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商品の説明
内容説明
The financial collapse of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in 2008 led to one of the most sweeping government interventions in private financial markets in history. The bailout has already cost American taxpayers close to $150 billion, and substantially more will be needed. The U.S. economy - and by extension, the global financial system - has a lot riding on Fannie and Freddie. They cannot fail, yet that is precisely what these mortgage giants are guaranteed to do. How can we limit the damage to our economy, and avoid making the same mistakes in the future? "Guaranteed to Fail" explains how poorly designed government guarantees for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac led to the debacle of mortgage finance in the United States, weighs different reform proposals, and provides sensible, practical recommendations. Despite repeated calls for tougher action, Washington has expanded the scope of its guarantees to Fannie and Freddie, fueling more and more housing and mortgages all across the economy - and putting all of us at risk. This book unravels the dizzyingly immense, highly interconnected businesses of Fannie and Freddie. It proposes a unique model of reform that emphasizes public-private partnership, one that can serve as a blueprint for better organizing and managing government-sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. In doing so, "Guaranteed to Fail" strikes a cautionary note about excessive government intervention in markets.
メディア掲載レビュー
[Guaranteed to Fail] is more multi-dimensional and nuanced than most other books on the bloody crossroads where real estate and banking meet... [The] authors show convincingly that the GSEs' subprime lending was not a noble idea that eventually went wrong or drifted into excesses--it was a fool's errand from the beginning. -- "Financial Times [A] valuable book on how two quasi-public companies became 'the world's largest and most leveraged hedge fund'... A balanced study, [Guaranteed to Fail] rises above a clash between partisans on the right--who call the companies 'ground zero' in the meltdown--and those on the left who blame deregulation and Wall Street excess... Part primer, part policy prescription, the text explains in simple language what these entities are, how they got so big, and why we must fix them. -- James Pressley, Bloomberg News In Guaranteed to Fail, a quartet of New York University professors from its Stern School of Business, focus on the 'debacle of mortgage finance' that Fannie and Freddie helped create, and offer a plan for reform. In clear language, and with plenty of data to support their arguments, the authors provide a concise but comprehensive history of the GSEs--which alone makes their book worth reading. -- "Barron's Guaranteed to Fail: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Debacle of Mortgage Finance, stands out among all the others... [I]t is one of the very few books to focus squarely on the ultimate cause of the crisis: US government housing policy and the role of the two government-backed mortgage giants Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae in giving effect to that policy. -- Stephen Kirchner, The Conversation [T]hought-provoking ... -- Gillian Tett, Financial Times [T]he authors provide a detailed template for reform. -- "The Economist No one can accuse the authors of failing to offer solutions to the problems they so thoroughly document... One can only hope that some trace of the constructive approach of Guaranteed to Fail will inform the ongoing debate in Washington on the vitally important question of the future structure of the U.S. mortgage market. -- Martin S. Fridson, Financial Analyst Journal This book should, without question, play an important role in the policy discussion of how to reform the mortgage market. Its accessible explanation of the GSEs' growth and behavior, and its detail and care in suggesting the direction for housing finance to go--and how to get it there--are its strengths. In terms of audience, the book seems more oriented toward policy discussions than academic ones... As a whole, it provides a useful overview of the rise and fall of the GSEs, and is a worthwhile read for those interested in understanding the recent crisis. -- Daniel K. Fetter, Journal of Economic Literature [T]he scholarly NYU tome focuses on policy mistakes and perverse incentives... The Stern School economists [highlight the] 'race to the bottom' among mortgage lenders ... [who] responded by 'moving down the credit curve of increasingly shaky mortgage loans.' ... Bad lending begat worse lending. -- Robert J. Samuelson, Claremont Review of Books
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カスタマーレビュー
Amazon.com で最も参考になったカスタマーレビュー (beta)
Amazon.com:
21件のカスタマーレビュー
16 人中、15人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
A Thorough analysis of the crisis
2011/4/11
形式:ハードカバー
A key point to note as you read this excellent book is that it is written by not one, but four professors - so, if you are expecting a thriller that explores the nefarious nexus between Washington and Wall Street, you will be deeply disappointed. I, personally, was disappointed there was no end of chapter questions and that the solutions to the non-existent odd numbered problems were missing in the back pages.
