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Book Description
"An extraordinarily impressive achievement and must reading for all serious students of law, economics, and organization".--Paul L. Joskow, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts of Technology.
About the Author
Oliver E. Williamson, the author of several books including the acclaimed Markets and Hierarchies (published by the Free Press), is Gordon B. Tweedy Professor of Economics of Law and Organization at Yale University. He is Fellow of the Econometrics Society and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Co-editor of the Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization.
--このテキストは、絶版本またはこのタイトルには設定されていない版型に関連付けられています。
--このテキストは、絶版本またはこのタイトルには設定されていない版型に関連付けられています。
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形式:ペーパーバック
タイトルにも書いたとおり2009年度ノーベル経済学賞を経済における「統治」の議論で受賞した、ウィリアムソン教授の代表的著作である。
著者は市場メカニズムが機能していないことを指摘し、その代替物として組織（単に企業ではない）に注目しており、なぜ企業が存在するのかというコース（企業・市場・法）以来の議論に対してある程度の解を与えた存在として現実経済を説明する上で重要な存在である。
本著の特徴として「市場メカニズムが十分に機能しない」ことを前提として議論をしていることがあげられる。
市場経済が働かない要因はなぜかを基に、市場メカニズムを機能させるために「制度」が出現するとし、どのような考えに基づき制度を形成するのかを議論している。
数学的な分析などに欠け、直感的分析に終始しており、議論の余地が多いのも確かである。
しかし市場メカニズムが機能しないのはなぜかという点に注目し、そこから制度の出現について言及した著作として社会科学内で屈指の引用数を誇る著作である。
以下私なりに本著を読むことを薦められる方々を列挙してみたので参考までに。
・市場メカニズムが現実問題として機能しない理由を知りたい方
・経済学で現実問題を説明したい方
・企業とは何かを経済という視点から知りたい方
・サイモン教授がなぜノーベル経済学賞を受賞したのかに疑問がある方（本著は限定合理性が大きな役割を果たしている）
簡単ではあるが上記に当てはまる方は読んでみる価値があると思う。
本著は著者の数々の論文に基づいており、1985年までの論文を幾らか読んでおくと内容を理解しやすい。
著者は市場メカニズムが機能していないことを指摘し、その代替物として組織（単に企業ではない）に注目しており、なぜ企業が存在するのかというコース（企業・市場・法）以来の議論に対してある程度の解を与えた存在として現実経済を説明する上で重要な存在である。
本著の特徴として「市場メカニズムが十分に機能しない」ことを前提として議論をしていることがあげられる。
市場経済が働かない要因はなぜかを基に、市場メカニズムを機能させるために「制度」が出現するとし、どのような考えに基づき制度を形成するのかを議論している。
数学的な分析などに欠け、直感的分析に終始しており、議論の余地が多いのも確かである。
しかし市場メカニズムが機能しないのはなぜかという点に注目し、そこから制度の出現について言及した著作として社会科学内で屈指の引用数を誇る著作である。
以下私なりに本著を読むことを薦められる方々を列挙してみたので参考までに。
・市場メカニズムが現実問題として機能しない理由を知りたい方
・経済学で現実問題を説明したい方
・企業とは何かを経済という視点から知りたい方
・サイモン教授がなぜノーベル経済学賞を受賞したのかに疑問がある方（本著は限定合理性が大きな役割を果たしている）
簡単ではあるが上記に当てはまる方は読んでみる価値があると思う。
本著は著者の数々の論文に基づいており、1985年までの論文を幾らか読んでおくと内容を理解しやすい。
Amazon.com で最も参考になったカスタマーレビュー (beta)
Amazon.com:
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40 人中、39人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
A classic of new institutional economics
2001/1/12
形式:ペーパーバック
EIoC is a classic work of new institutional economics. In it, Williamson works out his theories of transaction cost economics across an array of interesting economic questions. Most of the covered topics will be of interest not only to economists, but also to lawyers and policymakers. Among other examples, Williamson tackles such subjects as vertical integration, corporate governance, and industrial organizations.
Williamson's core idea is the theory of transaction cost economics. We can analogize transaction costs to friction: they are dead weight losses that reduce efficiency. They make transactions more costly and less likely to occur. Among the most important sources of transaction costs is the limited cognitive power of human decisionmakers. Unlike the Chicago School of law and economics, which posits the traditional concept of rational choice, Williamson asserts that rationality is bounded. Put another way, he assumes that economic actors seek to maximize their expected utility, but also that the limitations of human cognition often result in decisions that fail to maximize utility. Decisionmakers inherently have limited memories, computational skills, and other mental tools, which in turn limit their ability to gather and process information. As he demonstrates, this phenomenon, known as bounded rationality, has pervasive implications for understanding how institutions work.
