The Maginot Line 1928-45 (Fortress) [ペーパーバック]

The illustrations are everything you would expect from Osprey. They include maps, graphs, cut-away images, photographs and historical concept images. The author concludes the book with a section on visiting/touring the forts and some resources for further information. All in all, for someone who knew only the myth/legend of the line of fortifications, I found the book informative and entertaining; providing a good basis from which to pursue further reading. P-)

Allcorn begins with very short sections on the reasons why France decided to invest the Maginot Line and how the defenses were built, although there are no photographs from the construction period. Fully half the volume deals with the structure of the Maginot Line and Allcorn spares no detail about the different types of ouvrages ("works"), interval forts and "cloches" (armored cupolas). Indeed, Allcorn gets a bit carried away in his technical descriptions and becomes rather tedious. Unfortunately, Allcorn spends less effort on critical aspects of the Maginot Line, like where the key fortifications were actually located. While Allcorn provides five maps (the general distribution of fortifications, the forts in northeast France, the forts on the Italian border, the Metz fortified region, and the German invasion), none are detailed enough to actually locate large forts like the Hackenberg. Instead, Allcorn continually refers the reader to Michelin maps, which is rather a cop-out. Also, a number of the illustrations, such as the generator room at Hackenberg, really don't tell the reader anything.

The strength of Allcorn's account lies in exposing the myth of the Maginot Line for what it was not. Indeed, Allcorn notes that the French kept many details of the Line secret even after the Second World War and the popular conception remained that it was a continuous line of monstrous forts. The truth, as Allcorn demonstrates, was far more prosaic. The Maginot Line was in fact, a series of large and small combat blocks, which were themselves mostly a series of smaller bunkers. Allcorn has spent a great deal of time in what remains of the Line, and it is amazing to hear that the mighty Maginot Line only mounted 43 135mm howitzers and 138 elderly 75mm guns, as well as 162 other mortars and guns. Few of the forts had garrisons of more than 200-300 men and while some of the larger forts had internal rail lines for moving ammunition, there was no underground rail line connecting all the forts. Furthermore, living conditions were very poor inside the Line and the garrisons generally lived in nearby barracks except during war. Allcorn also provides details on the fortifications built along the Italian border and on Corsica, all of which were part of the Maginot program.

Allcorn's chapters on the Maginot Line in the Second World War and after do reveal some new details, but they are essentially weak. During the 1940 Blitzkrieg, the Germans were only able to seize a few of the smaller forts, but the bunkers built along the Rhine were all quickly knocked out by an ingenuous effort utilizing numerous 88mm flak guns. Allcorn concludes that the Maginot Line did what it was designed to do - deter and impede a German invasion of northeast France - but that the failure of French leadership to provide adequate air and armor units to prevent a German breakthrough elsewhere invalidated the whole program. While skimming over the German occupation of the Line, Allcorn does provide some interesting details about the Line after the war.

Typically, the Maginot Line is derided as a complete waste of money that failed to save France from invasion. If only the money had been spent on tanks and aircraft, the French might have survived the Blitzkrieg, goes the popular refrain. However, Allcorn notes that the Maginot Line, built between 1928-1936 cost about five billion francs (about $100 million in then dollars). Unfortunately, Allcorn fails to note that the French defense budget in the mid-1930s was about $900 million (45 billion francs) per year; therefore, the Maginot Line cost only about 1.3% of the French defense budget for eight years. Apparently, if France lacked money for mobile forces it was not due to the Maginot Line. Given the apparent low cost and apparent effectiveness of the fortifications that were built, it is hard to understand the argument that France lacked the money to extend the line across the entire French border. Indeed, if there was waste in the French military establishment, it was more likely due to the navy, which had a large number of expensive but obsolescent battleships. Perhaps the real argument should be, if only the French had scrapped their battle fleet (which was irrelevant to the threat of German invasion anyway), they might have gained the funds, personnel, armament and steel to complete the Maginot Line across the entire border. Is there anyone who thinks that Rommel or Guderian could have crossed the Meuse so easily in the face of Maginot-type fortifications?