Normative Ethics (Dimensions of Philosophy) [ペーパーバック]

Most everyone who was introduced to Yale Professor Shelly Kagan was introduced from his brilliant debate with William Lane Craig where he absolutely shined. In fact, I was so impressed from his debating skills I wanted to read his books.

1. Normative Ethics
2. The Limits of Morality
3. Death (The Open Yale Courses Series)

Normative Ethics is the branch of philosophical ethics that investigates the set of questions that arise when considering how one ought to act, morally speaking. In other words, normative ethics is concerned with and examines moral claims. The book under review is probably the flagship book on moral theories. Though it was written for graduate level philosophy majors, it can be easily read by anyone interested in morality and moral theories. Traditional moral theories rest on principles that determine whether an action is right or wrong and this book examines the most widely accepted extant theories.

I highly recommend this book to anybody interested in ethics as well as watching any of the videos of Shelly, as he is extremely interesting and informative person.

I have used Kagan's Normative Ethics, supplemented by several primary sources, for over a decade in my mid-level moral philosophy course that focuses on normative ethics. It is, in my opinion, the best overview of normative ethics available. It is not a moral problems text and it doesn't discuss metaethical issues except to clarify what they are and (largely) set them aside. It is relentlessly focused on normative ethical theory. The organization of the book is excellent, beginning the substantive discussion with theories of individual well-being. It is not just plausible forms of consequentialism that need to have an account of individual well-being. Commonsense morality, too, and many nonconsequentialist theories of morality take the promotion of individual well-being to be ONE relevant moral consideration. And deontological theories that impose a constraint on causing (or intending) harm, will need an account of harm, which (most plausibly) involves an account of well-being. So, this is a good starting place. The development from there can be seen as a very logically ordered discussion of a series of questions: Is individual well-being all that matters to the value of a state of affair from a moral perspective? If not, what other factors are relevant: equality in the distribution of well-being, preference for the benefit of those worst off, distribution in accordance with desert, merit, or entitlement? Then, is the promotion of what is valuable from a moral perspective all that matters in determining how we should act? If not, what else is relevant? Are there (non-value-based) constraints on promoting good outcomes--constraints against doing/intending harm, lying, breaking promises, etc.? If so, what is the "shape" of these constraints and how are they to be justified. If there is a standing moral reason to promote the good, within whatever moral constraints exist, does this lead to morality "demanding too much"? And, finally, then, Kagan turns his attention to moral foundations: how are we to justify whatever moral factors are relevant.

One extraordinary characteristic of this book deserves special mention. Some will find it a serious drawback; I find it a very attractive feature. In the body of the textbook, there is not one mention of any philosopher. Nowhere in the body of the book does one hear views ATTRIBUTED to Aristotle, Hobbes, Bentham, Kant, Mill, Rawls, etc. The book does, though, have a long annotated section on "Further Readings" that points students to the relevant literature. Those who want, primarily, to teach students the history of normative ethics will find this a serious drawback, though it can be addressed with supplemental reading. Those who want students primarily to engage with normative ethical theory directly, will find it an attractive feature of the book. I have students read a number of primary sources, including Bentham, Mill, and Kant. But I like the idea that the textbook that organizes our discussions is focused on the theory-space and the various arguments that can take place in that space, rather than who said what in the history of normative ethics.

I have had great success using this book and the student reception has been terrific. I routinely recommend it to new graduate students, or prospective graduate students, in philosophy who have a weak background in normative ethics.

Shelly Kagan is a very clear, sensible writer and his book covers a lot of ground, but it is not a very successful introduction to normative ethics, certainly not for undergraduates, and one couldn't imagine a person not already interested in the subject who would be drawn to learn more about it from reading this book. The problem is that Kagan is excessively concerned with gerrymandering between philosophical positions rather than getting to the heart (or even near the heart) of any one of them. So the presentations are all of the "if you happen to think this, then you might think that" variety. He also has a hobby-horse, that the positions one adopts on the foundations of ethics or on the proper focal point for ethics (is ethical judgment directed essentially toward acts, rules, or aspects of character?) do not necessarily determine the position one will take about what the primary factor in ethical judgment should be. So, for instance, a person who thinks that the key to morality is securing the best outcomes (rather than, say, upholding a moral code) may nevertheless think that the best way to secure the best outcomes is through the upholding of rules. This point is repeated with astonishing frequency in just about every discussion. Kagan is an agile and scrupulous arguer who knows his field and does his best to convey the state of discussion on many issues up to a moderate degree of depth (though the discussion of moral dilemmas is especially thin and does not enter into the details of any particular dilemma). This book will be informative, though unsatisfying, to committed readers but few newcomers to philosophy will get through it.