Kidding aside, I strongly believe in comparative advantage and we should not expect professors to become Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward or vice versa. The book is very well-served by the academic approach as the authors navigate the reader through economics, finance, history, and public policy issues with ease and eloquence. Fannie and Freddie are presented as two neglected children of abusive self-serving parents (the government and the equity holder) and the entire family has developed some very bad habits. There is a striking metaphor in the book that compares the creation of the agencies and Frankenstein. I was very impressed with the aptness of several metaphors that are interspersed throughout the book. Likening the entry of Fannie and Freddie into the high risk mortgage market to Caesar's crossing the Rubicon is another one worth mentioning.
The authors demonstrate with a lot of patience, that capital, that is supposed to flow to its most efficient use in capital markets unfortunately went to its more levered use. Because of the implicit government support, the typical risk/reward considerations are marginalized and as long as the housing markets boomed, the government took advantage of the agencies to promote public policy without recognizing the cost, and the equity markets enjoyed the benefits of leverage. The cast of the whole show and their roles are examined, as the book looks at various actors including other mortgage originators, MIs and Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs) and their part in the crises.
A well-researched essay on housing markets across the globe and how and why different countries stacked up the way they did during the crisis provides a global perspective. The dicussion of potential conflicts because of Fed's ownership of GSE securities and its important tool for monetary policy, the interest rate is interesting. The reforms proposed in the book, for example the recommendation to set up a system similar to TRIA will provide material to mull over several cups of coffee.
While there are references to corporate governance and implicit signals of government support through the presidential appointees in the boards, the incentive plans of Fannie and Freddie's management and how compensation metrics played a part could have been provided more context.
Despite ample coverage of the housing crisis in the popular press and numerous other publications, this book will still appeal to the student or the "student at heart" due to its well-thought out structure, clever use of anecdotes and analogies. The authors have not been averse to including quotes from a variety of sources to enhance the reader's experience.
Kidding aside, I strongly believe in comparative advantage and we should not expect professors to become Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward or vice versa. The book is very well-served by the academic approach as the authors navigate the reader through economics, finance, history, and public policy issues with ease and eloquence. Fannie and Freddie are presented as two neglected children of abusive self-serving parents (the government and the equity holder) and the entire family has developed some very bad habits. There is a striking metaphor in the book that compares the creation of the agencies and Frankenstein. I was very impressed with the aptness of several metaphors that are interspersed throughout the book. Likening the entry of Fannie and Freddie into the high risk mortgage market to Caesar's crossing the Rubicon is another one worth mentioning.
The authors demonstrate with a lot of patience, that capital, that is supposed to flow to its most efficient use in capital markets unfortunately went to its more levered use. Because of the implicit government support, the typical risk/reward considerations are marginalized and as long as the housing markets boomed, the government took advantage of the agencies to promote public policy without recognizing the cost, and the equity markets enjoyed the benefits of leverage. The cast of the whole show and their roles are examined, as the book looks at various actors including other mortgage originators, MIs and Large Complex Financial Institutions (LCFIs) and their part in the crises.
A well-researched essay on housing markets across the globe and how and why different countries stacked up the way they did during the crisis provides a global perspective. The dicussion of potential conflicts because of Fed's ownership of GSE securities and its important tool for monetary policy, the interest rate is interesting. The reforms proposed in the book, for example the recommendation to set up a system similar to TRIA will provide material to mull over several cups of coffee.
While there are references to corporate governance and implicit signals of government support through the presidential appointees in the boards, the incentive plans of Fannie and Freddie's management and how compensation metrics played a part could have been provided more context.
Despite ample coverage of the housing crisis in the popular press and numerous other publications, this book will still appeal to the student or the "student at heart" due to its well-thought out structure, clever use of anecdotes and analogies. The authors have not been averse to including quotes from a variety of sources to enhance the reader's experience.
10 人中、10人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
The best analysis I have read on the financial crises of 2007-09
2011/8/4
形式:ハードカバー
To my knowledge, this is the best work done so far on the financial crises of 2007-09, which peaked in September 2008 when, days after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were placed in conservatorship by the Treasury Secretary, several of the nation's largest financial institutions became insolvent and either were sold at fire sale prices to healthier banks or went bankrupt.
I have read numerous books on the subject, and reviewed several of them on Amazon, including reviews of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's report, A Colossal Failure of Common Sense, The Big Short, and Too Big to Fail. I have done my own research in primary materials published by the Fed, the GSE's, and dozens of papers published by regional Fed employees and academics around the world and hundreds of blog posts from bloggers of all political perspectives.
