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In this sweeping and insightful history, Henry Kissinger turns for the first time at book-length to a country he has known intimately for decades, and whose modern relations with the West he helped shape. Drawing on historical records as well as his conversations with Chinese leaders over the past forty years, Kissinger examines how China has approached diplomacy, strategy, and negotiation throughout its history, and reflects on the consequences for the global balance of power in the 21st century.
Since no other country can claim a more powerful link to its ancient past and classical principles, any attempt to understand China's future world role must begin with an appreciation of its long history. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication; it was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without, and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess.
In On China, Kissinger examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy from the classical era to the present day, with a particular emphasis on the decades since the rise of Mao Zedong. He illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, and three crises in the Taiwan Straits. Drawing on his extensive personal experience with four generation of Chinese leaders, he brings to life towering figures such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, revealing how their different visions have shaped China's modern destiny.
With his singular vantage on U.S.-China relations, Kissinger traces the evolution of this fraught but crucial relationship over the past 60 years, following its dramatic course from estrangement to strategic partnership to economic interdependence, and toward an uncertain future. With a final chapter on the emerging superpower's 21st-century world role, On China provides an intimate historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one of the premier statesmen of the 20th century.
Since no other country can claim a more powerful link to its ancient past and classical principles, any attempt to understand China's future world role must begin with an appreciation of its long history. For centuries, China rarely encountered other societies of comparable size and sophistication; it was the "Middle Kingdom," treating the peoples on its periphery as vassal states. At the same time, Chinese statesmen-facing threats of invasion from without, and the contests of competing factions within-developed a canon of strategic thought that prized the virtues of subtlety, patience, and indirection over feats of martial prowess.
