Defeat Into Victory: (Pan Military Classics Series) (English Edition) [Kindle版]

Awhile ago, I read QUARTERED SAFE OUT HERE, the wartime memoir by George MacDonald Fraser detailing his experiences as an infantryman with the 17th Division of the 14th Indian Army as the latter pursued the retreating Japanese through Burma during the closing months of WWII. He had nothing but high praise for the army commander, Field-Marshal William Slim. This prompted me to purchase and read Slim's own account of the time and place, DEFEAT INTO VICTORY. The two books are a perfect pair for anyone interested in the India-Burma Theater of the war - perspectives from both the top and bottom of the British Army's command structure.
Slim's memoirs, first published in 1956 while he was serving as Governor General of Australia, begin with his assignment to command the 1st Burma Corps during it's desperate fighting retreat from Burma into India in 1942 after the Japanese captured Rangoon. Then later, as chief of the 14th Indian Army, he oversees the regrouping and rebuilding of the force that finally decimates the Japanese invaders at Imphal in northern India, and subsequently chases the fleeing enemy back south through Burma.
One of Slim's most notable characteristics is his evident lack of an overbearing ego. Several times in his book, he makes reference to his mistakes, errors in planning or judgement, and his deficiencies as a military commander. (Imagine that other famous British Field-Marshal of the war, the prima donna Montgomery, admitting such!) Much to his credit, Slim apparently learned hard lessons as he went along, and emerged as the better man and general for it. This, combined with his great concern for his men's morale, health, training and supply, justifies the high regard in which he was held by "rankers" such as Fraser. Churchill was wrong when he remarked, "I cannot believe that a man with a name like Slim can be much good."
The author's history of the Burma war is comprehensive - perhaps excessively so for the casual reader such as myself. His narrative includes the movement of troops as far down as battalion level, which is way more than I needed to know. Because of this, I might have awarded 4 stars instead of 5 had I been less mindful of the contribution Slim's memoir makes to the history of an almost forgotten theater of the global conflict. A keener student of the Burma campaigns is certain to appreciate these details more than I did.
Finally, there is the Field-Marshal's dry British wit, which shows all too infrequently. For example, when discussing his opposite number in the Japanese Army, Lieutenant General Kawabe, Slim writes:
"I did, however, manage to get a photograph alleged to be that of Kawabe. It showed what might have been a typical western caricature of a Japanese; the bullet head, the thick glasses, and prominent teeth were all there... When I needed cheering I looked at it and assured myself that, whichever of us was the cleverer general, even I was, at any rate, the better looking."

Field Marshall Slim, Viscount of Burma, never lets us forget that it is the soldiers in the field that win battles: not politicians in their ivory towers, or generals in their bunkers far behind the action. Slim's theory is that politicians give guidelines for the campaign, and generals provide the training and backup so that the soldiers can get on with their business. He should, when possible, not get in the soldiers way.

This is a marvellous account of how the Commonwealth managed to stem the Japanese tide in South-East Asia. The main part of the book describes how he managed to restore morale and discipline in the army that was so humiliatingly defeated in 1943. That part should be compulsory reading at any management school. His solution was simple: he accepted that the defeat was due to faulty planning of the general staff. He then set out to provide training and equipment to the front-line troops. Since he commanded a multi-ethnic international army, he saw that every unit was supplied according to its own special needs. He even put his own staff on half-rations if any field unit lacked provisions - which usually quickly solved the problem!

As few generals and politicians he understood that war is about individuals and small units - they just add up to something bigger.

Slim could really write, the book is full of small anecdotes and self-ironic humour. When he writes about the actions it is af we were really there in the midst of it.

Finally, and most importantly: the book is totally devoid of any racism or demeaning of the enemy, it is incredibly respectful of his own native soldiers and of the Japanese enemy.

I have always heard that Defeat into Victory - Battling Japan in Burma and India, 1942-1945 by William Slim was an excellent book for military leaders and planners. Despite this, I was resistant to reading this book for several years. Field-Marshal Slim, after all, was a failure. He failed to stop the Japanese advance in Burma and took a shockingly long time to retake Burma.

After finally reading this book, I must admit I was wrong. This book is useful on at least four levels. First, it is a good read on a little known part of World War II. Even if one is knowledgeable about General Stilwell's experience in the China Burma India (CBI) Theater, this highly focused work will provides new and interesting insights on that theater of war. Second, Field-Marshal Slim was forced by circumstances to be very creative is his tactics, techniques, and procedures. It is useful to see how many of these ideas were adopted in modern militaries and how many still might have value. Third, Field-Marshal Slim has some very specific and interesting "lessons learned" spelled out in the last section of his book. Fourth, leadership as applied in combat, in a bizarre multi-cultural environment, and in the disease ridden tropics might be useful for both current military folks and those in business.

It was a surprise to learn about the relatively large number of troops involved in the Burma campaign. Like most Americans, my image is of a few aviation and engineering units and that the bulk of the fighting, to the extent there was any, was done by Chinese units and a handful of "special forces/commando" units. It was insightful to read about the difficulties in mixing the militaries of different nations. The British attempt, largely successful, at outsourcing the fighting to Indian and West African units was meaningful as well.

The use of helicopters and air mobile brigades was one of the many innovations that Field Marshal Slim implemented. The development of riverine forces was also interesting and potentially worth study since the U S Navy has decided to reintroduce such forces based on lessons learned from Iraq.

From page 535 - 551, Field Marshal Slim offers some specific lessons learned based on the Burma campaign. The only area where I think he is less than intellectually honest is his discussion on "Special Forces". Field Marshal Slim rejects the usefulness of special forces, but if one reviews his actual campaign, he seems to be inclined to argue the usefulness of small groups of elite forces that act as enablers of larger amounts of indigenous troops. Likewise, he is adamantly against commando and amphibious troops as "special". His argument is that all troops should be trained to do these types of things though perhaps not to the level that so called special forces are trained to.

