Comm Check...: The Final Flight of Shuttle Columbia [ハードカバー]

I followed the Columbia accident very closely so I wasn't sure this book would have anything new for me, but I was surprised by its depth. The authors are veteran space journalists and were able to get interviews that no one else did. The retelling of how the critical information about the foam strike never got anywhere past a few bobbled opportunities to discuss how dangerous these foam strikes could be is fascinating. Many, many wrong turns were taken by people who thought the worst wouldn't happen, at least not during their hectic workday. A great book and the only book about the Columbia accident worth reading.

I have no reservations in recommending this book to anyone who wants to learn more about the Columbia disaster. This book isn't "technical," in the sense of giving lots of equations etc. Rather it gives a thorough non-technical, managerial, and cultural description of events.

All of this book's sections are well written, and fit into a cohesive whole. There's the required section describing how things unfolded on that awful morning. The authors also describe the doomed members of Columbia's crew, and the unusually long period of training and delays they had to go through to get to space in the first place. This gives a glimpse into the space station and shuttle politics within NASA, and also gives a real human touch to the tragedy. Esp. with details such as Rick Husband's decision to make Kalpana Chawla the flight engineer, helping her to redeem her career as an astronaut after an earlier mistake.

There's background from previous flights to set the stage, esp. the near-catastrophic foam strike on Atlantis, 2 flights before Columbia. This section shows NASA's inadequate response on a past flight, which then leads into the description of the debris assessment team's work during Columbia's mission. I found this section particularly enlightening, and I could relate very much to it, working in a large organization myself. All too understandable, and thus even more frustrating.

The work of the CAIB is described more in broad-brush strokes, since it took place over a much longer period. But its points are well taken. NASA's organization repeated the mistakes of Challenger, despite some very good work on some other safety concerns with the shuttle. The author's give a blow-by-blow account of how Columbia came apart in this section, which is gripping reading.

Overall, I enjoyed this book a great deal, esp. the sections on the work of the debris assessment team, and the account of how Columbia came apart. The authors' epilogue on the need for a vision at NASA is also well taken. Thoroughly recommended.

When Space Shuttle Columbia broke apart over East Texas, the morning of February 1, 2003, the country mourned for astronauts and the space program yet again. Columbia, on Mission STS-107, came apart during reentry just a few minutes away from its scheduled landing in Florida. My first fear upon hearing about the tragedy was that it was a terrorist attack, especially since the mission included the first Israeli on a shuttle mission. That was replaced by the fact that a small chunk of foam doomed Columbia. I listened to as many newscasts, read as much as I could and tried to understand how that small piece of foam insulation could bring down one of the most complex machines ever built.

Soon transcripts were made available of the last few minutes of the flight. Houston finally realized that there was a problem long after veteran observers on the California coast noticed the shuttle breaking apart. Transcripts and data from onboard sensors revealed that the shuttle was burning up, inside out from the heat of reentry. They also revealed that the crew had no idea that anything was wrong.

News started falling off about the loss of Columbia and the crew of STS-107 until I saw a blurb about "Comm Check." Apparently someone had received a pre-publication copy and I knew that I had to get my hands on a copy when it came out.

I read the book in only a few settings. Michael Cabbage and William Harwood, veteran space journalists presented fairly tight storylines from the background of the astronauts, past NASA history (including the Apollo launchpad fire and the 1986 Challenger disaster), a timeline of Columbia's reentry interface, NASA business culture, the accident investigation, findings and a wrap-up. The most incredible portions of "Comm Check" dealt with the investigations and findings and the internal problems that NASA has.

The investigation and their subsequent findings show that the only plausible explanation is that a small piece of lightweight foam impacted Columbia just a few seconds after liftoff and severely damaged (breached) the wing. Upon reentry superheated gases entered the breach in the wing and allowed the shuttle's infrastructure to disintegrate. The authors explained every detail, narrowing the breach down to a specific spar on the left wing. The writing was extremely thorough but not overly complex. High school level readers will be able to comprehend this. Thankfully the book doesn't contain scientific or mathematic equations to explain points - just great, sound writing. One thing that I never understood was the sudden failure of communications and then a return to a stream of (albeit garbled) data. This meant that the systems (at that time) had not completely failed. I long wondered why this dropout occurred in the last few minutes of the mission. The authors revealed that as the wing?s aluminum structure melted, molten globules were flying off and were caught in the windstream. These globules, it was explained, acted like "chaff" from a jet fighter to interfere with the enemy?s radar. The molten globules interfered with the shuttle's communication and data streams. The title of the book "Comm Check? relates to the radio call that Houston used in the last few seconds, trying to reestablish contact with the stricken craft.

The other section of note deals with NASA culture as a business. A few mid level engineers examined video and low-resolution still photos of the launch and were concerned with the shedding of the foam piece. Their request for high-resolution photos from Earth to examine any damage were snubbed by those at higher levels within NASA. These managers were of the opinion "there is nothing that can be done now." The book revealed many complex levels and egos within the NASA community. While the shuttle may never have been able to reenter safely, engineers may have been able to come up with a possible solution but were completely negated by NASA management. The book also showed problems with NASA's operating culture dating back to the 1986 Challenger disaster. A 1996 book by Diane Vaughn (The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA) was heavily quoted. She has shown that in the ten years after the 1986 disaster little was done at NASA. In fact she had recommendations for NASA. They were adopted by all sorts of other institutions but not NASA:

"I heard from many organizations that were concerned with reducing risk and reducing errors and mistakes. The U.S. Forest Service called and I spoke to hot shots and smoke jumpers, I went to a conference the physicians held looking at errors in hospitals, I was called by people working in nuclear regulatory operations, regular businesses where it wasn't risky in the sense that human lives were at cost. Everybody called. My high school boyfriend called. But NASA never called."

The interviews in the book were first rate and were done with respect.

All in all "Comm Check" is a unique read. It is very interesting for those interested in space exploration but also for those who need to look at the struggles with corporate structure. Godspeed to Rick, Willie, Kalpana, David, Michael, Laurel and Illian.