At the policy level, transaction cost analysis is highly relevant to setting legal rules. Suppose a steam locomotive drives by a field of wheat. Sparks from the engine set crops on fire. Should the railroad company be liable? In a world of zero transaction costs, the initial assignment of rights is irrelevant. If the legal rule we choose is inefficient, the parties can bargain around it. In a world of transaction costs, however, the parties may not be able to bargain. This is likely to be true in our example. The railroad travels past the property of many landowners, who put their property to differing uses and put differing values on those uses. Negotiating an optimal solution will all of those owners would be, at best, time consuming and onerous. Hence, choosing the right rule-which is typically the rule the parties would have chosen if they were able to bargain (the so-called hypothetical bargain)-becomes quite important.
In sum, highly recommended. If so, you might ask, of course, why did I subtract one star? Mainly because of Williamson's unfortunate writing style. Although EIoC is largely free of the recreational mathematics that plagues modern economic writing, which is useful for those of us who flunked Differential Equations, it is very jargon-intensive. Worse yet, much of the jargon is self-created. All of which makes reading Williamson an effort-intensive project. Usually the cost-benefit analysis nevertheless comes out in his favor, but sometimes one puzzles out the jargon to find a rather obvious point that could have been conveyed far more simply. (The business about contracting nodes, pp. 32ff, is a classic example.)
10 人中、10人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
Why hadn't I heard more about this sooner?
2006/7/17
形式:ペーパーバック|Amazonが確認した購入
I was searching for something about comparative organizational forms - such as how is Toyota organized differently than GM and how does this benefit them? - when I found this. After searching around, I discovered that Oliver Williamson is both one of the most prolific writers and one of the most cited. Coase's 1937 essay, "The Nature of the Firm", challenged economists to open up the black box that neoclassical economics refers to as "the firm". Williamson responded by creating a whole new tool box for analyzing a wide variety of relationships called the New Institutional Economics (NIE). This book summarizes the state of NIE as of 1985.
The basic outline of NIE is easy to grasp, but shifts the focus of economics from choice to contract. Contractual man, furthermore, is not the perfect maximizer assumed in neoclassical economics. It might help if the reader knows a little about antitrust theory as it applied in the middle of the 20th century to vertical integration since much of this book is dedicated to showing why that theory overlooked the efficiency benefits. Williamson then applies it to the organization of labor (hierarchy vs. team production), unionization, corporate governance, and finally public utility franchise bidding.
While I respect Professor Bainbridge's experience teaching material this difficult, I personally didn't find the writing so bad as to deduct a star. Yes, it is jargon-filled, but this is a specialist's field. Once you learn the vocabulary, it seems to move along at a good pace without suffering from some of the archaic terminology found in law texts. It contains some rather simple math (which the reader can skim without losing anything of the argument). I especially liked how Williamson diagrams the decision-making process.
If you want to know more about why the business world is the way it is, this book will at least provide a new way of thinking if not the actual answers. It proposes and then offers answers to a variety of puzzles, but more importantly it shows how subtle changes in the analysis framework can yield better answers, which I think makes it worthwhile reading.
The basic outline of NIE is easy to grasp, but shifts the focus of economics from choice to contract. Contractual man, furthermore, is not the perfect maximizer assumed in neoclassical economics. It might help if the reader knows a little about antitrust theory as it applied in the middle of the 20th century to vertical integration since much of this book is dedicated to showing why that theory overlooked the efficiency benefits. Williamson then applies it to the organization of labor (hierarchy vs. team production), unionization, corporate governance, and finally public utility franchise bidding.
While I respect Professor Bainbridge's experience teaching material this difficult, I personally didn't find the writing so bad as to deduct a star. Yes, it is jargon-filled, but this is a specialist's field. Once you learn the vocabulary, it seems to move along at a good pace without suffering from some of the archaic terminology found in law texts. It contains some rather simple math (which the reader can skim without losing anything of the argument). I especially liked how Williamson diagrams the decision-making process.
If you want to know more about why the business world is the way it is, this book will at least provide a new way of thinking if not the actual answers. It proposes and then offers answers to a variety of puzzles, but more importantly it shows how subtle changes in the analysis framework can yield better answers, which I think makes it worthwhile reading.
11 人中、10人の方が、｢このレビューが参考になった｣と投票しています。
Very useful for corporate lawyers
2004/11/9
形式:ペーパーバック
As a lecturer in law and economics I have used big chunks of this book as teaching material. Another reviewer commented on the unfortunate writing style. I agree. Williamson is not accessible without significant effort from the reader, and often unnecessarily so. But he is also extremely enlightening. His analysis on contract governance is brilliant, and I have used his schematics on contract structures in both academic and professional life. I advise lawyers who work in the corporate field, particularly in complex contractual arrangements, such as franchises or distribution agreements, to read this book. It is really an eye-opener on why sometimes contracts fail to work as expected.
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