Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East [ハードカバー]

Author David Stahel's book "Kiev 1941: Hitler's Battle for Supremacy in the East" is one of the few ... perhaps even only book in English ... to focus on the battle for Kiev in August - September 1941. I've always found this lack of a proper study of the battle to be surprising, given both the epic scale of the German victory/Soviet defeat and the fact that Hitler's decision to turn away from Moscow in August 1941 to deal with the Soviet armies around Kiev proved to be extremely controversial among his generals and historians of the war. In most works, this battle gets a few paragraphs at best before the run-up to Operation Typhoon, the German attempt to take Moscow.

The book opens with an analysis of the strategic situation for both sides (including contributions by the western Allies) and examines the economic realities for the Germans. He then covers the internal discussions/struggles (both for the Soviets and Germans) that led to the Battle for Kiev. He then shifts into the fighting that occurred from late August until early October 1941. But Mr Stahel doesn't just cover the fighting around Kiev, he covers the fighting over the entire Russian Front (less the fighting in Finland), which is a good decision, as it shows how the Germans were having to frantically juggle their ever diminishing forces to try and accomplish their goals. It also shows that the Soviets were far from passive, and were trying to smash the Germans with significant counteroffensives in front of Smolensk and other places, and the need for troops to defeat these Soviet attacks further strained German resources and depleted their forces.

The author takes the fighting through the liquidation of the final pocket at Kiev and ends with the German forces poised, more or less, to begin Operation Typhoon. I say "more or less" because the fighting was so prolonged and distances to be covered by the German armies so vast, that many of the attacking forces weren't in position at the beginning of this offensive. He also shows that while the Germans won a historic victory, it was as much a matter of Stalin refusing to listen to his military advisors and pull his forces back from Kiev in time as it was the Germans winning the battle outright.

The tenet of Mr Stahel's analysis is that the Wehrmacht was wearing itself out (both mechanically and in terms of blood) faster than it could be replenished during Operation Barbarossa, and that the war's turning point had basically already occurred by August 1941, when the Germans failed to crush the Soviets in a quick campaign, and were forced into a battle of attrition. In a way, this book also addresses some of the criticisms of his earlier work, "Operation Barbarossa and Germany's Defeat in the East", which asked how the Germans could have already lost the war when they later won several smashing victories yet in 1941 at Kiev and at the twin battles of Vyazma and Bryansk, as well as in 1942.

The book is fairly German-centric, and by that I mean Mr Stahel primarily uses German records and reports to show how the Germans were being ground down even as they continued to win victories. There is a good coverage from Soviet side, mind you, but most of the analysis and descriptions are from the German point of view, which is in line with his showing of the steady deterioration of the German forces. There are over 20 photographs as well as 13 maps, most of which are from fellow-historian David Glantz's atlas of maps from the war. While the photographs are good, I can't comment much on the maps, as I'm reviewing this book from my Kindle, and the maps aren't large enough to really see much detail. However, if you're read anything from David Glantz, you're familiar with the layout and quality of these maps, which are generally very good albeit with a few weaknesses.

As the author notes in his introduction, this book can be viewed as a continuation of his above-mentioned book or as a study on the Battle of Kiev. Mr Stahel has an interesting and succinct writing style, and he presents his arguments clearly and persuasively. While I don't entirely agree with him that the Germans had irrevocably lost the war on the eastern front by August/September of 1941 (I personally think the Germans had a window of opportunity into 1942 to win a favorable peace with the Soviets), I don't disagree with his analysis of what was happening to the Germans during this time frame. I greatly enjoyed this book and found his analysis well-done and it added to my understanding of what was happening during this part of the war in the east. Five stars.