In On China, Kissinger examines key episodes in Chinese foreign policy from the classical era to the present day, with a particular emphasis on the decades since the rise of Mao Zedong. He illuminates the inner workings of Chinese diplomacy during such pivotal events as the initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the formation and breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance, the Korean War, Richard Nixon's historic trip to Beijing, and three crises in the Taiwan Straits. Drawing on his extensive personal experience with four generation of Chinese leaders, he brings to life towering figures such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping, revealing how their different visions have shaped China's modern destiny.
With his singular vantage on U.S.-China relations, Kissinger traces the evolution of this fraught but crucial relationship over the past 60 years, following its dramatic course from estrangement to strategic partnership to economic interdependence, and toward an uncertain future. With a final chapter on the emerging superpower's 21st-century world role, On China provides an intimate historical perspective on Chinese foreign affairs from one of the premier statesmen of the 20th century.
著者について
Henry Kissinger served as National Security Advisor and then Secretary of State under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, and has advised many other American presidents on foreign policy. He received the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize, the Presidential Medal of Freedom, and the Medal of Liberty, among other awards. He is the author of numerous books and articles on foreign policy and diplomacy, and is currently Chairman of Kissinger Associates, Inc., an international consulting firm.
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レビューを書かないかというアマゾンからの勧誘。レビューを書くためにもう一度注意して読むような本ではおよそない。だが、詳細を忘れているので、一応第一章と三章を読み返した。
中国には関心があったし、Ｏｎ Ｃｈｉｎａ（中国について）というタイトルに引かれて買ったが、およそ期待はずれの本だった。中国の社会全般について書いた本ではない。このレビューを書く参考に、アメリカのアマゾンのレビューを読んだが、驚くほど多数の読者が大変いい評価をしている。当然だろう。
日本人でもこれを読んだら非常に多くの読者が好意的な評価をするだろうと思う。なぜか。その理由は、キッシンジャーのような見解は日本の左翼の見解であり、またそれは左翼のみならず日本人の多くに常識として流布しているからだ。ましてやアメリカの読者は、日本や中国を日本人ほども普通知らないから、この本に賞賛を送るのは当然だ。（アメリカの読者を責めているのではない。逆にわれわれ日本人も欧米についてどれほど知っているというのか。）
そのアメリカのアマゾンで２０１１年６月２５日づけrandombuyerという読者が次のようにコメントしている。この本の本質をよくついている。「この本にまったくがっかりした。この本は中国共産党が書いたような本だ。中国は世界でもっとも偉大な国であり、過去いつもそうであったし、また今後もそうあり続けるだろうと。中国の歴史がまったく誤って伝えられている。中国はほとんど破壊しつくされたといってもいいくらいの状態になったが、それは中国人のとった破滅的かつ無能な行動によるものだ。しかし（自分たちの身から出たサビという点は無視され）中国人は自分たちがおかれた絶望的な状況をおどろくほど見事に処理したというふうに説明されている（つまり中国のアバタがえくぼとされている）。毛沢東とその考えやそのきまぐれ（ramblings)について、やや長い一章があてられている。毛沢東は一種の聡明な歴史的人物として描かれている。これは中国共産党の方針とぴったり一致する。」
また同じくアメリカのアマゾンのある人が、毛沢東が哲人政治家として誉めそやされ、それがキッシンジャーの自己礼賛になっていると書いている。わたしもそう感じた。毛沢東は田舎者であり、中嶋嶺雄氏によると「三国志」や「水滸伝」などの大衆小説を愛読したそうだ。中国史における武力による帝国主義的版図拡大、国内内戦、大躍進、文化大革命などはふれないか、ごくさらっとふれるだけで、あるアメリカのアマゾンの読者が言うように、中国指導部が読むことを意識したような本だ。
中国の戦略についても囲碁の例を引いて単純な説明に終始している。囲碁を知らない欧米の読者が思考麻痺になってもおかしくない。われわれなら種がすぐわかる手品のようなものだ。中国外交を囲碁の観点から説明するのにある真理があることは認めるが、この点でも、中国のもっと広範囲にわたった外交や戦略の紹介を期待していたわたしにとっては、期待はずれだった。中国の外交政策や戦略はこの本に書かれているよりもっと複雑なのだが。これは、キッシンジャーがもともと文化的要因をどちらかというと無視ないし軽視し、国際政治を物理学的（つまり文化や価値観を削ぎおとして）てとらえるという傾向が強く、これも一因かもしれない。
例えば最初に出てくる中印紛争。キッシンジャーは中国がいいように書いているが、そうではない。インドはアジア・アフリカ諸国の非同盟政策を米ソ対立の圏外に立ち、文字通り非同盟政策をおしすすめようとしたが、中国はこれを中国が指導権を握る、中国の世界戦略の一環として利用しようと考えていた。そこで邪魔になるのが大きな影響力を持つインドである。インドの権威を失墜、中国的にいえばインドの顔に泥をぬるために仕掛けたことだ。昨日までの友にこんな仕打ち。中国にとっては朝飯まえである。キッシンジャーは中国がいいように書いているが、高坂正暁によると、中国は石油がなくてあれ以上攻撃ができなかった、というのが真相だそうだ（海洋国家日本の構想）。
