Kenneth Pyle does a remarkable job in helping his readers better assess the future behavior of a resurgent Japan in fast-changing Asia. U.S. policymakers have been repeatedly wrong-footed in gauging Japan's foreign policy since the arrival of Commodore Matthew Perry and his ships on Japan's shores in 1853 (pp. 10, 67). Think for instance about the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor as an act of economic desperation over the American oil embargo, despite the odds against military victory (pp. 10 - 11, 64 - 65, 135 - 36, 204, 354). Another example is the Yoshida doctrine, Japan's unique Cold War policy that relied on U.S. security guarantees while pursuing mercantile realism, to which American policymakers remained oblivious for a long time (pp. 13, 45 - 46, 212, 225 - 77, 291).
Part of the challenge in understanding Japan is that the country is simultaneously a state and a unique civilization (pp. 13, 49 - 50). Furthermore, Japan has vacillated between infuriating ethnocentrism and remarkable receptivity to foreign influences during its history without ultimately sacrificing its unique culture (pp. 18 - 19, 22 - 23, 58 - 62, 76, 100 - 05, 116 - 36, 176, 239, 245). Finally, Japan has often not done enough to factor in the legitimate concerns of other countries in its "opaque" decision-making process, resulting in some needless frictions (pp. 15 - 16, 229, 250 - 52, 306 - 09, 354).
To his credit, Pyle clearly shows that the Japanese tend to shun radical change in their interaction with the outside world unless the circumstances deprive them of any other option. The difficulty of making change and the rapidity with which irresistible changes occur have often confused foreigners because of the apparent, inherent contradiction in this policy (pp. 52, 76).
Resource poor and a late arriver in the modern world, Japan is among the few countries in modern history which have been especially sensitive and responsive to the forces of the international environment (pp. 21 - 22, 27, 49). As a matter of self-interest, Japan has repeatedly allied itself with the dominant ascendant power (pp. 12, 44 - 46). Modern Japan's behavior is especially remarkable when one remembers that the country benefited from a unique isolation and security for almost all its history prior to the 19th century. (pp. 32, 34). The origin of that astonishing capability to adapt to external forces lies in the legacy of Japanese feudalism (pp. 39 - 41, 59, 62, 84). The same conservative ruling elite has displayed an extraordinary resilience in carrying on the strategic principles of the Meiji leaders, despite the ups and downs in their fortunes (pp. 23 - 24, 43 - 44, 49-51, 194, 220, 225 - 26, 260 - 77, 293, 357).
Pyle spends most of his time covering how Japan reorganized its domestic institutions to support its foreign policy while accommodating five fundamental changes in the international order in East Asia in the last century and half (p. 28):
1) The collapse of the Sinocentric system under the pressure of Western powers taking advantage of a weakened Imperial China in the middle of the 19th century (pp. 34 - 39, 72 - 136);
2) The substitution of the imperialist system for the decade-old Washington Treaty System based on the ideals of international liberalism under the influence of Woodrow Wilson after WWI. The new system was designed to check Japanese expansionism in East Asia (pp. 139 - 54, 159 - 67, 201);
3) The disintegration of the Washington System following the worldwide economic depression and the remodeling of Japanese domestic institutions after those of Nazi Germany in its conquest of much of East and Southeast Asia between 1932 and 1942 (pp. 167 - 69, 172, 183 - 91, 198 - 205);
4) The annihilation of Japan's fascist order and the imposition of a new U.S.-inspired liberal order after 1945 and its evolution during the Cold War. Postwar Japan retooled its domestic institutions to get the most out of the free-trade U.S.-sponsored regime while leveraging the military alliance between the two countries (pp. 205 - 77);
5) The post Cold War transition in Japan following the implosion of the Soviet Union-dominated communist order in 1989. Surprisingly, Japan, at the zenith of its economic power, sank in economic and political torpor, partly due to the absence of a clear-cut new order in East Asia and partly due to the emergence of other economic powers, especially China, in the region (pp. 5, 280, 284, 286, 300). Japan started rebounding from its torpor under the premiership of Koizumi Junichir by undermining the Yoshida doctrine and by engaging in economic and military multilateralism (pp. 291 - 309, 355 - 74).
Pyle consecrates the end of his book to the triangular relations among China, Japan, and the U.S. The U.S. has pursued the same policy in East Asia since WWI: No domination of any power in the region, free trade, and the spread of democracy to preserve peace and stability in the region (pp. 145, 311). The U.S. has developed a mixed policy of containment and engagement with China while strengthening its military alliance with Japan (pp. 314, 333, 348 - 54, 368 - 69). The continued engagement of the U.S. in the region is vital to keep Japan from putting itself in the orbit of China (p. 353). Japan, mindful of its past, location, and culture, has been conditionally engaging China in a way that is somewhat different from the U.S. (pp. 314 - 16, 324 - 36).
The legitimacy of the Communist Party leadership in China is built on strong economic growth (p. 337). If economic growth falters, the Communist Party leadership could be tempted to internationalize its problems by playing once more the nationalistic card that could backfire. Think for instance about fascist Japan in the 1930s and 1940s. More optimistically, the Communist Party could give up power peacefully as its counterparts in Central and Eastern Europe did in 1989.
To summarize, Japan's international behavior cannot be correctly understood without a proper grasp of the tectonic forces that have molded the country's history, geography, and culture.