Pacific Gibraltar: U.S.-Japanese Rivalry Over the Annexation of Hawai'i, 1885-1898 (ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy) [ハードカバー]

This is a superb account of the complexities involved in America's annexation of Hawai'i in 1898. The author details the growing public debate, which included far more than the intrinsic value of this splendid North Pacific archipelago. Instead, the issue was at the core of the late nineteenth-century debate over empire-building in the world's largest ocean. U.S. relations with Japan were at stake as the two emergent imperial powers both saw the contested Pacific Basin as falling within their respective spheres of influence.

Professor Morgan stresses the importance of strategic factors--Alfred Thayer Mahan's advocacy of naval supremacy, the deployment of an all-steel navy, the need for coaling stations and bases on insular dependencies, and, especially, the great power rivalry between Japan and the United States--in securing Hawaiian annexation. The author's research was thorough and grounded in primary sources, while revealing of the latest scholarship. His conclusions were fresh, measured, nuanced, and logical. The writing was clear and crisp.

A fuller understanding of this complex, controversial topic makes Morgan's book required reading.
Thomas J. Osborne
Author of "Empire Can Wait:" American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898 (1981).

Loath as I am to disagree with previous reviewer Thomas J. Osborne, whose great "Empire Can Wait": American Opposition to Hawaiian Annexation, 1893-1898 sits on my desk as I write this, there were a few things about "Pacific Gibraltar" I found less than entirely "superb." While there's a lot to recommend this book, one or two shortcomings deserve to be kept in mind too.

The first and most obvious of these is the book's subtitle. While "U.S.-Japanese rivalry over the annexation of Hawaii" forms a part of author William Michael Morgan's thesis, that in itself is not the sum of what this book is about. In fact, the first half or so is a pretty thorough retelling of the background and events of 1893 coup d'etat. The setting then shifts to Washington, D.C., as annexation is debated and achieved. While Japan -- or, more specifically, the real or perceived Japanese threat to Hawaii -- ultimately shaped the timing of annexation, that still only forms a part, and not the biggest part, of the story.

The second shortcoming may admittedly be more a matter of preference, but I found it unsatisfying that amid the discussions of geo-strategic tensions and political expediencies there was very little mention of justice or right. "Pacific Gibraltar" was published as part of the "ADST-DACOR Diplomats and Diplomacy" series of titles, with "ADST" being the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training and "DACOR" being Diplomatic and Consular Officers, Retired, Inc., so perhaps this sort of objectivity and reluctance to address questions or right and wrong is in the nature of diplomatic history? When the author does weigh the merits of various competing claims, he sometimes employs an odd equivalency, as when he argues that "the American-led rebels" manipulated constitutional voting qualifications "primarily to exclude Asians from the franchise and secondarily to shrink the Native Hawaiian vote." However, he continues, the royalists also attempted to manipulate voter qualifications, trying to do away with property requirements, for example, seeing "universal suffrage as their route back to power." "Political expediency governed the position of both camps," he concludes (p. 148). Well, yes, but...

Other times, Morgan sets up a straw man to represent the royalist position, as when he writes, regarding Queen Lili'uokalani's attempt to issue a new constitution, "it can be argued that she sought to redress what Hawaiians saw as the wrongs of the 1887 constitution," and that Hawaiian history since European contact had been a back-and-forth struggle for influence. "From this point of view," he continues, "it is possible to argue persuasively that white and Asian immigrants, for more than a hundred years after Cook, deserved no rights and privileges in Hawaii." "This is less an exercise in determining causation," he concludes, "than it is a moral judgment about the superior rights of the descendants of the original inhabitants versus those of latecomers" (p. 108). That last sentence may be true, but who was arguing then, or argues today, that "white and Asian immigrants" deserved *no* rights? To use Morgan's own terms, his book is focused on "determining causation," not on making moral judgments.

I do consider that a weakness when retelling a story so many people still consider primarily one of moral judgments, but I must acknowledge that Morgan does an impressive job on his primary mission of "determining causation." This leads him to conclusions that form, as the cover blurb puts it, "a sweeping reevaluation" of the period. I will be interested to read the debates I hope these conclusions stir. For instance, in keeping with Morgan's diplomatic focus, he devotes considerable attention to John L. Stevens, American representative in Honolulu at the time of the coup. Morgan shows Stevens "had an extreme pro-rebel bias" (p. 101), acted too quickly to recognize the "provisional government" before such in fact existed, and in general acted in a manner that "was highly improper, even by the permissive nineteenth-century tradition of meddling by American emissaries" (p. 80). But ultimately, Morgan rejects the position that seems to be taken for granted by many writers on the topic, arguing that Stevens never at any time "conspired" with the rebels before the revolution began.

I'll finish this long review by listing some of Morgan's other key conclusions, to give readers a sense of the ground this book covers. These include: That the success of the coup was not due to American political or military intervention, but rather to the relative strength and determination of the plotters compared to the weakness and irresolution of the government; That while sugar played a central role in Island politics, economics were secondary to strategic considerations for American pro-annexationists, who saw possession of Hawaii as essential to defense of the West Coast; and That while annexation was probably inevitable following the coup, the specific timing of annexation was driven primarily by fears of both internal and external Japanese influence in the Islands (here we return to the "rivalry" of the subtitle).

Finally, I should note that "Pacific Gibraltar" is a much denser and more academic book than, say Lost Kingdom: Hawaii's Last Queen, the Sugar Kings and America's First Imperial Adventure which I read and reviewed a few weeks ago. With its deep research and focus on politics and diplomacy, it's not necessarily a book for the reader with a casual interest in Hawaiian history. For those who choose to dive deeper, though, "Pacific Gibraltar" is a rewarding read that I think deserves discussion and debate.

I thought I had a pretty good idea of the story of the US annexation of Hawaii, but it proves to be more complicated. Hawaii was fated to not remain independent. The role of race was sadly more extensive than I had previously believed, it was certainly a different time.