日本についても誤解だらけである。三流の学者や政治家ならこれでもいいだろうが。キッシンジャーの日本の理解力は三流で、かつ日本の左翼・左派の見方と大いに共通している。この本には書いてないが、アメリカがその同盟国を無視して中国と関係改善に走った。そのため日本は中国との関係修復をせまられた。その日本の動きを、キッシンジャーは日本のアメリカに対する裏切りととらえ、彼にとっては「日本人は世界最大の裏切り者だ」となる。こんなキッシンジャーだから日本に対して誤解だらけでも不思議ではない。(以前エドウィン・ライシャワーのMy Life Between Japan and Americaという本を読んだことがある。そのなかにｷｯｼジャーも出てくるが、そのふれ方に「？」と思ったことがある。)
中国を持ち上げるために日本が曲解されている。キッシンジャーのこの本のなかから一つ、二つ例をあげる。
キッシンジャーは、日本人は朝鮮半島が日本の安全保障にとって重要であると考えていたという（これはまったく間違っているというわけではない）。中国は朝鮮半島の情勢に強い関心をもっていた。というのは、海からの（中国への）侵略者（日本？）はこの回廊を通ってくるからだ。朝鮮における中国（清国）の影響力が落ちると、日本はすかさず中国にかわって朝鮮半島に影響力をおよぼそうとした、というようなことを言っている。
古代における日本の朝鮮半島介入は、これはわけあってのこと（日本の安全保障）。当時朝鮮百済からの渡来者亡命者が日本にたくさんおり、彼らが日本の政策に大きな影響をあたえたのではないかと想像されたる。
それ以後豊臣秀吉の無謀かつ誇大妄想による朝鮮征服の試みはべつとして、日本は朝鮮半島の情勢をそのまま受け入れたきた。そのあいだ朝鮮にたえず圧力をかけていたのは中国である。日本は中国の優越的地位をそのまま受け入れていた。そのあいだ日本は朝鮮半島をあわよくば征服などと考えはしていないし、「中国の影響力が弱まり次第、今度は自分が代わって朝鮮に・・・」などと考えていたことはない。
明治以後、中国（清国）の地位が半島で弱まると、すかさず日本が・・・。これは間違い。明治になりなぜ突然日本は朝鮮半島に戦略的な関心をもつようになったか。それはにわかに朝鮮半島のまわりが、いや、朝鮮半島にかぎらず日本のまわりも、波がうねり始め高くなった。それは日本の野心によるものではない。それは黒船つまり帝国主義欧米がこの地域に到来したことによるものである。中国、朝鮮、日本は従来のような振るまいは許されなくなり、まったく新しい対応をせまられることになった。キッシンジャーがなにかほのめかすように、日本の軍国主義によるものではない。
極東で、日本の関係でいえば朝鮮半島で、イギリスとロシアがつばぜり合いをしていた。そのとばっちりで、日本がこれらの国に占領されたり分割されたりするのを、日本の指導者たちは恐れたのである。それを防ぐには、中国（清国）がしっかり朝鮮半島の戸締りをしてくれれば済んだのだが、中国はキッシンジャーの書いているとおりその必要性は認めずその考えもなく、また当然その意志も欠けていた。とばっちりを受けた朝鮮にはいい迷惑だが、そのため朝鮮半島をめぐって日中（日清）が争うはめになったのである。日本が恐れたのは中国ではなく、欧米列強だった。日本が当初希望したように、中国が日本と危機意識を共有し、共同で危機管理にあたってくれれば問題はなかった。ところが、中国はその伝統的な中華思想と日本蔑視から脱けだすことはできなかった。したがって日本は単独で自己の独立をはかるほか方法がなくなった。
キッシンジャーの日本誤解（というより、曲解）の例のうち、もう一つあげれば、満州事変と日支事変（日中戦争）。満州事変は日本政府が、あるいは参謀本部や陸軍省が計画したわけではない。それは出先の関東軍が「謀反的」にやったものだ。しかし、結局それを政府が承認したのだから、日本政府の責任はまぬがれないが。
１９３７年（昭和１２年〉日本が中国本土占領に乗り出したということを言っているが、これは日中の偶発事件が処理できず、拡大し、最終的にアメリカとの戦争にまでなった。この時期における日本の外交政策は欠陥だらけで、その観点からすると日本の政治や外交を弁護できるものではないし、また他国民に多大な犠牲と被害をおよぼしたが、しかしキッシンジャーがいうように（あるいは、臭わせるように）日本がナチドイツのように意図的に侵略の意思をもって拡大したわけではない。
この本は中国を一方的に持ち上げる本である。無垢な中国という像を描くため、日本を事実に反するように貶めて、つまり日本を悪者に仕立て上げ、それが効果的になっている。
(村田良平回想録にも平成２４年５月１３日づけでコメントを寄せています。読んで頂ければ喜びます。）
中国には関心があったし、Ｏｎ Ｃｈｉｎａ（中国について）というタイトルに引かれて買ったが、およそ期待はずれの本だった。中国の社会全般について書いた本ではない。このレビューを書く参考に、アメリカのアマゾンのレビューを読んだが、驚くほど多数の読者が大変いい評価をしている。当然だろう。
日本人でもこれを読んだら非常に多くの読者が好意的な評価をするだろうと思う。なぜか。その理由は、キッシンジャーのような見解は日本の左翼の見解であり、またそれは左翼のみならず日本人の多くに常識として流布しているからだ。ましてやアメリカの読者は、日本や中国を日本人ほども普通知らないから、この本に賞賛を送るのは当然だ。（アメリカの読者を責めているのではない。逆にわれわれ日本人も欧米についてどれほど知っているというのか。）
そのアメリカのアマゾンで２０１１年６月２５日づけrandombuyerという読者が次のようにコメントしている。この本の本質をよくついている。「この本にまったくがっかりした。この本は中国共産党が書いたような本だ。中国は世界でもっとも偉大な国であり、過去いつもそうであったし、また今後もそうあり続けるだろうと。中国の歴史がまったく誤って伝えられている。中国はほとんど破壊しつくされたといってもいいくらいの状態になったが、それは中国人のとった破滅的かつ無能な行動によるものだ。しかし（自分たちの身から出たサビという点は無視され）中国人は自分たちがおかれた絶望的な状況をおどろくほど見事に処理したというふうに説明されている（つまり中国のアバタがえくぼとされている）。毛沢東とその考えやそのきまぐれ（ramblings)について、やや長い一章があてられている。毛沢東は一種の聡明な歴史的人物として描かれている。これは中国共産党の方針とぴったり一致する。」
