Ostkrieg: Hitler's War of Extermination in the East [ハードカバー]

The onset of the Russo-German war of 1941-45 marked the beginning of a striking evolution to the manner with which war was being waged by Nazi Germany. It also could be described as the continuation and evolution of a long policy of racist aggression towards the Slavs, German utopian `Lebensraum' ideology, and a radical anti-Semitism long adhered to by Hitler and the senior officials of the Nazi party. For years now, these disparate threads of the historical record have been studied and analyzed with an increasingly sophisticated dialogue. With that said, with the exception of Geoffrey Megargee's fine analysis on the first half-year of the eastern war, "War of Annihilation", there has been nearly no attempt to write a synthesis of all these differing but connected aspects of the Russo-German war. This gap in the history of Nazi Germany and its nearly four year war in the east has now been addressed in Stephen G. Fritz' fine analysis, "Ostkrieg". Indeed his goal, admirably stated is, "to provide a deeper understanding of the complexity and immensity of the Ostkrieg by anchoring the military events of the war within their larger ideological, racial, economic and social context" (xx).

This narrative works best exactly as the author intends; as a synthesis of the work already done by pre-eminent history writers such as Richard Overy, Ian Kershaw, Peter Longerich and David Glantz, among hundreds of others. In fact, the bibliography alone indicates the immense degree of work spent preparing this book and reads like a `who's who' of Nazi Germany historiography. The narrative is constructed in chronological fashion and ties together the political, racist, economic and military history of Hitler's war against Soviet Russia in exemplary fashion.

An excellent example of this is in the author's analysis regarding the failures of `Taifun', the assault on Moscow, which began on September 30th of 1941. Typically a reader is likely to come across descriptions of the terrible mud that made advances by trucks, panzers and even infantry torturous. Likewise, one is likely to read accounts of the effects of the precipitous drop in temperatures beginning in November and the lack of winter clothing for German troops. Fritz' analysis, however, combines these elements with accounts of the incredible mental and physical fatigue of troops, the lice the inability of supplies to move forward to these same troops and a myriad of other difficulties that have been rarely connected in this manner (160).

Furthermore, the author deftly connects these difficulties to the equally significant racial and economic issues involved, such as the supply difficulties being exacerbated due to a hardening of attitude by the various Russian peoples. He also goes on to demonstrate how the Nazi hierarchy's racist starvation plans actually worked against weapons systems production at the very moment when an increase in production was most critical. Indeed, Fritz shows how it was not until the more than 3 million POW's in German custody had almost entirely died of malnutrition that Hitler reversed this policy. By this point however the net gain of POW's capable of productive work could in no way match the lost manpower due to men called up for military service (171).

Overall, the analysis is top-notch and allows the reader to understand the thinking and planning (as little as there seems at times) that existed in seeking truly pan-European goals. Fritz demonstrates that, rather than seeking war with the USSR in 1941 because of the intransigence of Great Britain, it was actually in spite of this fact. He further shows how the political, military and economic realities contributed to an ever-increasing radicalization of policy against both Slavic populations and most tragically, the Jews of all Europe. This radicalization, particularly against the Jews, Fritz demonstrates as an example of anti Semitism flowing and growing both from Hitler and those below him. In other words, he shows how Hitler directed the overall flow of planning with generalized statements and general plans but in many instances, the actual evolving brutality and radicalization on the ground was driven by those wishing to prove their devotion or wishing for more freedom of action to act on their own hatreds and biases. Finally, he provides a fine overview of all aspects of the war, from the initial exuberant victories through the absolute destitution and destruction of Hitler's Germany.

In conclusion, "Ostkrieg" is a fantastic piece of analysis and is by far the most complete narrative of the critical war waged by Nazi Germany against Soviet Russia. Although there are minor areas in which I am not completely in agreement with Fritz, I find overall this a compelling and worthwhile area of research and one that he has demonstrated a high degree of mastery. This work should serve for years as THE preeminent discussion of all aspects of Hitler's racist war of extermination. This is easily one of the best works of analysis on the Eastern Front and absolutely deserves the five stars given it!

This is an excellent book and extremely hard to put down. There is a richness in details that will satisfy most anyone. Not at the detail level of, say, a David Glantz tome; it, none the less, manages to give a full picture of the decisions and actions of the War in Russia. Frankly has the most definitive single paragraph describing Kursk that you will ever enjoy. Seldom have I read any work that I could recommend to a History Details "Nut", like myself, or to an individual wanting more than the average Stephen Ambrose junk. The writing is supurb and you will not be overwhelmed by German Technology words as well as non pronounceble Russian names. I have over 1200 books, in my library, with most on WW2; but this work will reserve a special place on my shelves. It has become my favorite work right before Germany and the Second World War Volume 3 and the first two (2) Volumes of Glantz's Stalingrad Trilogy. Please, read this book. The author does NOT fall victim to falling back on myths about Hitler, Russian command and control, and the old Germany would have won except for....It, at least to me, contains more relevant and easy to comprehend facts that have to arranged in one work on the 4 years of war in the east.

This book is an attempt to re-interpret Germanys war against the Soviet Union based secondary sources that have been written in the last few years. None of the narrative holds any surprises but the book is good as it makes it easier to understand Hitler's thinking and the reality of what happened in the Russian campaign.

In the First World War Germany had come close to victory. One of the reasons for its defeat was the allied blockade. Towards the end of the war agricultural production in Germany and the Austro-Hungarian empire fell. There were a range of reasons for this which included moving agricultural workers of the land into the army. In addition explosives are made out of the same things which are used to make fertilizer. The huge armaments industry led to falls in fertilizer production and agricultural output. Lastly Germany prior to the war depended on overseas inputs of grain to feed its meat production. The blockade caused issues around the ability to raise livestock and thus the production of protein and fats.

By 1918 750,000 German civilians had died of starvation or starvation related causes. Front line troops were on rations which were below the normal calorie intake of an adult involved in an active occupation. The shortage of food was one central reason for the revolt which saw the overthrow the of German monarchy in 1918 and the taking of power by a Social Democratic Government.

Hitler had been a front line soldier in World War One and he was keenly aware of the food issue. He had in the 1930s tried to militarize the German economy. This had been partially successful in that the German Army had been able to defeat France and Britain. However Germany was only a second tier power. It had only limited access to oil. Even the defeat of France did not do much to improve its access to resources. A good deal of France's manufacturing industry was dependant on British coal exports and these were now cut off.

The decision to invade the Soviet Union were thus part of a dream by Hitler to turn Germany into a major economic power by giving it the Russian hinterland. Russia had huge reserves of coal, iron and oil. If he could defeat the Soviets then there would be enough coal iron and oil to run the economy of Europe at a rate comparable to the United States.

The conduct of the war by Germany should be seen in this context. Hitler wanted to make Russia a subject state in the same way that Britain had made India a subject state. Hitler however was keen not to have a replay of World War One. One of the key elements of the German planning revolved around food. Most of the atrocities carried out by the Germans were aimed at ensuring a food surplus for Germany and its allies. (Italy, Hungary, Romania)

The Nazi leadership planned to reduce the Soviet population by 30 million by adopting a deliberate policy on victory of starving the subject population to death. As they did not win the war they were not able to carry this out. However during the war starvation was used as a deliberate weapon. Two million captured Russian soldiers were starved to death in 1941. Jews were rounded up and put in Ghettos with a ration of 400 calories. Those Jews who were not starved to death were shot or gassed. Most Jews were killed prior to 1944. By the end of 1943 the only significant surviving Jewish community in Europe was in Hungary. After the German take over of Hungary in 1944 they were murdered.