. Instead he focuses on the one thing he loves to talk about: political ideology. That puts the cart before the horse. Also, he doesn't discuss why China even with an authoritarian system can still be a responsible and constructive partner with the US over foreign problems, such as North Korea, as it is indeed proving to be so. India is a democracy - how is India helping America? France too is a democracy for that matter.

I find this book full of rage. No doubt it stems from his personal love of China and his hatred of the regime, and I empathize. Or maybe it's just a deliberate posture (what they call "grand standing")? But it is foolish to be impatient and fail to take the long view. (This is doubly odd since Terrill's familiarity with China's history is evident in this book.) It is also unwise to neglect the economic factors in the equation, and dishonest to be highly selective in presenting facts and figures to prove his points.