また同じくアメリカのアマゾンのある人が、毛沢東が哲人政治家として誉めそやされ、それがキッシンジャーの自己礼賛になっていると書いている。わたしもそう感じた。毛沢東は田舎者であり、中嶋嶺雄氏によると「三国志」や「水滸伝」などの大衆小説を愛読したそうだ。中国史における武力による帝国主義的版図拡大、国内内戦、大躍進、文化大革命などはふれないか、ごくさらっとふれるだけで、あるアメリカのアマゾンの読者が言うように、中国指導部が読むことを意識したような本だ。
中国の戦略についても囲碁の例を引いて単純な説明に終始している。囲碁を知らない欧米の読者が思考麻痺になってもおかしくない。われわれなら種がすぐわかる手品のようなものだ。中国外交を囲碁の観点から説明するのにある真理があることは認めるが、この点でも、中国のもっと広範囲にわたった外交や戦略の紹介を期待していたわたしにとっては、期待はずれだった。中国の外交政策や戦略はこの本に書かれているよりもっと複雑なのだが。これは、キッシンジャーがもともと文化的要因をどちらかというと無視ないし軽視し、国際政治を物理学的（つまり文化や価値観を削ぎおとして）てとらえるという傾向が強く、これも一因かもしれない。
例えば最初に出てくる中印紛争。キッシンジャーは中国がいいように書いているが、そうではない。インドはアジア・アフリカ諸国の非同盟政策を米ソ対立の圏外に立ち、文字通り非同盟政策をおしすすめようとしたが、中国はこれを中国が指導権を握る、中国の世界戦略の一環として利用しようと考えていた。そこで邪魔になるのが大きな影響力を持つインドである。インドの権威を失墜、中国的にいえばインドの顔に泥をぬるために仕掛けたことだ。昨日までの友にこんな仕打ち。中国にとっては朝飯まえである。キッシンジャーは中国がいいように書いているが、高坂正暁によると、中国は石油がなくてあれ以上攻撃ができなかった、というのが真相だそうだ（海洋国家日本の構想）。
日本についても誤解だらけである。三流の学者や政治家ならこれでもいいだろうが。キッシンジャーの日本の理解力は三流で、かつ日本の左翼・左派の見方と大いに共通している。この本には書いてないが、アメリカがその同盟国を無視して中国と関係改善に走った。そのため日本は中国との関係修復をせまられた。その日本の動きを、キッシンジャーは日本のアメリカに対する裏切りととらえ、彼にとっては「日本人は世界最大の裏切り者だ」となる。こんなキッシンジャーだから日本に対して誤解だらけでも不思議ではない。(以前エドウィン・ライシャワーのMy Life Between Japan and Americaという本を読んだことがある。そのなかにｷｯｼジャーも出てくるが、そのふれ方に「？」と思ったことがある。)
中国を持ち上げるために日本が曲解されている。キッシンジャーのこの本のなかから一つ、二つ例をあげる。
キッシンジャーは、日本人は朝鮮半島が日本の安全保障にとって重要であると考えていたという（これはまったく間違っているというわけではない）。中国は朝鮮半島の情勢に強い関心をもっていた。というのは、海からの（中国への）侵略者（日本？）はこの回廊を通ってくるからだ。朝鮮における中国（清国）の影響力が落ちると、日本はすかさず中国にかわって朝鮮半島に影響力をおよぼそうとした、というようなことを言っている。
古代における日本の朝鮮半島介入は、これはわけあってのこと（日本の安全保障）。当時朝鮮百済からの渡来者亡命者が日本にたくさんおり、彼らが日本の政策に大きな影響をあたえたのではないかと想像されたる。
それ以後豊臣秀吉の無謀かつ誇大妄想による朝鮮征服の試みはべつとして、日本は朝鮮半島の情勢をそのまま受け入れたきた。そのあいだ朝鮮にたえず圧力をかけていたのは中国である。日本は中国の優越的地位をそのまま受け入れていた。そのあいだ日本は朝鮮半島をあわよくば征服などと考えはしていないし、「中国の影響力が弱まり次第、今度は自分が代わって朝鮮に・・・」などと考えていたことはない。
明治以後、中国（清国）の地位が半島で弱まると、すかさず日本が・・・。これは間違い。明治になりなぜ突然日本は朝鮮半島に戦略的な関心をもつようになったか。それはにわかに朝鮮半島のまわりが、いや、朝鮮半島にかぎらず日本のまわりも、波がうねり始め高くなった。それは日本の野心によるものではない。それは黒船つまり帝国主義欧米がこの地域に到来したことによるものである。中国、朝鮮、日本は従来のような振るまいは許されなくなり、まったく新しい対応をせまられることになった。キッシンジャーがなにかほのめかすように、日本の軍国主義によるものではない。
極東で、日本の関係でいえば朝鮮半島で、イギリスとロシアがつばぜり合いをしていた。そのとばっちりで、日本がこれらの国に占領されたり分割されたりするのを、日本の指導者たちは恐れたのである。それを防ぐには、中国（清国）がしっかり朝鮮半島の戸締りをしてくれれば済んだのだが、中国はキッシンジャーの書いているとおりその必要性は認めずその考えもなく、また当然その意志も欠けていた。とばっちりを受けた朝鮮にはいい迷惑だが、そのため朝鮮半島をめぐって日中（日清）が争うはめになったのである。日本が恐れたのは中国ではなく、欧米列強だった。日本が当初希望したように、中国が日本と危機意識を共有し、共同で危機管理にあたってくれれば問題はなかった。ところが、中国はその伝統的な中華思想と日本蔑視から脱けだすことはできなかった。したがって日本は単独で自己の独立をはかるほか方法がなくなった。
キッシンジャーの日本誤解（というより、曲解）の例のうち、もう一つあげれば、満州事変と日支事変（日中戦争）。満州事変は日本政府が、あるいは参謀本部や陸軍省が計画したわけではない。それは出先の関東軍が「謀反的」にやったものだ。しかし、結局それを政府が承認したのだから、日本政府の責任はまぬがれないが。
１９３７年（昭和１２年〉日本が中国本土占領に乗り出したということを言っているが、これは日中の偶発事件が処理できず、拡大し、最終的にアメリカとの戦争にまでなった。この時期における日本の外交政策は欠陥だらけで、その観点からすると日本の政治や外交を弁護できるものではないし、また他国民に多大な犠牲と被害をおよぼしたが、しかしキッシンジャーがいうように（あるいは、臭わせるように）日本がナチドイツのように意図的に侵略の意思をもって拡大したわけではない。
この本は中国を一方的に持ち上げる本である。無垢な中国という像を描くため、日本を事実に反するように貶めて、つまり日本を悪者に仕立て上げ、それが効果的になっている。
(村田良平回想録にも平成２４年５月１３日づけでコメントを寄せています。読んで頂ければ喜びます。）
Amazon.com で最も参考になったカスタマーレビュー (beta)
Amazon.com:
93件のカスタマーレビュー
315 人中、259人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
Kissinger's On China becomes the GO-TO Book for our Generation - Just Extraordinary - FIVE STARS !!!!!!