This is the best work I have seen. It is concise - in fact, probably too concise - and accurate. It focuses on the heart of the problem, namely the way in which several bipartisanly enacted Federal policies of promoting home ownership turned Fannie and Freddie into "Federal Frankensteins" -- giant, severely undercapitalized, voracious consumers of credit risk that were, by dint of their size and also of biases built into the capital regulations for banks and other financial institutions, so deeply embedded into global financial system that they accounted by themselves for one-sixth of all "systemic risk" in not just the nation but the world.
While focused on Fannie and Freddie, this is not the simple "Community Reinvestment Act" screed that a few have pounded the drum for, and it even goes beyond the intensive credit risk analysis of Ed Pinto and Peter Wallison that has been well publicized. It emphasizes the leverage / undercapitalization of Fannie and Freddie relative to the credit risk, and also explains - not as much as I would have liked - the way in which rules regarding the capital of banks and other financial institutions subsidized demand for ever more Fannie and Freddie paper and thus incentivized their ever deeper push into weaker and weaker credits, to the point where they had subprime exposure - just subprime - equal to 6 times their capital when they went under.
For those who do not find this account persuasive, I will end by quoting one fact that the authors strangely do not use but which I find to be the strongest support for the view that the 1995 policy changes are the wellspring of the crisis; it comes from the Fed's Flow of Funds reports. From 1986 to 1995, the annual growth in US residential mortgage debt averaged less than $200 billion per year; considering inflation and population growth, the rate of growth relative to demand declined significantly over that period. In 1995, when mortgage growth was only $150 billion, the then administration launched its "National Homeownership Strategy" to expand home ownership in which F & F financing played a major role. By 1998, mortgage growth more than doubled, past $300 billion; by 2001 it was over $500 billion, and in 2005, it exceeded $1 trillion. In other words, annual mortgage growth went up more than 600% in that decade. The authors show how most of that was backed by or was held by F & F and how F & F backed or held, in most years, large segments of the subprime volume. This is the best account of how that was a not exclusive, but certainly principal, cause of the financial crises of 2007-09.
I have read numerous books on the subject, and reviewed several of them on Amazon, including reviews of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission's report, A Colossal Failure of Common Sense, The Big Short, and Too Big to Fail. I have done my own research in primary materials published by the Fed, the GSE's, and dozens of papers published by regional Fed employees and academics around the world and hundreds of blog posts from bloggers of all political perspectives.
This is the best work I have seen. It is concise - in fact, probably too concise - and accurate. It focuses on the heart of the problem, namely the way in which several bipartisanly enacted Federal policies of promoting home ownership turned Fannie and Freddie into "Federal Frankensteins" -- giant, severely undercapitalized, voracious consumers of credit risk that were, by dint of their size and also of biases built into the capital regulations for banks and other financial institutions, so deeply embedded into global financial system that they accounted by themselves for one-sixth of all "systemic risk" in not just the nation but the world.
While focused on Fannie and Freddie, this is not the simple "Community Reinvestment Act" screed that a few have pounded the drum for, and it even goes beyond the intensive credit risk analysis of Ed Pinto and Peter Wallison that has been well publicized. It emphasizes the leverage / undercapitalization of Fannie and Freddie relative to the credit risk, and also explains - not as much as I would have liked - the way in which rules regarding the capital of banks and other financial institutions subsidized demand for ever more Fannie and Freddie paper and thus incentivized their ever deeper push into weaker and weaker credits, to the point where they had subprime exposure - just subprime - equal to 6 times their capital when they went under.
For those who do not find this account persuasive, I will end by quoting one fact that the authors strangely do not use but which I find to be the strongest support for the view that the 1995 policy changes are the wellspring of the crisis; it comes from the Fed's Flow of Funds reports. From 1986 to 1995, the annual growth in US residential mortgage debt averaged less than $200 billion per year; considering inflation and population growth, the rate of growth relative to demand declined significantly over that period. In 1995, when mortgage growth was only $150 billion, the then administration launched its "National Homeownership Strategy" to expand home ownership in which F & F financing played a major role. By 1998, mortgage growth more than doubled, past $300 billion; by 2001 it was over $500 billion, and in 2005, it exceeded $1 trillion. In other words, annual mortgage growth went up more than 600% in that decade. The authors show how most of that was backed by or was held by F & F and how F & F backed or held, in most years, large segments of the subprime volume. This is the best account of how that was a not exclusive, but certainly principal, cause of the financial crises of 2007-09.
