I loved the documented history this book provides. It's a treasure trove of dates, quotes and important juxtapositions on the development and unwinding of structured finance. I turned the pages and you will too. But in the end, I was disappointed by the author's superficial understanding of the underlying issues. She wants to argue that the banks used clever innovation to exploit big loopholes in Fed and Basel regulations and to arbitrage ratings but she doesn't have a deep enough understanding to truly explain how this was done. As a result, she ends up contributing to the general populations' great misunderstanding of these markets.
Pages 61 to 64 provide one of many examples. She concludes at the top of page 64, "Banks had typically been forced to hold $800 million in reserves for every $10 billion in corporate loans on their books. Now that could be just $160 million. The CDS concept had pulled off a dance around the Basel rules." Regulators and rating agencies aren't that naive! Three pages earlier she notes that the issuer of credit default insurance had to post $700mm of collateral, held as Treasuries, and that the Fed demanded that the issuer either had to have a triple AAA rating, i.e. the capacity to absorb losses greater than the $700mm it posted as collateral, or else the bank had to post an addition $160mm of reserves with the Fed, over and above the $700mm. The logic of this requirement is obvious, either way, someone, the bank or the insurer, had to post at least $800 of reserves. There is a popular belief that AIG posted no collateral but the truth is that while, it in part did not post liquid collateral, it in fact posted the value of its other businesses as collateral. The Fed, of course, took those businesses as collateral in exchange for posting liquid collateral.
Her descriptions of leveraged super senior on pages 96-98 are similarly muddled, incomplete and misleading, greatly overstating the extent to which sophisticated regulators, rating agencies and commercial paper investors failed to understand the issues surrounding these structures. It's akin to a beginning chess player interpreting the games of grandmasters by mistakenly assuming they are boldly trying to win pieces rather than much subtler truly winable advantages. Instead, capital markets are highly efficient. And regulators and rating agencies are far more knowledgeable than the popular press wants to admit. I would suggest going to: http://www2.standardandpoors.com/spf/pdf/fixedincome/082205_levsuperseniorcdosSNAP.pdf and reading paragraph 1.3, "Incentives for the Protection-Buyer in a Leveraged Super Senior Transaction".
In the end, if the value of loans fall far enough, no matter how much you slice and dice the risk tranches someone must eat those loses. The slicing and dicing isn't necessarily the problem but rather the magnitude of the losses. And so, the story is woefully incomplete without also understanding the buying spree of Freddie and Fannie who, when they were not allowed to guarantee sub-prime and alt-a mortgages, instead bought 15-20% of the market with cheap quasi-government guaranteed financing, which drove up pricing. Brokers and banks couldn't have offered homeowners the ridiculous terms they did unless investors stood eagerly ready to buy on those terms. In large part, that buyer was Freddie and Fannie.
For its rendition of history, I would give the book 4; for the more important underlying argument, a 2; and so generously in total, a 3.