What do readers familiar with the Eastern Front remember about Kiev? That it was a massive battle of encirclement that cost Stalin's armies 665,000 casualties. Stahel reminds us that the battle also probably cost 100,000 to 150,000 German casualties, hundreds of panzers, and thousands of irreplacable wheeled vehicles. Stahel's work is first rate because it sheds light on the battle by bringing to light a host of unexplored primary sources - in this case German records at division and corps level. Stahel's exhaustive research into the records of tactical formations rather than higher headquarters leads him to a different conclusion about this portion of Barbarossa than the German Military History Institute's own official account (which depends more heavily on the latter). Stahel's book deals with far more than the battle of Kiev, as he also examines German logistics, personality clashes between German generals (General Guderian, as noted by Russell Hart, seems to really have had a hard time getting along with his contemporaries), and the post-1940 campaign hubris of both Hitler and the Wehrmacht. I was surprised to read that the reason the Germans were not prepared for winter was because they had only produced enough winter uniforms for a 250,000 man occupation force rather than the 2 million plus soldiers who found themselves still fighting the bloody but unbowed Soviet Army outside Moscow as the snows began. I found myself in sympathy with the German soldiers whose contemporary letters were quoted by the author. It is clear that those men went into Russia full of confidence having beaten the vaunted French Army in six weeks. As the realization set in that they would not defeat the Russians before winter, they began to believe that their war would never end. For many of them, that dread premonition would turn out to be true. The book is organized into ten chapters, starting with two entitled "The bulldog, the eagle, and the bear" and "Germany's defeat in the East" which ostensibly provide the framework for the operational narrative to follow. Chapter 2 - "Germany's defeat in the East" was the only chapter in the book that I had a little bit of trouble following the author's narrative. I thought Stephen Fritz's "Ostkrieg" explained the situation and events with a bit more clarity. The remaining chapters are entitled "The Road to Kiev," "War in the Ukraine," "Ominous Horizons," "The battle of Kiev," "Slaughter in the Ukraine," "Visions of Victory," "The calm before the storm," and "Moscow in the Crosshairs." In the last chapter Stahel convincingly argues that although Kiev was a victory for the Germans, it came at such a cumulative price that they had no chance of taking Moscow. A brief conclusion starts at page 345, with notes, bibliography, and index taking up the remainder (113 pages or a bit more than a quarter of the book). The maps are taken from Glantz and are adequate. I felt there could have been a few more photos, but the ones that appeared were also adequate. Highly recommended.

Mr Stahel's new book is an addendum to his earlier "Barbarossa". It has the same style and format of the first book but with an extension of content. The author felt compelled to write this book to fortify his arguments of his first book. Old ground from "Barbaroosa" is renewed then new material on the Smolensk sector is added. To further enhance his position, Guderian's march south, Rundstedt's drive east and Kleist's advance northward to join up near Kiev to trap Kirponos's Front is then covered. The difficult crossing of the southern Dnepr near Dnepropetrovsk will also be included as well as the troubles in the Leningrad sector for this time period. The author is covering all his bases in presenting his arguments.
Like the author's first book, this book has as its predominate theme the command decisions of Hitler, Germany's industrial shortcomings that couldn't adequately supply the front lines, the confusion and discord that was engendered within the German command structure that had terrible consequences for the Germans. He will provide many more examples of the losses the Germans endured in fighting this "successful period" of the war against a relentless foe. If you still weren't convinced after reading "Barabarossa" of Germany's lack of ability to win the war then you should read "Kiev 1941"; there is much more to consider.

Drilling down some, the key points that were brought out in the first volume are reestablished here: The Russians, despite being unprepared and poorly led were able to slow the Blitzkrieg along the Dnepr. Though Hitler made the right choice is sending Guderian to Kiev, much of his overall strategy was haphazard and random. Also playing large is the cowboy tactics of Guderian who cared only for the victories of his 2nd PzG no matter the consequences to AGC. The friction between Bock and Guderian is continued as 2nd PzG advances toward Kiev. Halder's shortsighted and poor planning of Barbarossa plus his impact over the arguments of the Moscow first strategy are also covered. Hitler's overall negative impact on the war effort is frequently visited. Stalin and his obduracy at Kiev is given good mention as well. Mr Stahel uses his vast knowledge of archival material to good use in these areas.
The author points out a number of Guderian events that appeared favorable in the short run but turned out poorly for AGC in the long run. Last but certainly not least that despite the outward appearance of a highly successful advance in the opening weeks, the Russians were inflicting too many casualties on men and machines which the Wehrmacht could not afford or sustain. The Germans were winning battles but losing the war.
Also mentioned: By the end of September and clearly by the end of December when Churchill, FDR and Stalin, the leaders of the three greatest economic powers in the world joined forces, Germany had little chance to win a long war of attrition. That position would be bolstered with the successful counter-offensive in front of Moscow.