52 人中、42人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
Response from authors to the claims in book review by "nycreader1"
2011/4/3
形式:ハードカバー|Amazonが確認した購入
On a forum such as Amazon, book readers are free to write whatever reviews they like; but when they completely miss the point, throw in quotes out of context, and mistakenly ignore important sources of data used in a book, authors feel compelled to respond. In response to the review and exchange by "nycreader1", we suggest that readers should consider our clarifications below and also look at what we believe are more balanced and accurate book reviews provided in the Financial Times and Bloomberg:
[...]
The title "Guaranteed to Fail" refers to the fact that the GSEs took on the credit risk of almost 50% of the mortgage market with very little capital. It is also an intended pun as they were for all practical purposes guaranteed by the government.
With respect to the reviewer ("nycreader1")'s points concerning gaps and omissions, we beg to differ:
(1) The fact that the GSE mortgages were higher quality than others is discussed in the book, but unfortunately those mortgages were not sufficiently high given that the GSEs held less capital (much higher leverage), as confirmed by their eventually facing losses in the range of (at least) $200 billion.
(2) The government-sponsored hedge fund reference is only meant to describe their risk taking, with the focus on "government-sponsored" not just on hedge fund, nor to say that they were actually organized as a hedge fund. Their extensive use of derivatives to hedge some of their interest rate risk is consistent with that terminology.
(3) The reviewer's comment on interest rate risk is taken out of context. The book explains how analysts and academics missed the boat by not focusing on the credit risk of the GSEs' holdings and guarantees -- i.e., by not realizing that the mortgages were not sufficiently safe relative to the GSEs' (far too thin) capital levels.
(4) Our reference to the accounting scandals is made in passing and is used just to explain why their mortgage portfolios didn't grow. We are unsure why these scandals should be necessarily have been called "frauds". More importantly, we do make a compelling case that there were portfolio and leverage issues at the GSEs even post-accounting scandals.
(5) We do describe the GSE loan performance. The data used are primarily those of Fannie and Freddie themselves, and their regulator (the FHFA). We in fact went to great lengths to ensure our conclusions were consistent with their own data. We don't "rely" on Pinto's data (which the reviewer claims in a response to a comment) but offer it only as corroborative evidence (see pp. 37-38).
Of course, we had to rate the book to post this review and we have rated it as 5-star, but the point was to convey that we have researched hard on the GSEs before putting this book out,
unlike what the review by nycreader1 (mistakenly) asserts.
- Viral Acharya, Matthew Richardson, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh and Lawrence J. White, authors of Guaranteed to Fail
[...]
The title "Guaranteed to Fail" refers to the fact that the GSEs took on the credit risk of almost 50% of the mortgage market with very little capital. It is also an intended pun as they were for all practical purposes guaranteed by the government.
With respect to the reviewer ("nycreader1")'s points concerning gaps and omissions, we beg to differ:
(1) The fact that the GSE mortgages were higher quality than others is discussed in the book, but unfortunately those mortgages were not sufficiently high given that the GSEs held less capital (much higher leverage), as confirmed by their eventually facing losses in the range of (at least) $200 billion.
(2) The government-sponsored hedge fund reference is only meant to describe their risk taking, with the focus on "government-sponsored" not just on hedge fund, nor to say that they were actually organized as a hedge fund. Their extensive use of derivatives to hedge some of their interest rate risk is consistent with that terminology.
(3) The reviewer's comment on interest rate risk is taken out of context. The book explains how analysts and academics missed the boat by not focusing on the credit risk of the GSEs' holdings and guarantees -- i.e., by not realizing that the mortgages were not sufficiently safe relative to the GSEs' (far too thin) capital levels.
(4) Our reference to the accounting scandals is made in passing and is used just to explain why their mortgage portfolios didn't grow. We are unsure why these scandals should be necessarily have been called "frauds". More importantly, we do make a compelling case that there were portfolio and leverage issues at the GSEs even post-accounting scandals.
(5) We do describe the GSE loan performance. The data used are primarily those of Fannie and Freddie themselves, and their regulator (the FHFA). We in fact went to great lengths to ensure our conclusions were consistent with their own data. We don't "rely" on Pinto's data (which the reviewer claims in a response to a comment) but offer it only as corroborative evidence (see pp. 37-38).
Of course, we had to rate the book to post this review and we have rated it as 5-star, but the point was to convey that we have researched hard on the GSEs before putting this book out,
unlike what the review by nycreader1 (mistakenly) asserts.
- Viral Acharya, Matthew Richardson, Stijn van Nieuwerburgh and Lawrence J. White, authors of Guaranteed to Fail
これらのレビューは参考になりましたか？
ご意見はクチコミでお聞かせください。
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