Finally, Field Marshal Slim managed to survive in a complex and bizarre multinational environment. It seems as if the United States might be in such situations in the future. Indeed, NATO forces in Afghanistan and Multi-National Forces in Iraq are - while different in detail - much the same in terms of the diplomatic and relationship building that is required of senior military officers.

This is a solid book for a variety of reasons. I highly recommend it.

It has become fashionable inside the business community to laud the efforts of certain military leaders and their emulation as a route towards supposed success. And so we have biographies on Patton and Schwartzkof purporting certain lessons that "business people" can learn from the greats --- though in the case above, the one a prima donna, and the latter achieving the military equivalant of a heavywieght prizefighter beating up a toddler, one wonders what we are learning.

Slim will probably never figure in a business seminar, but he certainly should. He was a person schooled in utter defeat and the lessons it teaches people. These lessons expressed in Slim's downhome, honest self-effacing style are really things that one can imbibe -- and learn a great chunk of military history to boot.

Slim was wary of theory over experience. Even in defeat he tried things first to see if they would work after making plans to implement then. During his retreat from Burma in 1942, he ran a test convoy up the roads with exactly the same wieght vehicles as he would withdraw in the future. This allowed him to see what would happen when he eventually had to retreat down the same road -- the importance of the dry run.

For Wingate fans you will find no blind adulation. Slim rightly recognised from a aerial perpective the waste of inserting men 100s of mile behind Japanese lines, rightfully insisting that they be better used and less expensively equipped as a regular fighting division. In the end he was proved right. A lesson in efficiency planning --- getting the best bang for you buck.

Slim kept a lean chain of command and did away with several levels inside his Army HQ, he refused to have a Chief-of-Staff as had recently been adopted by the British from the Americans. He was able to also cobble together chains of command that may have looked wierd on paper, but worked. His relationship with "Vinegar Joe" Stillwell the ascerbic American General who hated "limeys." Makes great reading. Slim alone in the entire British Command could handle him.

Personal courage was also not found wanting. He was frequently near the front and made it his duty to make sure that he had strong intelligence of the Japanese and a personal respect for them as fighting "insects." Noticably disturbed by Japanese attrocities against prisoners and wounded, he continually uses words of respect when describing Japanese resistance which was fantatical, yet "magnificent." Others, such a Wingate would learn this later in hard lessons.

Besides the fighting, Stillwell had to supply an Army spread over 800 miles of Jungle at the end of supply lines thousands of miles long, with virtually no roads, in some cases only jungle tracks operating as the lines of communication. He did this a large part with American help and British self-sufficiency. But is was Slim's decisions that allowed those best suited for the positions to get on with the business of supply. And where he could not purchase such equipment, they improvised, such as in rivercraft and jute parachutes.

Most importantly he recognised that one can never insist on 100% perfection in battle (nor business),both are adaptive to the situation and one perpares as best as one can, but it is more important to plan for imperfection and dealing with situations, rather than to insist on everything going to plan. Slim knew that the Japanese in Arakan and Imphal would cut off the forward British/Indian Army elements. He made no plan to hold at all places. He realised however that if British troops could pull into tough defensive positions supplied by air that mobile forces striking from the rear would eventually exhaust the Japanese offensive as they outstretched their lines of communication.

Slim has probably the ultimate recipe to maintain espirit de corps: it is well laid out and easy to understand. He identifies it as a common goal that everyone can buy into. He states that the material needs of troops for good morale are "last, important, but clearly last." He realised that fancy weapons, or fantastic incentive programmes can only supplement morale, the cannot built it.

There is also the combat story between the covers and Slim's personal confrontation with his inner being, failure has a way of stripping away a man's defences and forcing him to look at what he really is... and Slim was obviously on the edge at least once. But then he pulls it together and soldiers on... one is enlightened by his honesty and the plain humanity of the man, a trait almost never found in the overt ego-feeding extravaganzas of business and military biographies stocking the shelves of bookstore "Business Sections".

A great biography that entertains with majesty and adventure and teaches us something about the rigours of command and how good leaders lead, without the theory, without the ego -- just Bill Slim, simple teacher from Northern England who found himself a soldier and, through Defeat turned his forgotten Army and forgotten campaign into the western allies greatest Victory....but if the US could come close to producing leaders half as great.

Field Marshall Slim was ordered from Iraq to Burma to take command of the front in the upcoming Burma debacle. Under Wavell first, and Auchinlek later, he retreated with the Commonwealth armies into India, and later on led the allied armies into victory against the Japanese forces.

His writing is clear, concise, and he does not spare himself from criticism, Often after describing an order he gave, or wished he had given, he will go on to explain how his plan was a mistake, and how he should have done it instead. This is precious insight on the mind of the commander. In many first person war stories, we are told what happened, but not why, and when errors are committed, there is always a lot of blame sharing. Here it is different. Slim tells you what he did wrong, when, and why. This is refreshing.

He shows great respect for his enemy, and describes the enemy's gallant attacks and heroic defenses with respect and appreciation for the heroism of the Japanese soldier. He does not fail to condemm the Japanese war crimes.

He exhibits great wit in describing the different attitudes of the Indian, Sikh and Gurkha soldiers. In one instance, after a Japanese attack in Inphal, some Gurkhas had been ordered to bury the enemy bodies. One of these wasn't dead yet, so the Gurkha trooper gets ready to cut the enemy's head off with his Kukri knife; a British officer tells him "Don't kill him!", and the Gurkha answers "But sir, we can't bury him alive!" Episodes like this give a great sense of realism and "being there" to the whole story.

The best book I've read to date on the Burma front.