British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878-1915: The Inconsequential Possession (Studies in Imperialism) [ペーパーバック]

It is perhaps unfortunate that the author, who apparently has a warped axe to grind, focuses on the `fallacy' of Cyprus' strategic importance being established upon the British occupation of 1878, since Britain's and other countries' obsession with Cyprus' location is certainly no fallacy, unless Richard the Lionheart, Guy de Lusignan, the Venetians, the Ottomans and the British were just playing tiddlywinks. Whatever the debate within the British establishment, Cyprus was undoubtedly obtained for strategic reasons, as a `place d'armes' to watch over Anatolia and to try to keep the Russians out of the Eastern Mediterranean, as A.J.P. Taylor himself pointed out. It was also kept for strategic reasons, whatever internal debate within the British foreign policy and defence establishment.
Varnava also refers to British `efforts' to cede Cyprus to Greece after 1912. This is fantasy. Britain did not take up Greece's offer of a naval base on Kefallonia in return for enosis. Her sole interest, particularly when it offered Cyprus to Greece in 1915, was to bring Greece into World War One; but because Greece joined Britain late, the offer was withdrawn. Even Venizelos' British `friends' did not return Cyprus, even after Greece joined in the war. Thus, Britain wished to hang on, just as it wishes to hang on to the bases today, and prevent Cyprus from being substantively involved in EU defence structures. Varnava has either not seen, or ignored, the plethora of diplomatic documents and books demonstrating that Britain's essential purpose in hanging onto Cyprus was strategic. In fact, it still is, even if the strategy is now essentially American.
Varnava is also mistaken in his clear disdain for enosis, when he claims that it did not exist in Cyprus in 1821. This is bizarre, given that the Ottomans hanged Archbishop Kyprianos and several other bishops and laymen shortly after the outbreak of the Greek War of Independence, and then indulged in a massacre. Thereafter, and despite the British being less brutal than the Ottoman Turks, enosis was clearly on the agenda, particularly from the 1890s, when the British Colonial Office began to discuss it in its correspondence. Varnavas' knowledge of the most pertinent sources appears inadequate, as does his understanding of the concept of submerged nationalisms. It appears that he is not even aware of Reed Coughlan's superb Sources of the History of Cyprus, Volume X1: Enosis and the British: British Official Documents, 1878 - 1950
Varnava's book comes across as a misplaced effort to tell the world that Britain never really wanted Cyprus, and that enosis was only a late invention, both of which are completely disproved by the documents. This book cannot be recommended, and it is a case of `back to the drawing board', in other words a complete revision.