Anarchy, State, and Utopia [ペーパーバック]

If you have any interest in political philosophy at all, if you are worried about the erosion of individual liberty (and its companion, individual responsibility) in modern society, or (even) if you are a collectivist and actually promote government involvement in our individual lives for the "greater good" at the expense of some or all, you MUST read this book. It is a somewhat difficult book to digest, so others (political moderates or those apathetic with regard to political philosophy) need not even crack the cover.

If you find that you agree with the arguments and conclusions of Robert Nozick, you will be enriched with ammunition for debating political philosophy. If you DON'T agree and you believe that your disagreement is based upon sound philosophy, you will still be greatly rewarded - if for no other reason than you were required to expend some great effort to refute the presented material as you read it.

The major principles presented and defended by Mr. Nozick are as follows:

1) Anarchy is not tenable. 2) A "minimal state" or "nightwatchman state" that only protects the rights of its constituents is justified/legitimate. 3) any state beyond that "minimal state" is unjustified/illegitimate because it will inherently violate the rights of (at least) some of its constituents.

Beyond these major principles, Mr. Nozick also revisits the concept of Utopia in the last section of the text. I found this last section very enjoyable. Mr. Nozick's presentation of the concept of "Meta-Utopia" opened up whole new avenues of political thought for me.

I agree with the major principles of this work as I have stated them above; however, I found that I did not agree with everything presented. I enjoyed the mental exercise required to think through many of the presented topics. I was very pleased to realize the existence of this book and to read it.

Not that it has any bearing on the significance of the presented material, I did find the book to be quite difficult to read. Similar to what many critics and reviewers of this book have stated before, I found the organization of the presented material lacking and the absence of concise summaries of major topics disappointing. I found myself wishing that this were not the case - so that I might glean more benefit from the reading of the book. Also, Mr. Nozick seems too quick to prolifically digress into tangent discussions. Although the topics of these tangent discussions are quite interesting, it is my opinion that, coupled with the organization problem already mentioned, the frequency and magnitude of these discussions detracts from the persuasiveness of the book.

Even with the shortcomings, I feel some great deal of enlightenment and joy after reading this book. Mr. Nozick obviously respects and attempts to understand opposing views to the degree that he is willing to examine them with great scrutiny and then, aptly, present his arguments against them. Since I read books like this one to help me seek answers to philosophical political and otherwise) questions, I found it refreshing that an author would approach (or at least, attempt to approach) such arguments so objectively.

As I said at the beginning of this review, anyone with an interest in political philosophy will find the reading of this book to be time and thought well spent.

Rawls and Nozick were responsible for reinvigorating rights-based liberalism in the 20th century, saving political philosophy from mere in-fighting among utilitarians, and the superstitions of Marxism. Political philosophy since is largely a response to Rawls and Nozick.

This is a work of genius, though it is frequently misunderstood, perhaps on purpose. Most readers, including important philosophers like Thomas Nagel, simply misunderstand the argumentative structure, with the result that many famous criticisms of the book are irrelevant.

Nozick's thesis is that a minimal state can be justified, but a more than minimal state cannot, except under unusual situations.

Part I of the book is addressed to other libertarians, specifically market anarchists (also called anarcho-capitalists). As such, Nozick assumes libertarian rights of self-ownership (or self-governance). Basically, Nozick wants to show market anarchists that a minimal state can arise without violating anybody's rights, where the rights in question are things that all parties to the debate agree that we have. To do so, he describes a scenario in which security companies come inevitably to have natural monopolies over geographic areas. After providing a highly original analysis of the nature of risk and its moral implications, plus a hugely important discussion of side constraints and moral prohibitions, Nozick establishes that such a monopoly would legitimately prohibit other security firms and independent enforcers from operating in its area, provided it compensates everyone involved. The most natural form of compensation is free security. Nozick then argues that an equilibrium will occur in which the security of all can be provided for with an analogue of coercive taxation.

At the end of this section, Nozick, provided the argument is successful (and there are good reasons to think it is not) has established that an agency provided court, military, and police services in a geographic area will arise without violating rights and without the explicit intention of creating a state.

A very common misreading of Nozick occurs here. Many philosophers think Nozick believes that only a state that does arise in this manner and has this form (of a security company with private shareholders) can be legitimate. Nozick didn't think this and isn't committed to it. Instead, what he believes he has shown is both that a minimal state is desirable (it would arise unintentionally as a result of spontaneous order because it is superior to market anarchy) and legitimate. Nozick can then say that this leaves open whether the state will be democratic and in what way.

The second part of the book is meant to challenge arguments for the more than minimal state. It is also misunderstood, even by very smart people. Nozick does not assume libertarian rights in part II, though he refers to them at times. Instead, his argument consists of three factors. First, he primarily addresses egalitarian liberals (hereafter e-liberals). E-liberals believe that rights to personal freedoms (sexual activity, etc.) are justified, but hold that economic activity can be controlled by government decree. Nozick examines e-liberals reasons for wanting a more-than-minimal state (such as a welfare state or social democracy), and debunks them by drawing analogies between the economic activity the e-liberal would regulate and personal freedoms the e-liberal desires to leave free. If the e-liberal cannot identify a morally salient difference, she is forced to either deny the personal freedom, thus becoming an authoritarian, or admit that the economic activity should remain free, thus conceding Nozick's point.