2011/5/18
形式:ハードカバー|Amazonが確認した購入
Prior to the publication of this book the definitive resource on China was Jonathan Spence's "In Search of Modern China". Spence the Yale Professor, is still indispensible to a modern understanding of this remarkable country. Now there is a second more up to date source and that is Henry Kissinger. The former Secretary of State who is now 88 years fortunately has taken the time to put together this incredible piece of work that only he could have created.
The book demonstrates the necessity of having lived a very long productive life and generating wisdom capable of distilling his understanding of a country down to a 530 page volume of work. It is as good as any of his previous works (13 with this one) and for my money I now put this book in Kissinger's top three, along with WHITE HOUSE YEARS and DIPLOMACY.
First the MECHANICS of the Book
If you are going to read the hard copy as opposed to digital, you are in for a treat. The font is beautiful, and the paper used to print the volume is delicious. I say this because if you are a heavy reader; you really appreciate turning the pages of beautifully textured pages. I annotate all of my books, writing in margins, in the back on blank pages and just about everywhere, and I love writing on beautiful page that take the ink nicely. This book was crafted professionally as good as it gets.
The ORGANIZATION of On China
The Secretary has made 40 trips to China in his lifetime, enough that he should be the Honorary Ambassador to the country. He is thoroughly infused in the history of China, and he certainly does give you the history. There are 18 chapters plus an epilogue spread over 531 pages. There are 36 pages of footnotes and it is obvious that the Secretary had considerable organizational help with the footnotes which is to be expected.
The first three chapters or 91 pages are devoted to the nation's history and Kissinger gets it right. I have made many trips to China, but I still have problems with the language. When you read any book on China, you will have problems with pronunciation. What I do is quickly scan the book writing down 50 or a 100 names or terms I can't pronounce, and then head for the first Chinese restaurant in town, and ask for help with the words. People love to help, especially when you are taking an interest in their culture and language.
The guts of the book begins on page 91 or Chapter 4 which is Mao's Continuous Revolution. This chapter is superb and superbly written. If you study American China relations, the question that is always stipulated is whether or not America lost China in 1949. Kissinger correctly reminds us that China might never have been ours to lose, so we asking the wrong question.
Mao always believed that the Confucian order had for thousands of years kept China a weak China. Confucius preached HARMONY, and Mao believed that progress could only come from brutal confrontations both in China and with outside adversaries for China to advance. Mao also believed that these confrontations would happen naturally, but if they did not, he was not beyond creating confrontations even if they had to be within the Communist party to kept progress going, as he understood progress.
Chapter 6 which deals with China Confronts Both Superpowers is another section that only Kissinger could have written. It is here that China confronts the Soviet Union creating the Sino-Soviet split, and the United States with the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The chapter is riveting, and will affect and change your understanding of history.
MY ANALYSIS
The book is indispensible. You cannot understand China and modern Asia without having this book under your belt. One would have to be foolish to visit China and not read this book first to truly benefit from such a trip. Mao was famous for the Long March, and this book is a long journey for the reader but it is very rewarding. The Secretary takes us through the Road to Reconciliation in Chapter 8, and then the first encounters with Nixon, himself and the Chinese leadership in Chapter 9.
It is a fascinating portrayal of power meeting power head to head, and the respect that even enemies can hold for each other. It is now generally accepted that only Nixon the hardened right winger could have opened the door to China and brought the American people along with him, because he Nixon was viewed as tough. Perhaps in a decade or two, Harvard will accept what most historians have already accepted.
In Chapter 11 we witness the End of the Mao Era. Zhou Enlai falls and Deng's first return to power begins. Kissinger loves writing about Deng and calls him the indestructible Deng throughout chapter 12. Keep in mind that it was Deng who opened up modern China and began the reforms that were necessary for China to assert itself years later internationally and economically.
For those readers that know very little of China, this book is a whirlwind tour of a country fast gaining hegemony over Asia. You need to read Chapter 13 on the Third Viet Nam to understand how China is capable of dealing with its neighbors. Had we handled Viet Nam this way, the outcome and history would have been different.
CONCLUSION:
Henry Kissinger ON CHINA is destined to become a best seller and in the process will greatly help an America that knows very little about China except for newspapers, to understand not just the history of this vital country, but its future and the nexus of that future with America's future. No one can ignore China, so the sooner we as Americans gain the understanding that we need to make intelligent decisions, the better off we will all be. If you have an interest in China whatsoever, run to read this book, and do not put it down until you are finished with it. Good luck and thank you for reading this review.
Richard C. Stoyeck
ASSIDE:
I will share something extraordinary with you. When you read a book like this, you will have a better understanding of China than 98% of the people living in China and 95% of the Chinese people living in America. I am still shocked when I meet Chinese people in this country young and old who have next to no understanding of Chinese history prior to Mao. They do not know the name Sun Yat-sen, or even Zhou Enlai, and forget about the Cultural Revolution unless they lived through it. Even the tragedy of Tiananmen Square is fast fading from memory.
