Making Social Science Matter: Why Social Inquiry Fails and How it Can Succeed Again [ペーパーバック]

On the back of this book is a short endorsement: "This is social science that matters." Fairly innocuous, I'm sure you'll agree. Yet it wasn't the quotation that caught my eye: rather the name of the endorser, one M. Pierre Bourdieu. As anyone familiar with his work will know, Bourdieu - currently the world's leading sociologist - does not endorse books, because (he argues) to do so is to play the 'back-slapping' and unmistakeably self-interested game of citations and counter-endorsements which makes or breaks today's academic careers. So why, then, does the ascetically-principled high priest of Sociology deign to break the habit of a lifetime for this unassuming work? The simple answer is: it really is that good. This is the first work of social theory/methodology for a long time which actually made me enthusiastic about the future of the social sciences outside the insulated groves of academia. By re-inventing the Aristotelian concept of "phronesis" - essentially a form of reasoning which is neither scientific (in the sense of following universal rules) nor technical (being something which is simply 'done' without rational reflection), but geared towards the "deliberation of values with reference to praxis" - Flyvbjerg finds a solid ground from which to start fighting back against previously devastating critiques which quite rightly ask questions such as "social science: so what?". Rather than seeking to answer this criticism by producing universal rules along the lines of the natural sciences, he argues, social science should aim to generate "power-conscious" interventions geared towards opening dialogue and generating consensus which will enable society to move forward. Social science, for Flyvbjerg, becomes an arena of expertise which seeks not to tell people "what to do" or "why they are doing", but rather to ask "where they are going" and "is this desirable?". As someone on the verge of 'losing his faith' in the pursuit of social science as a meangingful discipline with something to offer back to its object of study, this book has totally rejuvinated my enthusiasm and, as such, I find it hard to recommend it highly enough. Flyvbjerg is far from inscrutable - he falls back on unconvincing Habermasian talk of consensual validity when trying to explain how social research will actually make an impact, and his appropriation of Foucault and Nietzsche as methodological mentors makes me nervous - but for me this only adds to the book's charm. Consistent with the author's argument, no line of thought, not even the positivist search for 'socal rules', is rejected out of hand, but rather "thought through" in the hope of extracting the good bits and throwing out the waffle. And that is precisely how I believe this book should be read - and you definitely *should* read it - except that waffle is refreshingly thin on the ground.

This is a provocative and important book, maybe even pivotal. Bent Flyvbjerg says that he's arguing for a new approach to social science, but I think his thesis is considerably more radical than that: he's effectively calling for social "science" to be abandoned and instead replaced with a sort of applied social practice analogous to medicine and civil engineering, endeavors which draw on science but necessarily go well beyond it.

Flyvbjerg begins by arguing that social science never has been, and probably never will be, explanatory and predictive in the way that the natural sciences are, especially the physical sciences. A main reason is that context and judgment are key to any kind of practical social science, yet they can't be reduced to theoretical terms. The arguments here borrow from the critique of AI presented by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus.

These limitations are fatal flaws for the project of social science modeled on natural science, so Flyvbjerg instead revisits Aristotle's classification of "intellectual virtues" and argues that, rather than aspiring for the virtues of episteme (associated with science) or techne (associated with technology), social science is better associated with phronesis, which is concerned with practical action in particular human situations, and thus deliberately and reflexively brings in context and judgment, along with considerations of values and interests. And because particularities are so important in making practical judgments and decisions, high-quality case studies are an important tool for phronetic social science.

The one element Flyvbjerg finds missing in Aristotle's conception of phronesis is explicit consideration of the issue of power, and he explores the ideas of Habermas, Nietzsche, and Foucault to help redress this. He finds Habermas' aims to be laudable, but his approach to be ultimately idealistic to the point of being infeasible. Nietzsche and Foucault turn out to be of greater value, largely because of their emphasis on contextualizing genealogical analysis.

Flyvbjerg next distills a set of methodological guidelines associated with his phronetic social science framework, and finally illustrates the framework with an interesting case study involving city planning (his specialty) in Denmark.

I greatly enjoyed this book, surely in large part because I tend to agree with Flyvbjerg's thesis and reasoning, and I guess it's not a coincidence that the philosophers he draws on are among my favorites. I also found the book to be well written and smoothly translated from the original Danish, though the chapters related to power were somewhat tough going at times.

Overall, I highly recommend this book to anyone with a serious interest in social science. However, at least a modest background in both social science and philosophy are probably prerequisites, since this is a fairly sophisticated book aimed more at an academic audience rather than the general reader.

Flyvbjerg's genius lies in his ability to tie the past to the future in exploring the relevance of social science. Flyvbjerg starts with the past by using Aristotle's concept of phronesis to connect with the historical value of social science. Social science, the science of human affairs, is uniquely situated to explore phronesis (practical knowledge and ethics). Yet, as Flyvbjerg elegantly describes, social science has fell away from the important concepts of context, experience and intuition. These concepts should be at the core of social science. For too long social science has attempted to imitate the natural sciences in developing context independent explanations and predictions. Flyvbjerg is successful in describing how a social science that no longer attempts to imitate natural science would flourish in the pursuit of phronesis.

Flyvbjerg defends the rational for doing the kind of socially relevant science that I have come to value as a PhD student in occupational science. Flyvbjerg defends my study of social issues, such as health disparities that exist in inner cities, by drawing on Nietzsche, Foucault and Bourdieu in a way that is readable and efficient. He asserts that there is a space for social science to be important, thus the term science that truly matters. By going beyond the attempts to imitate or compete with natural science, social scientists have room to claim their own territory. He essentially leaves the social scientists with a reason to continue believing in the importance of the work they do. He gives social scientists the tools to protect themselves against the attacks of the natural science.

Yet, Flyvbjerg does not merely attempt to defend the current form of social science. Flyvbjerg attempts to correct the flailing trajectory of social science by proposing a methodology for current and future social science research. This methodology is not so much an imperative as a push towards phronesis. Flyvbjerg's proposed methodology effectively shifts the focus of this book from the philosophical past to a practical present. Flyvbjerg gives guidance to the newly empowered social scientist through defining important indicators to create a social science that matters. These important methodological considerations should be part of the decision making process for anyone considering social research.

Flyvbjerg's vision for the future culminates in what I like to think of as a call to arms. He calls on social scientists to take up problems that matter in ways that matter. Once these problems are addressed results must be effectively communicated to fellow citizens. This creates a social science relevant and important that is delivered where it matters the most, to the people. For the social scientist, this call to arms can be as rousing as Mel Gibson's William Wallace in Braveheart. For the survival of social scientists there is only one possible future, making science that matters.