Another style of argument used in part II is what I will call "the liberal presumption" argument. The liberal presumption is that any human activity ought to remain unregulated by laws unless some strong reason can be shown to regulate the activity. (This can be contrasted against the authoritarian presumption, which Mussolini and Stalin held, namely that any activity ought to be governed unless strong reason can be shown to let it be free.) Nozick addresses e-liberals, who hold the liberal presumption, and then attacks the reasons they offer in support of regulating various activities. He shows that the reasons are based on misunderstandings and bad arguments, thus restoring the liberal presumption.

The last type of argument does not rely on this presumption. Nozick addresses Marxists, for instance, who are not liberals. His arguments against them consists mostly of just showing what's wrong with their position. For instance, Marxist exploitation theory crucially depends upon bad economic theory, such as the labor theory of value, something which was shown false back in the early 1870s. (Almost all contemporary economists would agree with Nozick on this. Marxism is to smart people what creationism is to dumb people, a pseudo-science.)

The result of these arguments is to show that the more than minimal state cannot be justified.

Along the way, in part II, Nozick provides us with some gems. He gives the first major critique of Rawls. The critique is devastating, as Nozick points out mistakes in Rawls reasoning (simple logical errors, etc.) that leave Rawls' project ungrounded. Rawls, for some reason, never responded to this critique. Nozick also analyzes envy, and provides hypothetical histories to arrive at the more than minimal state that uncover its nature (it is logically equivalent to system in which we all own parts of each other). He also sketches a theory of justice in holdings to contrast with Rawls, Dworkin, and others. This theory, the entitlement theory, is very rough, but it provides a welcome alternative to simplistic theories maintaining that all there is to justice is establishing patterns of ownership.

Part III is the least often read and least understood part of the book. Partly, it provides a contractarian argument for libertarianism (see Loren Lomasky's article in David Schmidtz' book, Robert Nozick, contemporary philosophy in focus). It thus contains some of the foundations that Nagel claims Nozick lacks (though this criticism is based on Nagel's mistaken reading.) In part III, Nozick asks us to try to construct a system that allows for experimentation and in which everyone, despite their differences, can find a society that allows them to live out their conceptions of the good. The system that best approaches this is a libertarian framework, inside of which non-libertarian communities may be established provided they respect other, different communities. Part III is sketchy, but contains seeds of brilliant things, and it is too bad it hasn't been explored more.

Overall, I would say that the argument of part I is the weakest, part II is the strongest, and part III the most interesting and ripe with philosophical potential.

If you care about political philosophy, you owe it to yourself to read this book. You also owe it to yourself to understand it. If you find yourself thinking Nozick is making a dumb mistake or begging the question, you've misunderstood. But you'll be in good company.

This book is one of the most unusual in the history of political philosophy, and perhaps one of most brilliant. The author's ideas are thought-provoking and highly original, and he asks the reader to consider arguments, rather than engaging in a "diatribe to convince" (my words here). The author creates a reading atmosphere of intellectual honesty, and this helps to soften the possible uneasiness that some readers might feel in encountering these kinds of arguments for the first time. Some may seem radical and unpalatable for readers of other political persuasions, but any reader who is open to new ideas should find the reading highly interesting. The political philosophy of libertarianism finds its best apology here, but the contents of the book, and the method of presentation will and has found application to other political philosophies, and to legal philosophy.

In the first chapter, the author asks the reader to consider what he calls the "state-of-nature theory". This (Lockean) notion, although archaic in the author's view, allows one to answer whether a state would have to be invented if it did not exist, this being a classical question in liberal political philosophy. The chapter is a detailed justification for pursuing the state-of-nature theory. He holds to the premise that one can only understand the political realm by explaining it in terms of the nonpolitical. He thus begins with the Lockean state of nature concept and uses it to build a justification for the state in the rest of the book.

Most of the discussion in part 1 of the book revolves around the "dominant protective association" in a given geographical area. The author then builds on this in an attempt to justify from a moral perspective "the minimal state". Along the way, one reads about the "ultraminimal state", which has a monopoly over the use of force except that necessary for immediate self-defense, but will not provide protection to those who do not purchase it. The author discusses the tension that arises between the ultraminimal state and those who decide not to participate in it. The game-theoretic, optimization-theoretic approach that the author takes, although not advanced and rigorous from a mathematical standpoint, is very straightforward to follow for those not familiar with the more analytical and formal aspects of many modern treatments of political science.

In part 2 the author attempts to deal with alternatives to the minimal state, such as those proposed by the political philosopher John Rawls, and incorporating the doctrine of "distributive justice". The entitlement-welfare state dialog has not abated in modern political debate, and those who desire an in-depth analysis of these debates will find it in this book. And again, game-theoretic analysis comes into play, although not from a rigorous mathematical standpoint. One of the more interesting discussions in this part concerns the right of individuals to leave a state that they find too compulsory. If a compulsory distribution scheme is the most important, why would a state permit this emigration? Would such an overidding principle of compulsory distribution also permit forced immigration? These are the kinds of questions that the author addresses in the book, and some are left solely for consideration by the reader.

Reader who desire a list of platitudes and endless arguments supporting libertarianism will not find them in this book. Readers though who are not concerned with their political and cognitive equilibrium disturbed will enjoy immensely this book. If it can assist in more careful individual consideration of accepted political doctrine and moral cliches, it has done its job.

...and indeed it has.