It reminds me of German history in the post Hitler period. Anybody in Germany who was educated post 1950 has very little to no understanding of the Hitler period. It is simply glossed over as a dark period in German history; the teachers do not know what to say. Just amazing.
The book demonstrates the necessity of having lived a very long productive life and generating wisdom capable of distilling his understanding of a country down to a 530 page volume of work. It is as good as any of his previous works (13 with this one) and for my money I now put this book in Kissinger's top three, along with WHITE HOUSE YEARS and DIPLOMACY.
First the MECHANICS of the Book
If you are going to read the hard copy as opposed to digital, you are in for a treat. The font is beautiful, and the paper used to print the volume is delicious. I say this because if you are a heavy reader; you really appreciate turning the pages of beautifully textured pages. I annotate all of my books, writing in margins, in the back on blank pages and just about everywhere, and I love writing on beautiful page that take the ink nicely. This book was crafted professionally as good as it gets.
The ORGANIZATION of On China
The Secretary has made 40 trips to China in his lifetime, enough that he should be the Honorary Ambassador to the country. He is thoroughly infused in the history of China, and he certainly does give you the history. There are 18 chapters plus an epilogue spread over 531 pages. There are 36 pages of footnotes and it is obvious that the Secretary had considerable organizational help with the footnotes which is to be expected.
The first three chapters or 91 pages are devoted to the nation's history and Kissinger gets it right. I have made many trips to China, but I still have problems with the language. When you read any book on China, you will have problems with pronunciation. What I do is quickly scan the book writing down 50 or a 100 names or terms I can't pronounce, and then head for the first Chinese restaurant in town, and ask for help with the words. People love to help, especially when you are taking an interest in their culture and language.
The guts of the book begins on page 91 or Chapter 4 which is Mao's Continuous Revolution. This chapter is superb and superbly written. If you study American China relations, the question that is always stipulated is whether or not America lost China in 1949. Kissinger correctly reminds us that China might never have been ours to lose, so we asking the wrong question.
Mao always believed that the Confucian order had for thousands of years kept China a weak China. Confucius preached HARMONY, and Mao believed that progress could only come from brutal confrontations both in China and with outside adversaries for China to advance. Mao also believed that these confrontations would happen naturally, but if they did not, he was not beyond creating confrontations even if they had to be within the Communist party to kept progress going, as he understood progress.
Chapter 6 which deals with China Confronts Both Superpowers is another section that only Kissinger could have written. It is here that China confronts the Soviet Union creating the Sino-Soviet split, and the United States with the Taiwan Strait Crisis. The chapter is riveting, and will affect and change your understanding of history.
MY ANALYSIS
The book is indispensible. You cannot understand China and modern Asia without having this book under your belt. One would have to be foolish to visit China and not read this book first to truly benefit from such a trip. Mao was famous for the Long March, and this book is a long journey for the reader but it is very rewarding. The Secretary takes us through the Road to Reconciliation in Chapter 8, and then the first encounters with Nixon, himself and the Chinese leadership in Chapter 9.
It is a fascinating portrayal of power meeting power head to head, and the respect that even enemies can hold for each other. It is now generally accepted that only Nixon the hardened right winger could have opened the door to China and brought the American people along with him, because he Nixon was viewed as tough. Perhaps in a decade or two, Harvard will accept what most historians have already accepted.
In Chapter 11 we witness the End of the Mao Era. Zhou Enlai falls and Deng's first return to power begins. Kissinger loves writing about Deng and calls him the indestructible Deng throughout chapter 12. Keep in mind that it was Deng who opened up modern China and began the reforms that were necessary for China to assert itself years later internationally and economically.
For those readers that know very little of China, this book is a whirlwind tour of a country fast gaining hegemony over Asia. You need to read Chapter 13 on the Third Viet Nam to understand how China is capable of dealing with its neighbors. Had we handled Viet Nam this way, the outcome and history would have been different.
CONCLUSION:
Henry Kissinger ON CHINA is destined to become a best seller and in the process will greatly help an America that knows very little about China except for newspapers, to understand not just the history of this vital country, but its future and the nexus of that future with America's future. No one can ignore China, so the sooner we as Americans gain the understanding that we need to make intelligent decisions, the better off we will all be. If you have an interest in China whatsoever, run to read this book, and do not put it down until you are finished with it. Good luck and thank you for reading this review.
Richard C. Stoyeck
ASSIDE:
I will share something extraordinary with you. When you read a book like this, you will have a better understanding of China than 98% of the people living in China and 95% of the Chinese people living in America. I am still shocked when I meet Chinese people in this country young and old who have next to no understanding of Chinese history prior to Mao. They do not know the name Sun Yat-sen, or even Zhou Enlai, and forget about the Cultural Revolution unless they lived through it. Even the tragedy of Tiananmen Square is fast fading from memory.
It reminds me of German history in the post Hitler period. Anybody in Germany who was educated post 1950 has very little to no understanding of the Hitler period. It is simply glossed over as a dark period in German history; the teachers do not know what to say. Just amazing.
