This is a very special book that will change the way you think about war and U.S. foreign policy. The author argues that in all of the major wars America has fought in the 20th century--World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, and Iraq--U.S. officials have screwed up the endings. Too often do they think more about defeating the enemy (the "day of") than planning for the result (the "day after").
Rose goes behind the scenes, using lots of primary sources to find out what decision-makers knew and when they knew it. In doing so, he creates a compelling case that in each "endgame," policymakers were haunted by the lessons they derived from the last war. Thus, for example, the lessons of Vietnam--don't get heavily involved in faraway drawn-out conflicts--cause the George H. W. Bush administration to bungle the end of the Gulf War and opt for an overly cautious and quick approach that failed to achieve the administration's own goals. George W. Bush's invasion of Iraq was, in some ways, a way to finish the job that his father had left undone. The research the author has done for each case is remarkable, and has the added benefit of providing many amusing anecdotes. (His stuff on Kissinger is particularly interesting.)
The most important contribution of "How Wars End" is its sketching of a grand strategy of pacification that has run through 20th-century U.S. foreign policy. In war after war, the United States has tried to put out fires in strategically important parts of the world. World Wars I and II were attempts to pacify Europe (by solving the Germany problem), Vietnam and Korea were attempts to calm East Asia, and the wars in Iraq were efforts to stabilize the Middle East.
Another thing that distinguishes this book from others is the quality of its writing. Unlike many historians and foreign policy commentators, Rose has a way with words. This makes the book not only eminently readable but also--and this is truly rare--an enjoyable read.
Oh, and there's a great final chapter that deals with Afghanistan, explaining in clear terms the choice the Obama administration has to make. Here, too, the specter of the last war looms large, with policymakers wanting to avoid a Vietnam, but also apply the lessons of Iraq.