I gave this book five stars for the author did a good job of covering material that was within the purview of the book but I have to mention my disappointment for the brief tactical battlefield coverage and analysis that was provided on the Kiev march and encirclement. I knew this book would not be like a Glantz, Zamulin or Nipe book but the series of events that took place in August and September in the Smolensk and Kiev sectors were gargantuan, with far reaching tactical impact and I was hoping the author would add greater depth and a little more excitement to his tactical coverage of Hitler's "greatest victory". Though some of this material will be new for many of us, much of this material can be read elsewhere but the melding of the individual parts of the two books into a coherent thread of thought was appreciated. Though enjoying both books and having gained an appreciation of Mr Stahel's abilities, I would have wished that the material in both books could have been included in just one book. The considerable duplication could have been avoided and the sequencing and organization of material could have been more succinct, making it easier to follow and understand for the new reader.
I will comment on one issue that the author brings up that refutes earlier authors. Its been said by others that Guderian's advance to Kiev was relatively quick and easy and that Eremenko's attempt to stop the Germans went poorly. Though Guderian did reach his objective, his forces suffered heavy casualties and the advance was difficult due to poor logistics, bad road conditions and hard fighting. Also, Guderian had to go back to Bock for reinforcements several times. In the end, his men were exhausted and his vehicles in need of repair and with Operation Typhoon coming up in early October, there would be no real time to recover. The Red Air Force was also more effective in destroying German equipment than what is generally known.

Mr Stahel did a nice job of incorporating many first hand accounts to supplement his narrative. Using communiques and personal, divisional and corps diary entries, the author bolstered key points of his narrative that in many cases also showed the personal side of war.
The brief but succinct Conclusion sums up the war conditions by the end of September and includes how the weaken Wehrmacht will have a difficult time with Operation Typhoon and the taking of Moscow. The author repeatedly shows the strategic weaknesses of insufficient industrial output and manpower. The author also shows the Germans making the same mistakes that over time would cost them dearly. The combined knowledge in both books gives the new or casual reader a big step forward in learning the pros and cons about Hitler's war doctrine, his country and his war machine during the early stage of the war.

Also provided are 13 b&w maps that were created by David Glantz. The style is similar to the maps in "Barbarossa". The maps are very good, highly detailed that show the deployments and course of the battle but some of us will need a magnifying glass to study them carefully. There are also 21 photos. The Notes Section and Bibliography are exemplary and will be of great help if further research is required. An Order of Battle for AGC but not AGS or the Soviets is provided??

I must stress again that while this book is praiseworthy from the strategic perspective and though there are examples of tactical history, this is not a David Glantz equivalent that chronicles in detail the tactical history of a campaign. While a few tactical events like a town falling or a division crossing a river by a certain date are briefly mention, this brief glimpse is not the main theme of the book but only used to give the reader a chronological reference or to point out either a German mistake or an event that cost the Germans dearly through Soviet intervention. The main theme is to convince the reader that Germany, having suffered relatively high casualties in men and machines in these opening months, failed to defeat Russia while she was vulnerable and therefore wouldn't be able to defeat Russia in a long war of attrition.

Mr Stahel's premise for both of his books is that the war will unfold exactly as it did and that the heavy cost in men, panzers, materiale and time of the Smolensk campaign plus the poor state of maintenance of the German heavy equipment at the end of the campaign as well as the low state of morale of the Wehrmacht will be the foundation for how the war will proceed. Coupled to this battlefield scenario is the fact that the German industrial capacity was insufficient to poduce enough panzers, submarines, planes, vehicles etc nor produce enough oil to run those machines or have a sufficently large enough pool of men to replace the large attrition rate to defeat the Russians.
His position does not allow for alternative history to change the outcome of the war. Hitler made many mistakes tactically, strategically as well as industrially that if those errors had never been made could have had a dramatic effect on the war but Mr Stahel doesn't include these possibilities in his equations. To do so would be to elevate his book to a whole new dimension, something like Mr Mercatante's "Why Germany Nearly Won" and that was clearly laid out in the author's "Barbarossa" book as not an avenue he wanted to take.

By writing this second book, Mr Stahel did a good job in bolstering his original position that despite the early victories, the German Army by Sept 1941 with its relatively deep irreplaceable losses in men, vehicles and panzers had lost its ability to win a drawn out war with the Soviets. Mr Stahel provides additional information on the Smolensk sector before expanding the battle zone to include the Kiev sector and even a glimpse into Army Group North's struggle with taking Leningrad and how it impacted AGC. The author also includes coverage of some of the troubles the Army Groups endured in preparing for Operation Typhoon and the non battle costs that the panzer groups paid for executing Hitler's Directive 34 (moving to the flanks). The amount of additional material presented certainly adds to the author's position while giving the reader an interesting strategic overview of this critical period that will have direct important ramifications to the war in the months ahead and indirectly to the years to come.

I know the specter of defeat for the Germans is more noticeable at Moscow 1941, Stalingrad 1942 or Kursk 1943 but the author strives to find the most earliest timeframe, the ultimate earliest time when the Germans lost the potential to win the war and then explains his position. It will take a leap of faith for some of us to accept his argument but the author's two books are fascinating and are still worthy reads.