Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb is a fascinating historical work that reads almost like a novel; perhaps a particularly technical Clancy novel, but a novel nevertheless. It targets a general audience and balances the consequent need for clarity with depth and technical detail, and with great success.
Rhodes starts by taking us through America's Manhattan Project, a subject he dealt with in depth in his earlier book, The Making of the Atomic Bomb. This time he focuses on the political elements of the project and with Soviet espionage. Klaus Fuchs is a major character in Dark Sun; in TMAB, which deals in much more depth with the scientific and technical problems behind atom bomb development, Fuchs has only a minor role. Here the scene switches back and forth between the U.S. and the USSR, where Igor Kurchatov takes charge of the Soviet nuclear program under secret police head Lavrenti Beria.
The early focus on espionage and Soviet work is important in this book; the subtitle, The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb, refers to the political impetus behind the bomb, not the scientific and technical issues. There were formidable technical difficulties in the design of the first hydrogen bomb, but nothing that would warrant the same in-depth examination of basic science that appears in the earlier book. It becomes clear in the course of Dark Sun that the making of thermonuclear weapons was driven by politics, not military need or science (not to minimize the role of politics in atomic bomb development, but that was also the result of extravagantly brilliant scientists pursuing basic and often unexpected research in physics). And much of that political impetus was the result of American shock that the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb as soon as they did, years sooner than American scientists and policy makers believed that they could. Hence the importance of Fuchs and Beria.
Also prominent in this book is Edward Teller. His obsession with thermonuclear weapons seems a powerful force behind American policy development. It's always seemed to me that Ulam was as much the father of the hydrogen bomb as Teller, but Rhodes convinces me that Teller deserves that sobriquet on the basis of his political efforts more than on the basis of his technical efforts. As the making of the atomic bomb was the result of extraordinary scientific and technical achievement, the making of the hydrogen bomb was the result of extraordinary political will. Much of that will was Teller's.
That will was also destructive. The book closes with an examination of the fallout from obsession with the Soviet threat and the way that bomb research was pursued in this country. I think that Rhodes overestimates the costs of the nuclear arms race by misallocating them, and he draws too strong a link between thermonuclear research and America's fraying infrastructure. He also gives short shrift to the case that our obsession with the Soviet threat was almost inevitable and necessary given Soviet behavior and the opacity of their motives at the time. I think Rhodes' treatment of Teller betrays a certain bias. If there's a villain in this book it isn't Fuchs, but Teller. Teller's role in the destruction of Oppenheimer wasn't meaningless and it wasn't an episode of which he should be proud, but Teller wasn't the devil. He was a man motivated by fear, and it was a fear of forces and events he didn't create. Teller was even less responsible for the cold war than he was the scientific father of the hydrogen bomb. I think Rhodes could have found a better villain.
In the context of the book I think these objections are small points; putting them aside, I think this book is very good.