67 人中、55人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
at times very interesting, at times pretentious, often nave
2011/10/27
形式:ハードカバー|Amazonが確認した購入
The book is worth reading. And yet, a novice to the subject of China, its history, and especially China's foreign relations, should be advised to take Dr. Kissinger's analysis with great caution and skepticism. Kissinger analysis is at times very interesting, at times pretentious, and, unfortunately, very often nave. Of course he "was there," he experienced a great deal of what he describes, and certainly he had studied the subject. But instead of helping his analysis, his own experience stands on the way of objectivity. First, Kissinger is in awe of Mao Zedong. Mao can do no wrong for Kissinger. All Mao's decisions are based on meticulous planning; informed by the millenia of China's culture; and with long term considerations. In Kissinger's view, when Stalin maneuvers in some negotiations, he is conniving and conspiring, but when Mao is doing the same, he is planning, he is thinking, and following ancient Chinese strategy. Historical facts do not sustain that picture. Although Mao clearly was very skillful revolutionary, his behavior was also very erratic and often reckless. Kissinger rarely, if ever, admits that. For example The Great Leap Forward that led to famine and estimated 30-40 million deaths and set China back decades in economic development is barely mentioned by the author. The destructive and humiliating Cultural Revolution is actually presented in a positive light by Kissinger. Maybe he didn't intend the portrayal to be that way, but Kissinger writes about Cultural Revolution as it would be a political and philosophical campaign that simply didn't fulfill Mao's expectations. It was a "titanic struggle." The fact that China's society and culture was almost destroyed doesn't seem to be bothering Kissinger that much. For him Mao is still the "philosopher king," and no, there is no sarcasm in Kissinger's words. Kissinger seems to be impressed by Mao's skillful use of poetry and ancient proverbs, but doesn't see the ignorant, paranoid, and delusional side of the man who was responsible for destructive policies throughout the 50 and 60s. That's why I would argue that Kissinger's portrayal of Mao is nave.
Second, Kissinger has an annoying habit of explaining all in terms of Chinese culture. Obviously, the culture does play an important role, but when all is explained by culture, nothing is. There is a "cultural explanation" for the Chinese being assertive in politics, and there is a "cultural explanation" when they are diffident. When they wait patiently when they are overrun by others, well, that's their culture, they know from thousands of years of history that the tide will turn one day. When they fight and resist, well, there is also some cultural explanation.
Kissinger's analysis gets better the closer he gets to the present times. Although he never abandons his respect for Mao, his description of the reforms under Den Xiaoping beginning in 1978 is fascinating, not so much the fact that China finally began economic expansion, but how difficult and even uncertain the reforms were in the early years. Of course, Kissinger cannot avoid a constant reminder of his own importance throughout all these years. His grandiosity is somewhat annoying (and that's why I said the book is at times pretentious).
Finally, I would argue that the epilogue is the best part of the book: a look into the future of China and U.S.-China relations. In short, I am rather disappointed with the description and analysis of Mao's Years, but satisfied with the later parts of the book. And overall, knowing Henry Kissinger's work and writing, I expected a greater mind.
Second, Kissinger has an annoying habit of explaining all in terms of Chinese culture. Obviously, the culture does play an important role, but when all is explained by culture, nothing is. There is a "cultural explanation" for the Chinese being assertive in politics, and there is a "cultural explanation" when they are diffident. When they wait patiently when they are overrun by others, well, that's their culture, they know from thousands of years of history that the tide will turn one day. When they fight and resist, well, there is also some cultural explanation.
Kissinger's analysis gets better the closer he gets to the present times. Although he never abandons his respect for Mao, his description of the reforms under Den Xiaoping beginning in 1978 is fascinating, not so much the fact that China finally began economic expansion, but how difficult and even uncertain the reforms were in the early years. Of course, Kissinger cannot avoid a constant reminder of his own importance throughout all these years. His grandiosity is somewhat annoying (and that's why I said the book is at times pretentious).
Finally, I would argue that the epilogue is the best part of the book: a look into the future of China and U.S.-China relations. In short, I am rather disappointed with the description and analysis of Mao's Years, but satisfied with the later parts of the book. And overall, knowing Henry Kissinger's work and writing, I expected a greater mind.
64 人中、50人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
Excellent Material from an Excellent Source
2011/5/21
形式:ハードカバー
Dr. Kissinger has had personal experience with four generations of Chinese leaders, as well as building an appreciation of its long history. His "On China" primarily covers China's initial encounters between China and modern European powers, the breakdown of its alliance with Russia, rationale behind and its involvement in the Korean War, and President Nixon's historic trip to Beijing. The book is an attempt to explain differences in how the Chinese both view themselves as an exceptional civilization (cultural; non--applicable to other nations) and think about foreign and military strategy, vs. the U.S. (God-given, with an obligation to spread to others). Most of "On China" consists of a readable, but detailed history of China, along with how those events have shaped its leaders. Kissinger's historical accounting begins with with Confucius, and goes on to also summarize the forced opening of China by Great Britain and other 'barbarians,' Japanese and Russian occupation, Mao's takeover and creation of continual chaos, reclaiming former boundaries (India, Tibet, Inner Mongolia; crises over Taiwan), rationale for Sino-U.S. rapprochement, the 1989 Tiananmen Square Massacre, and China's subsequent healing and economic resurgence initiated and led by Deng Xiaoping.
Early China was plagued by internecine conflict that threatened the empire's sustainability. Confucius (551 B.C.- 479 B.C.), an itinerant philosopher largely ignored in his lifetime, provided the 'glue' that has both kept the empire together since, while uniting its people, and providing much of Asia's 'state religion.' Expertise in Confucian thought became the key to advancement after the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - A.D. 220) adopted Confucius' thinking. In doing so, the State assumed a moral obligation to provide virtue and harmony, and its people took on an obligation to obey the state as well as honor their ancestors and emphasize learning.
Between 1405-1433, China's Admiral Zheng sent out a fleet of large, technically advanced ships to Africa, the Middle East, India, and other closer locales. The fleet's size, number of vessels, and sophistication dwarfed that of the Spanish Armada that was created 150-years later. The purpose of the voyages is unclear to historians, and the next Emperor ordered the fleet destroyed, along with Zheng's records of those voyages. The expeditions were never repeated. More significantly, withdrawal from Western nations limited access to new ideas and led to China being physically and economically dominated by others from the mid-1800s until the 1990s - its 'Century of Humiliation.' (China's share of the world's GDP was about 25% in 1500, grew to approximately 30% in 1820, and fell to about 4% in 1950.) Deng's re-opening China's economy in 1979 brought China back - it is now the world's #2 economy and expected to become #1 in about 15 years, based on purchasing-power parity.
As an aside, Kissinger also notes that China's turbulent history has taught its leaders that not every problem has a solution, and that too great an emphasis on total mastery over specific events could upset world harmony. Important lessons that the U.S. could benefit from.
Keys to understanding China: 1)Confucianism - a single universal standard of conduct and social cohesion. 2)Sun Tzu - outsmarting an opponent = good, conflict = bad. 3)China's recent history of humiliation. 4)Fear of social disorder.
Human-rights activists will not be satisfied with Kissinger's lack of umbrage on human rights in China - especially regarding Mao; realists, however, will recognize that the passage of time, China's rapid economic improvement and Confucian history make the topic much less important to the Chinese. Those more sardonic will simply note that Kissinger's firm does extensive business in China and he does not want to risk that. Kissinger also does not cover China's newly acquired economic power vs. the U.S. via its extensive holding of U.S. debt, our recent loss of respect due to the 'Great Recession' and our loss of manufacturing leadership. Regardless, "On China" is essential reading; it also clearly demonstrates why Dr. Kissinger is renowned among foreign policy experts.
Early China was plagued by internecine conflict that threatened the empire's sustainability. Confucius (551 B.C.- 479 B.C.), an itinerant philosopher largely ignored in his lifetime, provided the 'glue' that has both kept the empire together since, while uniting its people, and providing much of Asia's 'state religion.' Expertise in Confucian thought became the key to advancement after the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - A.D. 220) adopted Confucius' thinking. In doing so, the State assumed a moral obligation to provide virtue and harmony, and its people took on an obligation to obey the state as well as honor their ancestors and emphasize learning.
Between 1405-1433, China's Admiral Zheng sent out a fleet of large, technically advanced ships to Africa, the Middle East, India, and other closer locales. The fleet's size, number of vessels, and sophistication dwarfed that of the Spanish Armada that was created 150-years later. The purpose of the voyages is unclear to historians, and the next Emperor ordered the fleet destroyed, along with Zheng's records of those voyages. The expeditions were never repeated. More significantly, withdrawal from Western nations limited access to new ideas and led to China being physically and economically dominated by others from the mid-1800s until the 1990s - its 'Century of Humiliation.' (China's share of the world's GDP was about 25% in 1500, grew to approximately 30% in 1820, and fell to about 4% in 1950.) Deng's re-opening China's economy in 1979 brought China back - it is now the world's #2 economy and expected to become #1 in about 15 years, based on purchasing-power parity.
As an aside, Kissinger also notes that China's turbulent history has taught its leaders that not every problem has a solution, and that too great an emphasis on total mastery over specific events could upset world harmony. Important lessons that the U.S. could benefit from.
Keys to understanding China: 1)Confucianism - a single universal standard of conduct and social cohesion. 2)Sun Tzu - outsmarting an opponent = good, conflict = bad. 3)China's recent history of humiliation. 4)Fear of social disorder.
Human-rights activists will not be satisfied with Kissinger's lack of umbrage on human rights in China - especially regarding Mao; realists, however, will recognize that the passage of time, China's rapid economic improvement and Confucian history make the topic much less important to the Chinese. Those more sardonic will simply note that Kissinger's firm does extensive business in China and he does not want to risk that. Kissinger also does not cover China's newly acquired economic power vs. the U.S. via its extensive holding of U.S. debt, our recent loss of respect due to the 'Great Recession' and our loss of manufacturing leadership. Regardless, "On China" is essential reading; it also clearly demonstrates why Dr. Kissinger is renowned among foreign policy experts.
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